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This project offers a fundamental rethinking of the origins of the imperial
presidency, taking an interdisciplinary approach as perceived through the interactions of
the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government during the 1930s, 1940s,
and 1950s. In light of the end of the Cold War and twenty-first century recurrence of the
imperial presidency after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the original thesis proposed by
historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. in The Imperial Presidency and other works based on
the periodization of the Cold War is in need of updating.
By utilizing legal theories, political science models, and historical analysis, this
project creates a more complete concept of how governmental players and bodies
interacted in the post-World War II United States, creating an environment conducive to
the construction of an imperial presidency in the future and de-centering the executive
overall. A combination of legal realism, rhetorical analysis, the two presidencies theory,
rally effect concepts, and political models such as the attitudinal model, cue theory, and
distributive politics take this project beyond a simple historical study by focusing on the
background, mindset, and behavior of political actors involved, not just their documents.
Tying all of this together, I argue, is the concept of continuous warfare, a liminal
zone of political malleability between traditional peace and traditional war, which

governmental actors utilize for their purposes, prerogatives, and agendas. Stretching
beyond the Cold War and into the present day, the ambiguous nature of continuous
warfare systematically persuaded Congress and the Supreme Court of the United States to
give up their governmental checks on the Commander in Chief during the forties and
fifties. This perpetual imbalance of power creates a sturdy structure that might house an
imperial president. Additionally, the American people, manipulated by governmental
actors within the allowances of continuous warfare, came to accept this liminal zone as a
new version of “peace” in the United States, creating the illusion of safety and security, a
“house of peace.” The American public’s willingness to accept continuous warfare under
the pretense of peace reinforced the structural imbalance of power that continues to house
a strong executive.

Copyright by
Katherine Elizabeth Ellison
2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In President Harry S. Truman’s memoirs, he noted that “Within the first few
months I discovered that being a president is like riding a tiger. A man has to keep riding
or be swallowed.” In my own experience, I quickly discovered that writing a dissertation
has much of the same thrilling fear as Truman’s take on the presidency. One simply has
to keep writing, no matter the other distractions, pitfalls, or bumps that occur along life’s
road. Many people and organizations made my own personal “tiger ride” as smooth as
possible.
Foremost, my advisor Dr. Ed Martini provided valuable insight well beyond the
dissertation writing process. Though my topic was at times a learning experience for us
both, Martini never failed to give constructive criticism, hopeful praise, and lend
direction throughout this project’s inception and completion. Beyond this, I could not
have asked for a more ambitious, talented, and all around good guy to be my advisor,
serve as a role model, and guide me through the seemingly perpetual turmoil of
academia. For this, I am deeply grateful.
Along with Dr. Martini, the other members of my dissertation committee, Drs.
Mark Hurwitz, Kathleen Donohue, and, Sally Hadden helped to create a perfect forum for
the interdisciplinary nature of this project. In particular, Dr. Donohue inspired me not
only to continue my graduate education but also to take an interest in the activities of
government due to her own research on executive power. Although I never had the
ii

Acknowledgements—Continued
pleasure of taking a course taught by Dr. Hadden, our interactions during this project and
beyond, have left me in awe of her almost imperceptible ability to move between the
fields of law and history amongst many others. Her critiques continually posed questions
that helped to make this project whole. Finally, Dr. Hurwitz allowed me the opportunity
to expand my historical viewpoint to the very closely related field of political science,
public law in particular. Dr. Hurwitz’s perspective helped me to see the holes in my
historical analysis and better understand how the Court and government operate.
Beyond my committee, I would like to thank my officemates over the last five
years, Chris Jannings, Francis Bonenfant, Bill Watson, Samantha Steele, and Adam
Quigley for providing, not least of importance, entertainment, encouragement, and a
sometimes-necessary escape from the rigors of academe. Along with the 4419 crew, I
owe a debt of gratitude to the Western Michigan University Department of History for
providing me with a home for my doctoral study, an opportunity to grow as a student and
teacher, and the funding for many of my supplies and excursions that made this project
possible.
Additionally, the staff and librarians of the Harry S. Truman Library and
Museum, Library of Congress, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, University of
Kentucky Special Collections, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law,
Special Collections and Rare Books at the Tarlton Law Library, and Franklin D.
Roosevelt Presidential Library deserve thanks for their help in finding documents and

iii

Acknowledgements—Continued
hauling endless cartloads back and forth to the research room for my use. A special
mention must go to the Truman Library, which provided a generous research and travel
grant to help defray the costs of my trip to Independence, Missouri in search of the
foundations of the imperial presidency. Likewise, the Graduate College at Western
Michigan University, including especially Dr. Julie Nemire, helped this extensive project
get underway and reach completion through the Gwen Frostic Dissertation Fellowship,
two graduate research grants, and a Dissertation Completion Fellowship.
Lastly, my parents Mary and Allen Temple, my father-in-law Terry Ellison, my
friends Adam Engel and John Byczynski along with many other friends and family have
provided endless moral and financial support throughout my education for which I could
never thank them enough. Most of all, my husband Phil never failed to play devil’s
advocate or lend a well-thought out opinion about my work. His constant
companionship, encouragement, and unconditional love were key factors in my sanity
over the last several years. His own daily work in the legal world provided additional
insight and humor that helped to break up the monotony of historical research. I look
forward to beginning our life post-student, finally!

Katherine Elizabeth Ellison

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................

ii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................

viii

CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................

1

The Executive as Architect ................................................................

5

Previous Residences...........................................................................

9

Building a House of Peace .................................................................

14

The Many Rooms ...............................................................................

16

Breaking Ground ................................................................................

24

I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: FROM ROOSEVELT TO
TRUMAN ...................................................................................................

26

Skillset................................................................................................

33

Management Style .............................................................................

60

Knowledge of Foreign Affairs ...........................................................

68

US-Soviet Relations ...........................................................................

95

Conclusion .........................................................................................

107

II. POURING THE FOUNDATION: CONTINUOUS WARFARE AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF ........................................................................

109

Fuzzy Language and the Twilight Zone ............................................

113

US-Soviet Discord .............................................................................

123

v

Table of Contents—Continued
CHAPTER
The Atomic Bomb..............................................................................

136

The National Security State ...............................................................

145

Conclusion .........................................................................................

172

III. INSTALLING THE FLOOR: THE END OF CONGRESSIONAL WAR
POWER.......................................................................................................

174

Isolationists and Interventionists........................................................

181

Congress and World War II ...............................................................

189

Delegating Power to the Executive ....................................................

195

Truman and the Congress ..................................................................

205

The Benefits of Undeclared War .......................................................

214

Votes and Appropriations for the Korean War ..................................

221

Wartime Industry and Congressional Districts ..................................

226

Conclusion .........................................................................................

236

IV. FRAMING THE WALLS: WAR AND JUSTICE ON THE SUPREME
COURT .......................................................................................................

239

The Judicial-Executive Relationship .................................................

244

Historical Precedent and the Two Presidencies .......................

244

Presidential Appointment and the Attitudinal Model ...............

250

Packing the Court and Presidential Prestige ...........................

253

Curtiss-Wright and Cue Theory ................................................

260

vi

Table of Contents—Continued
CHAPTER
The WWII Rally Effect ..............................................................

264

Personal Relationships and the Problem of Judicial Papers ...

267

Executive Power Case Studies ...........................................................

274

Korematsu v. United States .......................................................

274

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company et al. v. Sawyer ..............

286

Conclusion .........................................................................................

319

V. MOVING IN: EISENHOWER’S HOUSE OF PEACE .............................

320

Eisenhower as President ....................................................................

329

The Atoms for Peace Program ...........................................................

336

Congress and the New Look ..............................................................

348

Keeping the Peace ..............................................................................

360

Conclusion: Move In Day ..................................................................

373

EPILOGUE: THE MODERN HOUSE OF PEACE ...............................................

376

APPENDICES
A. Illustrations .................................................................................................

381

B. Tables ..........................................................................................................

391

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................

395

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FDR

Franklin D. Roosevelt

HST

Harry S. Truman

APP

The American Presidency Project

DDEL

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
EP

Eisenhower Papers

PP

Records as President

PSF

President’s Secretary’s Files

WHCF

White House Central File

FDRL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
FFP

Papers of Felix Frankfurter

OCP

Oscar Cox Papers

RP

Roosevelt Papers

FRUS

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States

HSTL

Harry S. Truman Library
AP

Dean Acheson Papers

CP

Clark M. Clifford Papers

TP

Truman Papers

CLP

SMOF

Staff Member and Office Files

WHCF

White House Central File

PSF

President’s Secretary’s Files
Tom C. Clark Papers
viii

Bomb Coll.
LOC

Atomic Bomb Collection
Library of Congress

SP

Harlan Fiske Stone Papers

DP

William O. Douglas Papers

JP

Jackson Papers

TLL

Tarlton Law Library
Clark Papers

Tom C. Clark Papers

University of Kentucky Special Collections
Reed Papers

Stanley Forman Reed Papers

Vinson Papers

Frederick Moore Vinson Papers

ix

INTRODUCTION
“Carry the battle to them. Don't let them bring it to you. Put them on the defensive. And
don't ever apologize for anything.”
--President Harry S Truman1

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Americans awoke to televised horror as
they learned that terrorists, with a plot to use jetliners as missiles, had attacked the United
States. The live television image of a Boeing 767 careening head on into the South
Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City burned into the American psyche,
leaving the average person scared, worried, and most of all, confused. Americans had
come to take the relative peacefulness of American life for granted, as 9/11 was the first
time in sixty years that the United States had experienced an act of war on home soil. 2
As an eerie silence settled in the skies over the United States, Americans braced
themselves for war.
In this time of extreme emotional duress, Americans turned to their president,
their Commander in Chief, to lead them through the haze, to explain how this could
happen in a time of peace in the United States and in the twenty-first century. In a
televised address that evening, President George W. Bush, having served less than eight
months in office, noted, “Our first priority…is to take every precaution to protect our

1

New York Times (September 20, 1964).

2

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 4, 293. See also: Richard B. Bernstein, Out of the Blue: A
Narrative of September 11, 2001 (New York: Times Books, 2003); Gregory J. Sidak, “Price of Experience:
The Constitution after September 11, 2001,” Constitutional Commentary 19, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 37-62.

1

2
citizens at home and around the world.”3 In his folksy style, Bush thoroughly melded the
nation with the American concept of home. Speaking of the 9/11 victims as “moms and
dads” and “friends and neighbors,” Bush relayed how terrorist attacks might shake the
foundations of the biggest buildings but “they cannot touch the foundation of America.”4
The American home, one filled with peace since Pearl Harbor in 1941, was
suddenly under attack by unknown enemies, yet President Bush sought to reassure
Americans that their house was, and would, remain standing. A house—the home—had
always served as the ultimate symbol of the American dream and as a representation of
safety and security for all Americans. 5 At the end of his speech, Bush reflected this
mindset when he asked for prayers, for those whose “safety and sense of security had
been threatened.”6 Historian Elaine Tyler May commented on this American home
metaphor during a time of war in Homeward Bound, noting, “The self-contained home
held out the promise of security in an insecure world.”7 However, the events of
September 2001 were well beyond the threats of the Cold War and pressure of sudden
nuclear annihilation on which May focused, leaving twenty-first century Americans to
wonder about their future safety in a suddenly war-wracked country.

3

George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” September 11, 2001, The
American Presidency Project, accessed January 26, 2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index
.php?pid=58057&st=&st1=#axzz1kamWYRRF. American Presidency Project hereafter cited as APP).
Emphasis added.
4

Bush, “Address to the Nation.”

5

Merriam-Webster defines a house as both a building that serves as living quarters and a
protective shelter or refuge. This definition is synonymous with “home.”
6

7

Bush, “Address to the Nation.”

Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York:
BasicBooks, 1988), 3.

3
War was the one threat that had largely managed to leave the United States
untouched at home with the exception of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. One reason why these events were so traumatizing
for Americans was the direct impact they had on the perceived safety of the American
home. After the 9/11 attacks, Bush proclaimed that the new “Department of Homeland
Security” would “give law enforcement the additional tools it needed to track down terror
here at home.”8 Warfare had never been a comforting idea. A war on American soil
stood in opposition to the very concept of home as a place of safety and security, a place
of peace.
However, for the past sixty-seven years, Americans have been embroiled in a war
that managed to let them feel largely comfortable, safe, and at peace at home. Historian
Michael Sherry argued in In the Shadow of War that a culture of war has indoctrinated
Americans since the 1930s. Sherry claimed that warfare so much surrounded Americans
that war became acceptable as a general part of American life. “War’s shadow hung over
the nation,” Sherry noted, “but its substance was hard to grasp.”9 Legal scholar Mark
Tushnet noted that modern war was a “condition” not a state of things, a “more-or-less
permanent condition,” suggesting warfare went far beyond the traditional parameters of

8

George W. Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” September 20, 2011, APP. Emphasis added.
9

Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1995), ix. For more on the recognition of American cultural infatuation with war,
see also Mary L. Dudziak, Wartime: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford, 2012);
Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2010); Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War
(New York: Oxford, 2006).

4
the battlefield.10 How was it possible that Americans, so threatened by attacks at home,
would embrace war, the preeminent concept of danger to their home, wholeheartedly?
The answer lay in the fuzzy nature of the liminal zone between traditional war and
traditional peace that Americans had come to accept since the late 1940s. This condition
led Americans to believe they were living in an era of peace while political actors within
the government—legislators, judges, and even presidents—quietly manipulated the
concept of war beyond what they told to the public, in order to fulfill personal political
agendas. In 1945, President Harry Truman initiated the beginning phase of this
“continuous war.” This war was nontraditional in nature, formulated from ideas,
concepts, and words that undergirded all future traditional armed conflicts and periods of
relative peace. Continuous warfare provided a “twilight phase” between traditional peace
and war where the horrors of war subsided but the associated executive and governmental
powers did not.
Truman and other presidents concealed this condition by building around it a
“house of peace.” The outward appearance of peace, promulgated through covert
activities, fuzzy language, and federal subservience to the executive throughout the 1940s
and 1950s, helped Americans, unknowingly, embrace the idea of warfare. While the
Cold War eventually overshadowed continuous warfare until the fall of the Soviet Union
in the early 1990s, this state of war continued until the present day, cloaked by political
language and actions that suggested a greater desire for peace than war. Taking this
understanding at face value, Americans were at home, safe, and comfortable in the
government’s house of peace.
10

Mark Tushnet, “Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties During Wartime,”
Wisconsin Law Review 2003, no. 2 (2003): 279.

5
Like any home that might last for decades, the building of this house of peace
included a sturdy underlying structure. Just as traditional homes are set on a firm
foundation, with strong walls, and secure roof, the government constructed the house of
peace with similarly well-founded political elements. This governmental structure would
come to house an increasingly strong executive with the possibility of generating imperial
presidents.
The Executive as Architect
Executive power itself has been a topic of debate in the United States since the
formation of the constitutional government in 1789. Given the United States’ foundation
in republican virtue, separated power, and democratic principles, it was reasonable that
Americans had (and have) an innate suspicion of any person holding such a powerful
office as that of president. It was this suspicion that maintained the pressure on
established governmental checks, the separation of powers that allowed the United States
government to continue to function. However, if this suspicion is set aside and the
checks weakened or neglected, there is potential for a disruption in the balance of powers.
This disruption would cause the power of the Federal government to become unbalanced
between the three branches, giving more power to one branch over the other two. The
most dangerous situation for the country is when the power shifts toward a strong
executive with the possibility of a single tyrant controlling the nation by his personal
prerogatives.
However, not every powerful president was or might be a danger to the United
States. The very nature of executive power was malleable so that the president could
have more power in certain situations, such as times of war. During warfare, the

6
president gains more power through his constitutionally sanctioned role as Commander in
Chief.11 In this position, he controls the nation’s military and militias, and the people
recognize him as the protector of this American home.
Though the president retains his role as the head of the American military even
without warfare, the power commensurate with the role of the Commander in Chief is
directly related to war. The Framers of the Constitution meant for this unique power to
be temporary, redistributed once the conflict was over. Nevertheless, some presidents
have gone beyond their constitutional role, usurping power from the other branches in
order to accomplish their agendas.12 When this usurpation goes unchecked by members
of Congress and the US Supreme Court, the presidency is out of control and might
become imperial.
Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. first recognized this scenario in his 1973 book,
The Imperial Presidency. Schlesinger contended, “When the constitutional balance is
upset in favor of presidential power and at the expense of presidential accountability, the
presidency can be said to become imperial.”13 Schlesinger’s work was poignant and
11

Article 2, Section 2 states: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States…” U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.
12

Things such as executive orders, signing statements, and executive decrees fit here and set no
constitutional precedent. Historically, there has been much debate over how much power the Framers
intended to grant the president through the CINC Clause. Major arguments include: 1) The Framers were
purposely vague so the president could assume any powers he needed in an emergency situation (including
future situations, like nuclear war, that the Framers could not have actually predicted), 2) the Constitution
grants purposely limited power to the president only through control of the military troops with Congress
having the real power to “make war”, and 3) the CINC Clause gives the president war-making power
through his control of the troops and Congress’ war power is merely a technicality. While nearly every
book on executive power includes some discussion of these arguments, an in-depth discussion of these
issues can be found in Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1995).
13

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company,1973; reprint, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), ix (page citations are to the reprint
edition).

7
timely, recognizing that Richard M. Nixon was the epitome of an imperial president.
According to Schlesinger, Nixon’s ability to abuse the power of the presidency
supposedly came from years of Cold War, which extended the emergency situation and
with it, the power of the president as Commander in Chief. “The Cold War, by
generating a climate of sustained and indefinite crisis, aborted the customary reversion of
power to the coordinate branches. The most visible sign of growing presidential
imperialism was the transfer of the power to go to war from Congress to the executive,”
noted Schlesinger.14 Despite Schlesinger’s conclusion about Nixon’s presidency and the
eventual termination of the Cold War, the imperial presidency reappeared in full force
during the twenty-first century.15
The explanation for this return of the imperial presidency was not the Cold War,
as Schlesinger originally contended, but continuous warfare—a phase between traditional
peace and traditional war that started after World War II and continued to the present.
While historians often overlooked Harry Truman’s accomplishments by contrasting them
with Franklin Roosevelt’s achievements, it was under Truman’s leadership that the
presidency changed and the circumstances of modern warfare and the state of continuous

14

15

Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency, xv.

George W. Bush has been cited as another imperial president who falls outside the timeframe of
the Cold War. For more on this, see: Charles Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and
the Subversion of American Democracy (New York: Little, Brown, 2007); Jane Mayer, Dark Side: The
Inside Story of how the War on Terror turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday,
2008). Not knowing what to do about the disconnect between the end of the Cold War and George W.
Bush’s presidency, Savage argued that Vice President Dick Cheney was the link between Bush and Richard
Nixon. For Savage, it was Cheney (who acquired his first White House job during Nixon’s presidency)
who worked to rebuild the imperial presidency after its collapse, only resurrecting it once he was vice
president under George W. Bush. Mayer’s focus neglected a connection to the Cold War specifically, but
did relate the foreign relations nightmare of torture to Bush’s rise to power. She argued that a misconstrued
understanding of Bush’s presidential power as Commander in Chief allowed his staff to circumvent legal
restraints on his actions.

8
warfare created a structure for imperial executive power that was lodged in the house of
peace.
While Truman was not an imperial president, he laid the groundwork for the
unstoppable executive power that would override the power of Congress and the court for
future presidents. Despite Roosevelt’s command of the executive branch, the power he
used would have been, theoretically, restored to the other branches of government after
World War II concluded, restoring the balance intended by the Framers of the
Constitution. Roosevelt did not live to see World War II end, however, leaving Truman
to keep his power in the only way he knew possible: his inherited role as a wartime
Commander in Chief. Prior to this point, the power of the Commander in Chief was
temporary, with presidents only utilizing this role during periods of war when command
of the military was necessary.16 The Roosevelt-Truman switch in 1945, the first use of
the atomic bomb, US-Soviet hostilities, and the creation of the National Security State all
coalesced to create a state of continuous warfare, and with its heightened security, the
illusion of peace.
In Building A House of Peace: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the
Framework for Executive Power I argue that the convergence of continuous warfare,
relinquishment of congressional power, and judicial neglect in the period from 1941
through 1960 marked the origin of the imperial presidency. This combination of factors,
cloaked by demonstrations of peace by political actors unwilling to give up the profits of
16

Franklin Roosevelt specifically told those around him in the White House to start calling him
Commander in Chief as opposed to Mr. President once the United States became formally involved in
World War II. Likewise, George W. Bush began referring to himself as Commander in Chief in executive
signing statements and domestic policy after September 11, 2001. As an example, see: George W. Bush,
“President’s Statement on the Intelligence Authorization Act, 2005,” December 23, 2004, White House,
accessed January 11, 2013, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/12/200412236.html.

9
warfare, subsequently created an underlying structure for executive power, applicable in
the present day. This approach moves the discussion of presidential power outside of
Schlesinger’s Cold War framework and seeks to de-center the executive, instead focusing
on the legislature and judiciary that allowed presidential power to increase independent of
a strong individual, sometimes culminating in an imperial president. Though not all
presidents have chosen to utilize the full limit of this power, the underlying structure, the
house of peace, remained intact to conceal presidential prerogatives.
Previous Residences
The scholarship dealing with executive power in the American presidency has
developed steadily throughout the existence of the United States. Early scholarship
stemmed from the presidency as defined by the Constitution and included such
documents as the Federalist Papers, which first sought to clarify the powers of the
president.17 In “Federalist No. 69” Alexander Hamilton set out to define the powers of
the president compared to those of the King of Great Britain and the Governor of New
York. “This [Hamilton’s explanation] will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness
of the representations which have been made in regard to it [executive power],” Hamilton
claimed in “Federalist No. 69,” already contending with conflicting ideas about the role
of the president as early as 1788.18 This initial debate over the role of America’s chief
executive continued as the office developed from one president to the next, but as the

17

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers (New York: 17871788). See, in particular, “Federalist No. 67-69, 71-77.”
18

Hamilton, “Federalist No. 69,” in The Federalist Papers, Library of Congress, accessed October
3, 2012, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html. (This edition of The Federalist Papers
hereafter cited as FP, Library of Congress hereafter cited as LOC).

10
position of president became synonymous with the man serving in the office, beginning
with President William McKinley in 1897, the scholarship expanded.19
By the twentieth century, scholarship concerning executive power clearly dealt
with the constitutional grant of power or executive power as defined by the individual in
the office. One example of this early individualistic scholarship is political scientist
Richard E. Neustadt’s Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents.20 In this work,
Neustadt claimed, “The search for personal influence is at the center of the job of being
President.”21 The focus of Neustadt’s text was on individual presidents and the
individual skills, techniques, and personality quirks that made them effective, powerful
presidents.22 These things included professional reputation, presidential prestige, and
ability to persuade, with each dependent on the individual in the office. For Neustadt and
other similar scholars, there was no underlying structure to executive power outside of
the limitation of the Constitution, and each individual made the office his own.

19

McKinley was the first president in the line of modern presidents noted for his individualistic
stance on the issues and active campaign techniques, standing in stark contrast to earlier party candidates
such as Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland who followed the party platform and left their
administrations to control by strong Congresses. Although there are potential earlier exceptions to the
partisan president, such as Abraham Lincoln or Andrew Jackson, these were a rarity. Additionally, though
the more endearing and exuberant Theodore Roosevelt often overshadowed McKinley’s presidency,
McKinley is often cited as the first president who took his own stand on the issues. For a good discussion
of this and why McKinley deserves more merit overall, see: H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His
America (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2003).
20

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership
from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990; 1960). For other individualist scholars of the
modern period, see: Matthew Dickinson, Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power, and the Growth of the
Presidential Branch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Fred I. Greenstein, The HiddenHand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic books, 1982); Geoffrey Perret, Commander in
Chief: How Truman, Johnson, and Bush turned a Presidential Power into a Threat to America’s Future
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007).
21

Neustadt, Presidential Power, xxi.

22

Neustadt’s 1990 edition includes presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan.
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Neustadt’s work and other individualist authors continued to be important for the
investigation of one particular president, but by the time that Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Watergate coalesced in the early 1970s, it became more difficult to attribute abuses of
power at the Nixonian level to a single man. It was because of Richard Nixon that
Schlesinger first revised the concept of executive power, defining the imperial presidency
in 1973.23 Beyond Nixon’s own manipulative skills and deceitfulness, there was another
force at work expanding executive powers outside the bounds of the Constitution—war.
The Commander in Chief (CINC) Clause of the Constitution had always stood as a
possibility for expanded executive power, but the temporary nature of its use had made it
less a threatening expansion of power than a necessary one. However, the Cold War took
the CINC outside the temporary bounds intended by the Constitution, and gave the
executive free rein through the use of “inherent powers.” The Framers had not actually
written these assumed powers into the text of the Constitution but presidents garnered
them from the purposeful vagueness of that document. Schlesinger’s structuralist work
defined the Cold War as the precursor to excessive executive power or the imperial
presidency.
Structural scholarship, with Schlesinger at the fore, flourished until the beginning
of the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War brought a crisis for the study of executive
power. If the Cold War had been the impetus for the imperial presidency, was the United
States now safe from a gross misuse of executive power in the future? Would it now be
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left up to the individual in office to create a strong presidency? Would the constitutional
balance of power finally be restored, specifically when it came to the war powers?
Executive power scholars overall were at a loss for where to place the origin of
executive power (and abuse of power), in the individual or in some underlying structure.
Los Angeles Times reporter Robert Shogun’s 1991 book, The Riddle of Power:
Presidential Leadership from Truman to Bush looked back at earlier individualist
concepts like ideology, values, and character in determining powerful presidents.24
Concurrently, Neustadt published an updated version of his book in the early 1990s,
working off his original individualist perceptions.
Other constitutional scholars now saw the danger of the CINC Clause in the
Constitution and sought to reexamine its meaning and potential use. Constitutional law
scholar Louis Fisher fit into this genre and returned to an examination of the
Constitution’s war powers and the presidency.25 His work, Presidential War Power,
outlined the use of the CINC Clause from the framing of the Constitution to the modern
day, contending through an historical survey that the Framers’ intended separation of war
powers had gradually dissolved, leading to an excess of power in the executive branch
due to the president’s role as the “sole organ” in dealing with foreign affairs.26
Nonetheless, Schlesinger retained his original structuralist approach throughout
this crisis in scholarship. In a new 2004 introduction to his classic work, Schlesinger
qualified his earlier conclusions by contending that it was not necessarily the Cold War
24
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that created the possibility of the imperial presidency but international crises overall.
“Once again,” Schlesinger noted in 2004, “international crisis has resurrected the
Imperial Presidency…The impact of 9/11 and of the overhanging terrorist threat gives
more power than ever to the Imperial Presidency.”27 However, by the time authors like
Charlie Savage targeted Bush as an imperial president in books like Takeover: The
Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy, the War
on Terror had been in existence for less than a decade.28 By the end of Bush’s first term
in office he had established himself as a unitary executive—a president with complete
control over the executive branch of government. Arguably, it was under this role that
Bush went on to abuse his executive powers through the establishment of several
questionable military and security policies.29 With Nixon’s abuse of executive power
coming only after more than two decades of Cold War in Schlesinger’s earlier analysis,
scholars continued to question the likelihood that 9/11 could create the same impact.
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Building a House of Peace
Building a House of Peace fits most closely within the subset of post-revisionist
structural scholarship, seeking an underlying structure for executive power that goes
beyond the individual and beyond the Cold War. Schlesinger’s Cold War structure was
incomplete, neglecting the significance of the other branches in creating executive power,
and the long-lasting impact of the liminal zone between peace and war. In addition, The
Imperial Presidency’s and other Cold War-framed works’ arguments became more
fragile in the post-Cold War United States. Building a House of Peace closes these gaps,
taking a thematic and interdisciplinary approach to executive power from the perspective
of the other branches while expanding the structure of power beyond the Cold War period
and into a more complicated zone of continuous warfare that casts doubt on the American
meaning of peace at home. Since this dissertation is largely restricted to the period from
1941-1960, it also intersects several other fields of scholarship including those dealing
with the Cold War (including the Korean War), the atomic bomb, the National Security
State, Harry Truman, Franklin Roosevelt, and Congress and the court when concerning
warfare and executive power issues.30
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The year 1941 marked the beginning of the United States’ entrance into World
War II, Franklin Roosevelt’s utilization of the power of the Commander in Chief, and the
beginning of the working relationship between Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
While the focus of Building a House of Peace is on Truman’s ascension to the
presidency, an understanding of Roosevelt’s position at the time of his death is necessary
to see the changes in the Truman administration and understand the position of important
players who carryover between the two administrations.
In addition, because Truman’s continuous warfare and expansive executive power
extended beyond his own administration, it is necessary to bridge the gap between
Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. Building a House of Peace ends in the year 1960 for
two main reasons: inclusion of the Korean War and Eisenhower’s utilization of the
completed house of peace concept through his New Look and Atoms for Peace programs.
The end of the Korean War in 1953 offers the chance to examine the theory of continuous
warfare beyond Truman and beyond traditional armed conflict. Additionally, by 1954
Eisenhower had a chance to transition fully from the Truman administration to his own
prerogatives as president, allowing an examination of his use of executive power as seen
through executive orders, legislative initiatives, and military actions short of war, which
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relate to his role as Commander in Chief during continuous warfare. How he then put
his prerogatives into action during the remainder of his presidency illustrated the
sturdiness of the house of peace.
The Many Rooms
The house of peace has many rooms. In John chapter 14, verse 2 of the Bible,
John wrote, “In my Father’s house are many rooms.” The many different churches or
religions may be the “many rooms” that John references, which add complexity to the
study of Christianity, just as the variety of fields of scholarship utilized in this analysis,
including the subjects of history, political science, and law add complexity to the house
of peace. Since each of these fields has its own terminology and methodology, it is
important to define clearly the purpose in using individual terms along with tracing the
development in these fields of the study of executive power. Each of these fields also has
its own purpose—a study of the past events and circumstances versus the creation of a
predictive model versus an application of concepts to real life circumstances. For
example, in utilizing secondary literature concerning the Supreme Court’s behavior
during the 1952 Youngstown v. Sawyer case, it is necessary to discuss Jeffrey A. Segal
and Harold J. Spaeth’s “Attitudinal Model” from the realm of political science.31 Instead
of using this model to predict future court decisions or explain a case outcome, this work
uses the concept behind the model (various elements that create a jurist’s attitude and
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ideology, which in turn affects his/her decision) to examine Youngstown and other court
decisions historically from the perspective of the justices.
Building a House of Peace is truly an interdisciplinary project. The purpose of
this project configuration is not simply an examination of the actions of the legislature
and judiciary, often left to the realm of political scientists and legal scholars, because
each of these fields offers their own unique perspective on how the branches of
government work. Political models and legal theories serve as starting points as to how
one might go about examining Congress and the court, and how these institutions
function. With the addition of historical analyses of circumstances, biographical
information, and differing periodization, the actions of the people and institutions in a
particular scenario come into focus, offering the most complete picture of what occurred.
Since the period under investigation in Building a House of Peace is a familiar one, this
combination of a multitude of perspectives offers a new way of viewing the people,
events, and circumstances of the 1940s and fifties, which reveals more detail than
traditional analyses in the individual fields of history, law, or political science would
allow.
In the first chapter, “Laying the Groundwork: From Roosevelt to Truman,” the
focus is on delineating the distinct differences between Franklin Roosevelt and Harry
Truman when it came to foreign affairs. As an experienced executive, Franklin
Roosevelt understood both the practical and political elements involved in retaining a
bond with the Soviet Union. In one regard, the American-Soviet alliance guaranteed an
American victory with decidedly fewer casualties than may have been the case if the
Soviets had not put forth their forces in the brunt of battle. Looking beyond World War
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II, a partnership with the Soviets guaranteed a safer world, alleviating the threat of
capitalism against communism and vice versa.
On the other hand, Harry Truman was relatively inexperienced as an executive
when he ascended to the presidency, forcing him to rely on Roosevelt staffers, aides, and
advisers who had not been privy to Roosevelt’s mindset. As a result, Truman was unable
to see the larger picture and instead was open to persuasion by those around him and his
own personal feelings about the Soviet Union and its leader, Joseph Stalin. Likewise,
Truman’s reliance on the administrative staff helped create a structured presidency more
adaptable to future administrations.
As a result, in sketching out these differences there is a distinct division between
Roosevelt as Commander in Chief and Truman as Commander in Chief. A realization of
this shift leads to a better understanding of why Truman made certain decisions regarding
the end of WWII and the US-Soviet relationship. The results of this shift between the
two men with obvious differences in skill, management style, and knowledge of foreign
affairs, forced Truman to attempt to retain his power as Commander in Chief through the
manipulation of the politically malleable post-war confusion that would come to be the
hallmark of continuous warfare.
In the second chapter, “Pouring the Foundation: Continuous Warfare and the
Commander in Chief,” continuous warfare, its definition, creation, and use by the
president as Commander in Chief are the focus. The cause of this continuation of war
from traditional warfare, to preventive war, and finally cold war, rooted in the period of
1945 through 1950, is the combination of suspicion of and discord with the Soviets, the
use of the first atomic bomb, and Truman’s extension of the military and creation of the
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National Security State. Combined, these factors created the possibility of a state of
continuous warfare and with it, the beginning of the imperial presidency.
Part one of this second chapter discusses the background of the Commander in
Chief, as a specific power listed in the Constitution, and as scholarship has discussed it.
It is particularly important to outline how other presidents have utilized the role of
Commander in Chief in order to differentiate the circumstances under which Truman held
the position post-WWII. An emphasis on continuous warfare shows that Truman’s
power extended beyond the traditional warfare of World War II and began before the
limited war in Korea.
Chapter Two also intertwines a discussion of the changing nature of war in the
period just after WWII. Cold War scholarship has largely ignored this period, including
it as either part of WWII or the beginning of the Cold War, if mentioned at all. This
phase deserves its own representation as a period of neither peace nor war, however. In a
1946 debate in Congress over the universal military training program, Representative
James Wadsworth (R-NY) advocated that the then current condition was a “twilight
zone,” which meant that the United States was at neither peace nor war, but in-between.
“The war is not over in a technical sense,” Wadsworth noted, yet the United States was
also not at peace as it still squabbled with the Soviet Union over post-war agreements,
adjusted to the nuclear age, and continued the military apparatus at home.32 This twilight
zone between peace and war is at the heart of the definition of continuous war, linking
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individual bouts of traditional armed conflict without allowing any of the advantages of
war to subside.33
Chapter Three, “Installing the Floor: The End of Congressional War Power,”
focuses on how members of Congress reacted to the first large-scale, undeclared war, the
Korean War of 1950. As part of the larger structure of executive power, the other
branches of government must relinquish their “check” on executive prerogative, allowing
the power to build in unrestricted fashion and setting constitutional precedents that would
be difficult or impossible to reverse. When discussing warfare and the Commander in
Chief role of the president, the most significant role that leaders of Congress have is the
power to declare war. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution states, “The Congress shall
have Power…To declare War.”34 This single line has been an issue of debate in the
modern era due to the now typical use of “undeclared war” or “imperfect war” by the
president.35
The intention of this third chapter is to assess why, during this period, members of
Congress essentially gave up the power they did have to restrict the executive. While
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debate has focused on the constitutional clash between the president’s ability to control
the armed forces and Congress’s role in declaring war, there is also an historiographical
gap about another element of congressional power. Despite the president’s ability to
usurp congressional war power by sending troops and instigating a “war” without a
formal declaration, Congress still had the ability to “control the purse.” The ability to
control the allocated funds toward war would allow Congress to stop a war, but the
legislature has never applied this power to the modern undeclared war without drastic
political repercussions.36
Congressmen gave up their power during this “twilight zone” period because of
the changing nature of war and insecurities regarding new methods of war, and because
of benefits that occurred by lax use of congressional power. Prior to World War II, the
US experienced a retreat toward isolationist views in government. Isolationist politicians
argued against any foreign involvement because of the perceived threat that these posed
to the US at home. Gradually, as WWII expanded abroad, Roosevelt and internationalist
legislators sought to break down this concern. Internationalists largely contended that an
isolated US was a target to belligerents and seen as weak overall. The attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941 confirmed this perspective and helped to shift legislators away from the
old isolationist ideas.
As WWII went on, congressional leaders became increasingly disinterested in
foreign affairs due to the secretive and complex nature of modern warfare. This was in
36
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part due to the bipartisan agreement between legislators for the duration of the war where
knowledge of foreign affairs might only cause upset, but also due to the concealment of
information from Congress, such as the Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb.
When the Korean War later encouraged congressmen to abdicate their ability to declare
war, individuals in Congress expressed anger but continued to yield to the executive in
foreign affairs, maintaining financial and political benefits during an unpopular war.
With a strengthened executive and apathetic Congress, the final check on
executive authority remained with the Supreme Court of the United States. The court
represents a unique part of the federal system of government. Originally cited as the
“weakest branch” by constitutional Framer Alexander Hamilton, the modern court has
grown into a powerful position amongst the branches, acting as a bastion of justice
against Congress and the executive in the eyes of the public.37 Though the court has little
ability to protect itself against encroachments by the other branches, its own position as
an independent institution of the people has generally served as efficient security.38 In
addition, with its lifetime appointments and the near inability to impeach a justice, the
Supreme Court serves as the sole interpreter of the Constitution. With its discretionary
jurisdiction this role is unassailable by the other two branches.
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As a result, Chapter Four, “Framing the Walls: The Supreme Court’s Final Check
on Executive Power,” focuses on the court’s decisions regarding executive power
questions from 1941 to 1960. In 1933, the court, unfavorable to domestic presidential
power, ruled sympathetically that the president was the “sole organ” in foreign affairs in
the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.39 Two landmark decisions, the
case of Korematsu v. United States (1944) dealing with Japanese internment during
WWII and the case of Youngstown v. Sawyer (1952) regarding Truman’s seizure of the
steel mills under the parameter of wartime necessity, confirm this earlier decision. The
court’s opinions in both cases, despite their clear difference in outcomes, have served to
increase executive power during periods of war. A focus on the Youngstown case
revealed the court’s struggle with the changing nature of war during this period and the
clash in interpreting the extent of the CINC powers of the president during an undeclared
war.
In this section, use of political science and legal concepts were necessary due to a
major gap in historical study of the court’s decisions and its justices’ behavior. An
examination of attitudinal theory, strategic factors like presidential prestige and the rally
effect, along with external issues like press coverage and election year effect reveal
historical significance.40 In turn, this investigation illustrates how and why the court gave
up its power to check the executive branch during war. When warfare, congressional
39
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apathy, and court support coalesce, executive power has the ability to go completely
unchecked to the point of an imperial presidency.
In the final chapter, “Moving In: Eisenhower’s House of Peace,” the focus is on
connecting the outcome of the Truman presidency with its creation of continuous
warfare, the benefits to the executive and Congress, and the new legal standards set by
the court, to the Eisenhower Administration and its first involvement in “war” beyond
Korea. Evidence suggests that Eisenhower took the house of peace to the next level by
orchestrating a worldwide Atoms for Peace program that boasted peaceful uses of atomic
energy. At the same time, however, Eisenhower continued an elaborate buildup of the
military state, including nuclear weapons testing, through his New Look program.
Congressional disregard for military operations during the 1950s and a court focused
elsewhere on civil rights issues continued to support these actions by the Eisenhower
Administration. Eisenhower completed the conversion to a permanent continuous war,
by concealing the elements of this war with peaceful prerogatives that lulled the
American people into believing they were safe and at peace at home.
Breaking Ground
To date, the discussion of executive power has been widely deliberated through a
focus on the executive branch and individual man in office, most predominantly within a
Cold War framework. This work reassesses executive power from the perspective of
Congress and the court through an interdisciplinary analysis in order to reveal an
underlying structure to the growth of executive power. The interdisciplinary nature of
this project serves not only to extend its usefulness beyond a particular field, but also to
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illustrate the importance of utilizing cross-disciplinary techniques in research with the
aim of revealing a more complete picture not based around a singular perspective.
My analysis of executive power relies on the undergirding factor of warfare but
moves beyond the traditional restrictions of the Cold War by reexamining modern
warfare as continuous since the late 1940s, when the government constructed a house of
peace to conceal the need for war. This new concept of “continuous warfare” adds
increased significance to the overall importance of executive power and the president’s
role as Commander in Chief in the post-1945 period, and the American relationship with
warfare at home. Through the construction of a house of peace, Truman and others were
able to preach peace while practicing war, which began an indefinite increase of
executive power through a permanent structure that remains intact today.

CHAPTER I

LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: FROM ROOSEVELT TO TRUMAN

President Franklin Roosevelt, then in his fourth term in office, sat in the living
room of the “Little White House” in Warm Springs, Georgia working diligently on the
afternoon of April 12, 1945. Roosevelt’s companion, Lucy Mercer, commissioned the
artist Elizabeth Shoumatoff to paint a portrait of Roosevelt during this Warm Springs
vacation. Shoumatoff’s portrait illustrated the Roosevelt who had led the country
through its worst economic depression and into the second major world war, which
threatened democracy and freedom. The face of the president was worn, with sunken
eyes highlighted by dark circles and framed by a swath of gray hair. This chosen
depiction was in spite of Mercer’s attempt at having Shoumatoff paint something more
flattering than the most recent public photos of Roosevelt.

Roosevelt’s mouth was set

resolutely in a position that gave no hint of his former ebullience but left the viewer to
reflect on everything that Roosevelt saw, said, and did in over twelve years in office.
Complaining of a terrible headache, Roosevelt slumped into a coma just a few moments
later. Just past three-thirty that afternoon, Franklin Roosevelt died, having never
regained consciousness.1 In his wake, he left a family, a country, and a world to mourn
his passing. Additionally, Roosevelt left behind his presidency, less than two months into
his fourth term, to Vice President Harry S. Truman. Much like Shoumatoff’s painting,
Roosevelt’s plans for the post-war world and the remainder of his presidency endured
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unfinished as Truman orchestrated a subtle though definite change in Rooseveltian
policy.
By the time Roosevelt’s death was announced to the country that evening at five
forty-nine Eastern War Time, Truman had been at the White House just over ten
minutes.2 According to Truman’s diary entry from that day, the first he ever wrote, he
“did not know what reaction the country would have to the death of a man whom they all
practically worshipped.”3 This haphazard entry on the most important day of Truman’s
life was not simple hyperbole. In reality, both the country and the world felt the weight
of the loss of Roosevelt. According to one article in the Los Angeles Times, “Every
American regardless of his political affiliation or philosophy, feels not only the sadness in
the passing of the president but appreciation in the very great loss…history will record
him as one of our greatest presidents.”4 In Moscow, the Soviet Government honored
Roosevelt like no other American president, with extensive press coverage and blackbordered flags flying above the wall of the Kremlin.5 The Los Angeles Times again
reported, “The government of the Soviet Union expresses its sincere sympathy to the
American people in their great loss.”6 Political leaders in England and France likewise
2
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expressed their sympathy for the United States and lowered flags to half-staff throughout
their empires. At home, Roosevelt’s state funeral stretched through a mourning
Washington D.C. Roosevelt had planned, in advance, every detail himself.7 As Truman
soon found out, this was a typical instance of Roosevelt’s personal domination over all
facets of his life and presidency.
Unfortunately for Truman, he was relatively unknown to the world around him
and almost entirely unfamiliar with the details of the world situation on April 12, 1945.
After Truman took the oath of office approximately an hour and a half after finding out
about the president’s death, he immediately called a meeting of the Cabinet.8 Truman
again reflected in his diary, that he “was not familiar with any of these things [World War
II, Winston Churchill, or Joseph Stalin] and it was really something to think about…”9
Truman sought counsel in the expertise of the Roosevelt Cabinet, hoping to get up to
speed quickly on the situation abroad. This plan backfired, however, when it became
obvious that Roosevelt had largely served as his own Secretary of State and had relied
upon a multitude of advisors before making a decision. The abrupt death of Roosevelt in
April of 1945 during a key moment in world history altered the course of American
history, shifting it toward permanent involvement in international politics and a new type
of warfare that Truman embraced. Roosevelt’s method for running the country and the
7
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war focused solely on his own unique management of the Executive Branch and personal
skills as president. Truman stood in stark contrast to Roosevelt in background, style,
skills, and beliefs, which changed the presidency and bred a continuous war based on
ambiguous concepts of war and peace in the post-WWII world.
From the state of Missouri, Truman diverged greatly from the East Coast elite
Roosevelt, but both were worthy politicians for an era steeped in turmoil. Truman had
tried his chances at entrepreneurship after the Great War by opening a haberdashery with
an Army friend, but soon fell into politics with his natural Midwestern friendliness and
honest demeanor. After the haberdashery failed, Truman became an elected Eastern
District County Judge of Jackson County, Missouri, which included his home,
Independence. In this position, Truman found his calling. As a judge, Truman focused
on the simple issues that most people in his district were concerned about, like road
maintenance. By focusing on the needs of his constituents, Truman found success in
politics. Likewise, his Midwestern upbringing naturally encouraged conviviality and
collegiality, which later became trademarks of his personal management style as
president. Though Truman lost his reelection in 1924, he won his seat again in 1926 and
served until 1934. By the federal midterm elections of 1934, Truman had connected with
Tom Pendergast, a notorious Kansas City political boss. A relation to one of Truman’s
Army associates, Pendergast helped to propel Truman out of Missouri and into the US
Senate, where he flourished as a politician. Once in Washington, Truman drew a lot of
flak as the “gentleman from Pendergast,” but after his colleagues realized he was not only
hard working and honest, but a straight talker, he gained his own place in the Senate.10
10
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Truman’s association with Pendergast, though initially a handicap, helped teach him the
basics of politics including the necessity of keeping friends and connections in important
places. Truman later drew on his newfound connections in Congress to help him create a
working structure for the presidency, which later presidents could utilize.
It was as a senator that Truman honed his skills of collegiality while becoming a
steadfast supporter of Roosevelt, his New Deal, and later his actions in World War II.
Truman repeatedly voted on the side of New Deal legislation and sided with Roosevelt on
the ill-fated Judicial Reform Bill of 1937. However, Truman’s reputation came from his
formation of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program,
which investigated wartime contracts and expenditures. Truman first got the idea for this
committee, better known as the “Truman Committee,” when he decided to go on his own
fact-finding trip in 1940 to investigate complaints of wasteful spending in war production
at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri. With the complaints confirmed by the situation at
Fort Leonard Wood, Truman decided to form a committee, based on his knowledge of a
similar committee during the American Civil War, to investigate “waste and
inefficiencies in war production” nationwide.11 The location of a new camp or defense
plant often appeared as part of a deal by congressmen and businessmen to direct money
to their districts, and the Truman Committee sought to make sure these deals were
legitimate contracts and that the agreements were carried out efficiently.12 The Truman
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Committee vehemently compared allocated military base and camp funds to the actual
amount spent, seeking both an understanding of defense needs and more realistic
spending goals for such necessities.13 Likewise, the committee held hearings regularly in
response to complaints or concerns from industry and manufacturers, such as the
petroleum industry, which questioned domestic price regulations during World War II. 14
Additionally, bomb production sites fell under the purview of the Truman Committee’s
investigations, including secret atomic bomb production facilities, though information
regarding the actual products was not a direct concern of the committee.15 In this role,
the Senate began to think of Truman as the “watchdog of the war effort.”16
It was Truman’s involvement in his Senate committee that put him on the list of
frontrunners for the vice presidential nomination for Roosevelt’s fourth term in 1944, and
Truman’s jovial nature kept him on the top of that list. The Truman Committee allowed
Truman to gain considerable prestige within the Senate and likewise help push policy
prerogatives.17 Additionally, Truman looked like a promising candidate because he got
along so well with the other senators. The Roosevelt campaign had to consider their
long-term goals of forming the United Nations organization and negotiating peace
treaties when WWII ended. Truman’s relationships with members of the Senate would
13
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be a formidable asset, to both Roosevelt and Truman once he took over as president. In
the case of domestic issues, Truman was also the right candidate, as his “border state”
association allowed the ticket to hold onto the southern delegates without being
specifically associated with southern issues, mainly the growing uproar around African
American civil rights. Other contenders for the nomination included Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States William O. Douglas, Vice President Henry
Wallace, and Director of War Mobilization James Byrnes.18 What everyone besides
Roosevelt knew was that whomever Roosevelt chose as vice president would surely be
the next president of the United States, as Roosevelt’s condition was rapidly deteriorating
by 1944. In a 1964 oral history, Edward McKim, a longtime friend of Truman,
remembered attending a White House reception in September of 1944. Afterward,
outside of the White House, McKim turned to Truman and told him, “turn around and
take a look at that place; that was where [you are] going to be living.” According to
McKim’s account, Truman replied, “’I'm afraid you're right, Eddie.’ … ‘And it scares the
hell out of me.’”19
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There is some debate over how many times Truman actually met with Roosevelt
during FDR’s last administration. Though Truman preferred to claim he met with the
president frequently, he was more likely treated the same as Roosevelt’s other vice
presidents—set aside to watch as the master did his work. This was evident in Truman’s
lack of knowledge regarding the building of the atomic bomb, Roosevelt’s postwar plans,
and his political relationship with leaders of the Soviet Union.20 Truman had slightly less
than three months to adjust to being vice president before Roosevelt’s death threw him
into the presidency with all its power in a contentious period of war. The results of this
abrupt shift between Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, two men with obvious
differences in skill, management style, and knowledge of foreign affairs, led to a hazy
zone somewhere between peace and war that typified continuous warfare and with it, the
foundation of the imperial presidency.
Skillset
The skillset that Truman brought to the White House in 1945 was vastly different
from that brought by Roosevelt in 1933. Foremost, the two men came from exceedingly
different backgrounds, and Truman was by no means a natural born leader. With
Truman, what one saw was generally what one got. As a machine politician during the
1930s and 40s, Truman was all too familiar with the concept of loyalty and knew that it
worked both ways. Truman’s loyalty to Roosevelt policies initially cloaked his lack of
leadership skill. As president, Truman initially pledged to uphold Roosevelt’s legislation
and ideals, which he believed would maintain his positive relationship with the Senate.
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Truman only deviated from this loyalty when his own Midwestern isolationist beliefs
began to alter the already wavering US-Soviet policy at the end of World War II.
Truman’s lack of foresight and inability to lead the country to peace, led to the initial
blunders between the Soviet Union and US. The shift between Roosevelt and Truman at
this time was significant because Truman’s lingering isolationism disallowed him to see
the United States in the truly international format that Roosevelt had intended. This
subsequently caused Truman to heighten defense of the United States through an ill-fated
preparation for war that resulted in a new, continuous state of war. Global threat and
increased defense marked the often murky, liminal zone between peace and war known
as continuous warfare. This “war” mimicked the beginning phase of a preventive war
militarily and the political benefits of a traditional war while maintaining a rhetorical
exterior of peace.
With no clear plan for peace and no clear plan for war with the Soviet Union,
Truman floundered between the two due to his lack of leadership skill. The near limitless
political malleability of such a state, between peace and war, further disguised Truman’s
continuous war and allowed him to operate within this fuzzy zone instead of choosing
one path or the other. One significant problem with historian Arthur M. Schelesinger
Jr.’s analysis of Truman and Roosevelt in The Imperial Presidency was that he
disregarded the significance of the shift between Roosevelt and Truman and the
importance of the two presidents’ difference in skills and management styles, instead
relying on external events to create the Cold War.21
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Unlike Truman, Roosevelt did not have to adjust to the presidency. Roosevelt’s
leadership skills were almost innate. As a member of the upstate New York elite,
Roosevelt naturally came to think of society hierarchically.22 Coming from a wealthy
family with more than 2000 acres along the Hudson River Valley where neighbors
included members of the Vanderbilt family and descendants of the Livingstons,
Roosevelt felt that he was at the top of this social hierarchy. In turn, Roosevelt never
really had to work at anything and perceived himself as a natural born leader.23
According to political scientist Richard E. Neustadt, “Roosevelt, almost alone among our
presidents, had no conception of the office to live up to; he was it. His image of the
office was himself-in-office.”24 Since Roosevelt believed he belonged at the top of the
social hierarchy, as the president of the United States, he did not need a period of
adjustment. The plethora of legislation engineered by the Roosevelt administration
during the first hundred days of his first term in office was evidence of this mindset.
Roosevelt began his term with an exhibition of what appeared to be innate skill, which
immediately established his reputation. Neustadt argued that reputation was one source
of personal effectiveness or “actual power.” Though all presidents have some powers as
a right of the office, it is how they use these powers to be effective that yields their actual
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power. Roosevelt loved the presidency for the personal power it gave him, while Truman
loved the presidency as an institution; therefore, Roosevelt was a powerful president
because of his personal skill while Truman laid the groundwork for other powerful
presidents by bolstering the institution of the presidency through his organization and
structure.25
Personal power is not the only element needed to maintain a strong and effective
executive, however. Both Roosevelt and Truman utilized their individual skills of
influence on members of Congress. Presidential relations with Congress define the
president’s ability to achieve his policy preferences. In this regard, presidential power is
not just the formal powers vested in the presidency but additionally the ability of a
president to influence those around him, specifically Congress.

One of the foremost

goals of a president is to convince others in government that particular actions are right
for them. This persuasive power has to be more than just charm or reason, however.
Political scientist Fred Greenstein purported that the key qualities that relate to a
president’s job performance are proficiency as a public communicator, organizational
capacity, political skill, vision, cognitive style, and ability to manage emotions.26 In
Roosevelt and Truman’s relations with Congress, they experimented with these qualities,
yielding very different relationships.
In his own administration, Roosevelt honed his skills of persuasion by holding
together the delicate New Deal coalition; he used these skills to deal with Congress as
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well. Although Roosevelt never served in either house of Congress, he understood the
importance of presidential relations with Congress through his experience as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson. As a part of the Wilson
administration, Roosevelt witnessed the consequences of poor presidential-congressional
relations firsthand with the failure to approve the Treaty of Versailles and US
involvement in the League of Nations. As president, Roosevelt learned to pressure
Congress to do what he wanted by drafting his own legislation in the executive branch.
Roosevelt followed up this legislation by holding face-to-face meetings with
congressmen and senators, telling them to act quickly. If need be, Roosevelt would
likewise wield the promise (or threat) of patronage.27
However, Roosevelt’s greatest skill in dealing with Congress came from his
masterful ability to communicate effectively. Roosevelt did not aim his fireside chats and
speeches at just the public, but also at Congress as well.28 For example, in Roosevelt’s
first fireside chat on the Emergency Banking Act, he stated that the legislation was
“promptly and patriotically passed by the Congress.” Roosevelt continued, “I want to tell
our citizens in every part of the Nation that the national Congress—Republicans and
Democrats alike—showed by this action a devotion to public welfare and a realization of
the emergency and the necessity for speed…”29 In this instance, Roosevelt was
commenting to the people on congressional action, but also sending a message to
Congress that this was exactly what he wanted, bipartisanship and speed. In one of his
27
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later fireside chats on wage stabilization in 1942, Roosevelt more clearly threatened
Congress before his national audience:
I have told the Congress that inaction on their part by that date will leave me with
an inescapable responsibility to the people of this country to see to it that the war
effort is no longer imperiled by the threat of economic chaos. …In the event that
the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the
responsibility, and I will act. …The President has the powers, under the
Constitution and under Congressional Acts, to take measures necessary to avert a
disaster which would interfere with the winning of the war.30
Though Roosevelt generally preferred and cultivated genial relations with Congress, he
was never afraid to wield the power of the executive as he saw fit. While excessive
executive power might have alarmed the public, Roosevelt cleverly utilized the medium
of radio to place the blame for problems on Congress. As the above example indicated,
Roosevelt also tied the subject to a prominent public interest issue, winning the war.
In this regard, Congress was left to make the next move, but would be held
accountable not only by Roosevelt, but by their constituents as well. Schlesinger
disagreed, instead painting Roosevelt as subservient to Congress until the US entrance
into World War II gave him power as Commander in Chief. “The second Roosevelt, for
all his popularity, preferred—certainly in his first two terms—to base his actions on
congressional legislation rather than on executive prerogative,” Schlesinger claimed. 31
However, Schlesinger ignored Roosevelt’s skills, background, and language when
dealing with Congress, which subsequently lessened the overall significance of the 1945
Roosevelt-Truman shift in Schlesinger’s analysis. Roosevelt’s crafty, intimidating
approach to relations with Congress would not work for all presidents and thus remained
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a non-structural staple of Roosevelt’s personal power as president, which contrasted
sharply with Truman’s structural approach.
Despite a clear Democratic majority in Congress throughout Roosevelt’s time in
office, Roosevelt misplayed his power over the Congress after his election landslide in
1936. In many ways, Congress, with its shrinking Republican minority, was supportive
of Roosevelt’s New Deal and later, war, plans. The public seemed squarely behind
Roosevelt and his New Deal after 1936.32 Roosevelt attempted several failed plans
during his second term that greatly reduced his power over the Congress. The first in this
line of schemes was the failed Judicial Reform Bill of 1937. Roosevelt and the Justice
Department, headed by Attorney General Homer Cummings, had formulated Roosevelt’s
“Court Packing Plan” in secret. Over the course of several weeks between Roosevelt’s
election in November and his revealing of the court plan, Roosevelt carefully considered
and scrutinized the possibilities available to alter the Supreme Court’s anti-New Deal
stance. Roosevelt rejected the idea of a constitutional amendment when he decided that
the time involved and complicated procedure was more than he wished to take on.
Instead, a reform bill ppeared to be the most expedient and useful method to allow
Roosevelt to alter the conservative majority of the court. This plan focused on the
appointment of new judges for each federal judge who had worked at least ten years, was
over age seventy, and refused to retire.33 In the United States Supreme Court alone,
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Roosevelt would have been able to appoint up to six judges who were more sympathetic
to his prerogatives, enough to change the panel in favor of the New Deal.
While historians and political scientists generally considered Roosevelt a skillful
politician, he woefully misjudged the power of his post-election mandate in 1937.
Whereas many in Congress and the country had been open to some sort of change in the
Supreme Court, the more appropriate method seemed to be a constitutional amendment,
which the people’s own representatives could decide on. Roosevelt’s plan came off as a
poorly concealed lunge for complete executive control akin to a dictatorship. As the bill
lay in consideration in the Senate Judiciary Committee, a remarkable thing appeared to
happen with the Supreme Court; it suddenly reversed its previous conservative stance and
began validating New Deal legislation.34 This supposed “switch-in-time” served to
disintegrate the necessity of Roosevelt’s Judicial Reform Bill and essentially save the
Supreme Court. In actuality, the court had not orchestrated a sudden and drastic shift in
response to Roosevelt’s 1936 election or his Court-Packing Plan but had gradually
adjusted their outlook on constitutional doctrine over time. This much more gradual
change first appeared in the 1934 case of Nebbia v. New York, in which the court upheld
New York’s law regulating milk prices. With this minor decision, contends legal
historian Barry Cushman, the court broke down the distinction between public and
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private enterprise on which earlier conservative decisions had rested. In the end,
Roosevelt got his way with the court and they upheld much of his New Deal.35 However,
his overzealous Court-Packing Plan was largely a flop that caused him to lose a great
amount of support in the eyes of both the public and the Congress.
After further problems from 1937 through 1938 with increased labor activism and
an increased economic downturn known as the “Roosevelt recession,” Roosevelt
attempted another scheme, this time to alter his relations with Congress, again using his
communication skills. Prior to the 1938 midterm elections Roosevelt attempted to keep a
number of conservative Democrats from running for Congress, hoping to have them
replaced by New Dealers.36 The “purge of 1938” began with Roosevelt’s fireside chat of
June 24, 1938, where he noted:
In the coming primaries in all parties, there will be many clashes between two
schools of thought, generally classified as liberal and conservative. Roughly
speaking, the liberal school of thought recognizes that the new conditions
throughout the world call for new remedies. … The opposing or conservative
school of thought, as a general proposition, does not recognize the need for
Government itself to step in and take action to meet these new problems. It
believes that individual initiative and private philanthropy will solve them—that
we ought to repeal many of the things we have done and go back, for instance, to
the old gold standard, or stop all this business of old age pensions and
unemployment insurance, or repeal the Securities and Exchange Act, or let
monopolies thrive unchecked—return, in effect, to the kind of Government we
had in the twenties.37
Roosevelt noted that he would not be involved in the primaries, although he emphasized:
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As the head of the Democratic Party…charged with the responsibility of carrying
out the definitely liberal declaration of principles set forth in the 1936 Democratic
platform, I feel that I have every right to speak in those few instances where there
may be a clear issue between candidates for a Democratic nomination involving
these principles, or involving a clear misuse of my own name.38
Then in July of 1938, Roosevelt set out on a cross-country tour where he aimed to utilize
not only his eloquence but also his popularity to end the reign of conservative Democrats
in the November election. However, after early July primaries in Iowa and Indiana, it
quickly became apparent that Roosevelt’s support alone could not make or break a
Democratic candidate. By August, Roosevelt’s purge had ended before it ever began.
Though Roosevelt crisscrossed the country and gave a number of speeches, they were not
the tough-hitting political rhetoric that most had predicted to occur. After the November
vote, the conservative bloc in the Senate had increased to approximately forty senators
who would now be able to take a stance against the more liberal New Deal policies.
Every candidate allegedly on Roosevelt’s purge list had survived reelection.39 Both the
Court-Packing plan and the Roosevelt purge illustrated Roosevelt’s desire for control
through his personal power, whereas Truman would demonstrate his desire to have a
working relationship with Congress more compatible with a long-term structure for
presidential control and more conducive to working in a period of political confusion
over war and peace.
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It was as a US senator that Truman learned how to get things done in Washington
and acquired the skill of always being conscious of the public’s watch. Truman’s opinion
of presidential relations with Congress came from a different perspective than Roosevelt,
that of an insider. Truman knew who to pressure to accomplish one thing or another.40
In a 1946 memorandum by James H. Rowe Jr., an employee of the Bureau of the Budget,
titled “’Cooperation’ or Conflict?: The President’s relationships with an opposition
Congress,” Rowe quoted a portion of “Federalist No. 70”, in which Alexander Hamilton
wrote:
They [Congress] often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the
other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side, they
always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other
members of the Government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.41
Rowe sent this memo to White House Counsel Clark M. Clifford in December of 1946
when it became evident that Truman would be dealing with a Republican majority
Congress in 1947. What Rowe suggested throughout the memo and by quoting Hamilton
was that the president must be aware of public opinion and not stray too far from it in
order to maintain control over Congress. As a former senator, Truman was very much
aware of the significance of public opinion and its direct relation to those elected to
Congress. As president, Truman kept this insider information in mind when dealing with
congressional issues. Truman gave an example of his self-consciousness in a March
1950 letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Truman noted that he privately referred
to Senator Joseph McCarthy, anticommunist crusader, as “a pathological liar” and to
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Senator Kenneth Wherry as “the block-headed undertaker from Nebraska.” 42 Truman
went on to say, “Of course, we can’t do that publicaly [sic], but there’s no doubt that’s
exactly what they are.”43 In this statement, Truman showed that while he was not always
on friendly terms with all members of Congress, he was aware that to challenge them
publicly could be detrimental. Roosevelt risked this detriment repeatedly because of his
own perceived preeminence, but future presidents adopted Truman’s conservative stance.
During his presidency, Truman also utilized several skills for retaining a strong
relationship with Congress, such as cultivating relationships with those who might be
effective liaisons. Rowe had suggested in his 1946 memorandum that the president
should use liaisons in Congress if possible. By liaisons, Rowe meant that the president
should essentially seek to keep some reliable congressmen closer than others and use
them to pass information from the executive to the legislature and vice versa. People like
Democratic Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas, who was a good friend of Truman’s
and loyal to the administration, would have been a fine choice under Rowe’s analysis.
Although Rayburn was friends with Truman, he also served as an elder statesman in the
House, which allowed him to gain the confidence of Republicans and draw together
liberals and conservatives within his own party.44 Truman did retain Rayburn as a friend
throughout his life, but to what extent he used Rayburn’s position in the House is
unknown.
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Taking a more formalistic, structured approach, Truman expanded his skill for
keeping liaisons by making the upkeep of these relationships an official duty of his
appointments secretary, Matthew Connelly. Connelly himself was a holdover from
Truman’s days as a senator, where he had served as the chief investigator for the Truman
Committee and as an executive assistant to Truman.45 As appointments secretary in the
White House, Connelly was in charge of favors, patronage, requests for help, and all “the
countless personal involvements between Members of Congress and the Chief
Executive.”46 In a confidential 1953 report, “Notes on the White House Staff Under
President Truman,” Neustadt (a former Truman special assistant) wrote that Connelly
was so busy with congressional relations that he even had an assistant to help maintain
these relationships. The assistant, Joseph Feeney, worked “as a liaison man with certain
individuals and groups in Congress.” Neustadt claimed, “His [Feeney’s] role was always
pretty much a mystery, even around the White House, but personalities and patronage
were the framework in which he operated.”47 Despite congressional complaints about
Truman’s policies during the latter forties and early fifties, through Connelly and Feeney,
along with his own personal friendships, Truman maintained a relatively harmonious
relationship with Congress, which stemmed directly from his personal knowledge of the
inner workings of the legislature.
Outside of dealing with Congress, both Roosevelt and Truman had to
commandeer public opinion in order to achieve their ultimate policy and political goals.
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Roosevelt understood that control of public opinion guaranteed a president more power
over Congress, reelection, and a promising historical legacy, so he sought to use his skills
of manipulation to control the public’s perception of him as president. Neustadt believed
that “The search for personal influence is at the center of the job of being president.”48
While this personal influence may come from simple popularity, a more viable
route for any president to take involved a crafted manipulation of the public or his public
image. This followed along the lines of the Law of Anticipated Reactions. Essentially,
people do as they must while theorizing what would be the probable reaction.49
Inherently, rational people continually weigh their options based on what they think may
be the outcome. People do not act haphazardly and see what happens, but make their
own predictions ahead of decisions. Neustadt contended that if others think highly of
someone, that someone will have a greater opportunity for influence.50 Roosevelt wanted
this greater opportunity for influence so he attempted to control carefully the public’s
understanding of him, so that when they weighed their options, they stood on the side of
Roosevelt and his policy.
A personal letter from Felix Frankfurter, Harvard Law professor and later
Supreme Court Justice, to Roosevelt in the fall of 1933 illustrated how Roosevelt’s
associates viewed his manipulation of his public image. As Frankfurter wrote to
Roosevelt, he was reacting to the newspapers he read while in Oxford, England. In direct
reference to Roosevelt’s most recent fireside chat, Frankfurter wrote, “I ventured [sic] to
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tell you that not the least important basis for your hold on the people is their feeling that
you are a truth-teller and not a miracle-worker.”51 Roosevelt’s most recent truth had been
telling the people the hard reality that economic turnaround would not happen overnight.
Though this may have been a truthful analysis passed on to the public from the great
leader, in reality, it also setup the New Deal for greater longevity and continuing public
support despite programs that would ultimately do little to end the Great Depression. It
was to Roosevelt’s benefit to shape the public opinion by explaining the difficulty of the
economic situation in terms they could understand. Any failure on the part of the New
Deal programs to reinvigorate the economy would simply seem a part of this hard reality
and no reflection on Roosevelt himself.
Roosevelt’s manipulation of people was a lifelong endeavor that began at a very
young age and continued into his presidency. One aspect of Roosevelt’s skills of
manipulation included the cloaking of his emotion. Roosevelt traded regular outward
emotions for constant ebullience, charisma, and good humor. Roosevelt may have
learned this trick as a child. After Roosevelt’s elderly father suffered a heart attack in
1891, leaving him an invalid, Roosevelt “tried to spare his father anxiety by masking his
own emotions and projecting a calm, cheerful demeanor.”52 This was one characteristic
that epitomized Roosevelt, who, even in the darkest of times, was cheerful and humorous.
However, Roosevelt was just as good at physical deception as he was at emotional
deception. During his college days, Roosevelt kept his courtship and later engagement to
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Eleanor Roosevelt a complete secret from his overbearing mother. This was no small
task, considering the familial bond between Franklin and Eleanor.53
After he became involved in politics, Roosevelt further honed his manipulative
and deceptive skills. One innate problem for Roosevelt during his early political career
was his elite status, a considerable problem to overcome in order to win a majority of
votes from middle and lower class citizens. Seeing promise, political journalist Louis M.
Howe joined Roosevelt’s campaigns to help mold his image into something acceptable to
the public. With Howe’s help, Roosevelt quickly learned that being part of the aristocracy
was something to overcome, not flaunt. This was simply the first step in Roosevelt’s
creation of a public political persona. Roosevelt knew to project himself as a man of the
people, despite his elite background, and proved to be inwardly devious and complicated.
As president, the wealthy, elite Roosevelt illustrated deception in his ability to take on
issues that affected real people through his countless New Deal work programs, rural
electrification projects under the Tennessee Valley Authority, and his famous fireside
chats that boiled down complicated issues to a friendly conversation that anyone could
understand. To most people around Roosevelt, even his family, he was so adept at his
man of the people role that his closest companions did not even know the real man and
lost sight of his underlying political ambitions.54
Roosevelt’s greatest public deception undoubtedly came from his ability to
conceal his disability after 1924. Americans in the twenties, thirties, and forties were
53
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very familiar with Roosevelt’s plight with poliomyelitis; however, what most did not
know was that Roosevelt remained completely paralyzed from his waist down. The
majority of Americans who knew of his illness unknowingly assumed he had recovered.
Knowing that the public would see his disability as a major weakness in a leader and
would keep him from high-level politics, Roosevelt went to elaborate lengths to hide it
from the public. Few photographs exist of Roosevelt in his wheelchair; the handful that
do survive are personal family photos. Roosevelt’s public persona was so mammoth by
his 1932 run for the presidency that he was able to make a deal with the press to never
photograph him in his wheelchair. At the same time, Roosevelt opted to avoid any public
appearance in his wheelchair. On the campaign trail, Roosevelt spoke from the rear
balcony of his train car or from his personal automobile. With immense upper body
strength, Roosevelt propped himself upright on stiff metal leg braces. Roosevelt had his
pants cut long and his leg braces painted black so they nearly disappeared under his
clothing. Podiums gave him a place to balance while cars and chairs blurred the fact that
he could not stand. Foremost, Roosevelt went to outstanding lengths to stage public
appearances. Arriving hours ahead of time in some cases, Roosevelt was able to make
sure no one saw him in a wheelchair. Additionally, bystanders saw Roosevelt hoisting
himself between two people to give the illusion of walking in many public forums.
Combined with Roosevelt’s jovial outward emotions, those who knew of his disability
said he did not act like a disabled man and hence, most were able to overlook his
paralysis.55
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However, Roosevelt used his disability when he needed to politically. Generally
known for appearing completely healthy, Roosevelt appeared in 1924, shortly after his
paralysis, at the Democratic Convention on crutches in order to nominate Al Smith.
Though Smith lost the nomination, Roosevelt gained political prestige. Roosevelt
appeared courageous for overcoming his illness and appearing on stage with crutches in a
weakened state, and he gave an invigorating nomination speech that earned him nods
from leading Democrats. Roosevelt used his disability as a strength in certain
circumstances; he more easily persuaded people because they wanted to believe this man
with such an incredible story of recovery.56 How Roosevelt chose to use or hide his
disability was a unique political attribute that only he could utilize for his benefit.
In addition to his public persona, Roosevelt also carefully watched public opinion
through the use of surveys, illustrating his skill for gaging public interest. Although
public opinion did not control Roosevelt’s policies, he used frequent polls to determine
how he needed to steer the public in the right direction. In one example, early on in the
war effort, Roosevelt tested his power as Commander in Chief in the public’s eye.
Attorney General Oscar Cox noted a tally of opinion poll results in a 1943 memorandum
on the question of whether or not the president as Commander in Chief needed to consult
Congress before making important decisions on the war effort. Nearly eighty percent of
Americans polled said it was perfectly acceptable for the president to make decisions
without Congress under these circumstances. This initial poll was only for the Roosevelt
evidence in its support exists. The Roosevelt library supports the story, however, referring to it as a
“gentleman’s agreement” based simply on trust between the two parties—a method of bygone eras.
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administration’s use, but in the memorandum between Cox and Roosevelt advisor Harry
Hopkins, Cox noted:
An attempt ought to be made to get across to the public some of the historical and
other reasons why the Chief Executive, in time of war, has to have a good deal of
scope in decisions in the same way that a Commanding General in the field does.
…After this is done, there ought to be another poll run, with the idea in mind that
the poll itself would be made public and have its own effect on public opinion.57
This instance not only illustrated Roosevelt’s skill in gauging public opinion, but also the
extent to which he and his administration attempted to manipulate that opinion. By
making the opinion poll public, those who did not agree with the president’s
overwhelming decision-making power as Commander in Chief might strongly reconsider
it in the face of a contrary opinion held by the majority polled. Additionally, Congress
had to answer to a public that stood in support of their Commander in Chief.
As president, Truman was not nearly as adroit as his predecessor at molding the
public, yet he brought his own skills of persuasion to the political game. Whereas
Roosevelt often meant for his speeches to manipulate public opinion or create a certain
image, Truman’s presentations were generally straightforward attempts to outline public
policy that were simply persuasive in their honesty. When Neustadt reminisced about the
Truman staff in his 1953 report, he focused on Truman’s speeches to the public and his
relationship with the media. Neustadt contended that lawyers, economists, and public
administration people were the ones busy writing Truman’s speeches, not professional
speechwriters. As a result, Truman’s speeches were not generally captivating, but they
were informative and clearly illustrated the administration’s policies. Truman’s speeches
were generally short and choppy with no attention paid to eloquence. This “earthy,
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combative speaking style” served to be strangely persuasive since the public associated it
with Truman’s own ordinariness and willingness to work hard. However, whereas
Roosevelt utilized every opportunity to manipulate the public, his policies, and his staff,
Truman’s staff could easily manipulate him. As special counsel to the president, Charles
Murphy helped prepare many speeches for Truman. Murphy could easily influence the
presentation to the public through the word choice, chosen issues of importance, and
timing. Unlike Roosevelt, a natural leader, who maintained ultimate expertise on all
administration issues, Truman instead relied upon others. This reliance was evident in
Truman’s presentation at press conferences. Truman initially won respect from the press
for being a “straight talker.” If Truman did not know the answer to a question, he did
know exactly who in his administration could answer it and pointed the reporter in that
direction. Truman was also adept at peppering his discussions with profanity if the
conversation warranted it, showing glimpses of his temper. The press appreciated this as
a dramatic change from the evasive Roosevelt administration that never gave a
straightforward answer to any question.58
Though Truman’s bluntness initially won him accolades publicly, his lack of skill
in public presentation created a continuous problem for him as he moved toward his
second term in office. Truman noted in his diary entry for February 8, 1948, “I hate
headline hunters and showmen as a class and individually. It’s too bad I’m not a
showman. My predecessor was, and I suppose profited politically by it.”59 Truman
continued, “Fate put me here, and fate can keep me here or put me out—and out would
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suit me better.”60 Truman was certainly no showman and what little skill he possessed in
this arena seemed to dissipate rapidly when contrasted with Roosevelt. Part of Truman’s
difficulty with the media stemmed from his characteristic stubbornness. Though both
Roosevelt and Truman had certain goals in mind throughout their presidencies, Roosevelt
understood the art of manipulation and deception in order to achieve those goals and
make the people around him believe they wanted to achieve them as well. Truman held
steadfast to his own ideals and often neglected public opinion when it did not mesh with
his personal policies. In a diary entry from January of 1947, Truman jotted, “Read the
morning papers as usual. Some gave me hell and some did not. It makes no difference
what the papers say if you are right.”61 Later in May of 1948, Truman wrote to his sister
Mary Jane that he “had thought that pictures and the radio would cure the news liars—but
they—the liars—have taken over both.”62 What these notes illustrated was that Truman
failed to appreciate the connection between the media, the public, and the need for
devious strategies that Roosevelt embraced.
As Truman’s outward appearance and presentations faltered throughout his
second term in office when he dealt with an unpopular war and a burgeoning state of
continuous warfare, he turned toward more covert means to achieve his prerogatives. It
was Truman’s ultimate lack of skill that forced him to lead a campaign of “fuzzy
language.” Since Truman did not possess the overt rhetorical power of Roosevelt, who
could simply speak to the people and convince them to follow his plans, he had to turn to
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more covert activities. Truman had lost face with the public and could not openly
manipulate them as Roosevelt had, so he began to use purposely-ambiguous language.
This fuzzy language was most evident in Truman’s discussions of war and peace after
World War II (See Chapter 2). Use of confusing and often vague language and
terminology, making the truth “blurry” or “fuzzy,” allowed Truman to continue his
defense goal, extending the benefits of war under the pretext of peace, while avoiding a
direct confrontation with the unpopular sentiments of the American public. Militarization
of propaganda during the early fifties under the new national security state apparatus
allowed the president complete control over propaganda as Commander in Chief, giving
Truman the ability to mold continuous warfare into whatever he wanted.63 Though
Truman did not directly create continuous warfare, the nondescript nature of the often
murky, liminal zone between peace and war following WWII lent an advantage to
Truman in his national defense plans, which helped to solidify this state of nontraditional
war.
One final skill as Chief Executive upon which Roosevelt and Truman varied a
great deal revolved around the concept of the “inner circle.” Most presidents rely upon
someone or a group of people to act both as a sounding board for ideas, policy, and other
administrative prerogatives and to serve as advisers. Those kept closest to the president,
whom he relied upon most frequently, might become known as his inner circle. These
personal connections often aided the president in his daily tasks and made the executive
office run more efficiently. Neustadt contended that the president’s “strength or
weakness…turns on his personal capacity to influence the conduct of the men who make
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up government.”64 Neustadt’s analysis held true in the president’s relationship with
Congress, but also in his personal relationships amongst his staff and Cabinet. Though
presidents generally make the final decision on important issues, their connection to their
closest advisers can greatly impact the direction in which those decisions turn.
Roosevelt had few close, personal advisers upon whom he relied for information
that might impact his final decisions, showing a lack of skill in creating an inner circle.
James Roosevelt, the president’s son, argued that Roosevelt had no confidants. As
discussed above, Roosevelt rarely, if ever, showed his true demeanor to those around
him. This aloofness allowed Roosevelt to manipulate people in a very calculated manner
for his purposes, but it also removed the true availability of any close advisers,
confidants, or friends. Roosevelt’s son also argued that Eleanor Roosevelt, the First
Lady, failed to be a confidant despite her sharing in one of the closest relationships the
president maintained.65 Instead, Roosevelt had a frequently changing circle of people
around him, as opposed to a more permanent inner circle. This constantly changing
group of people, who always agreed with the president, allowed Roosevelt to keep his
upbeat mood and continue his persona. However, these friends were essentially
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artificial.66 Additionally, as can be seen in his archives, though people often offered
Roosevelt advice and Roosevelt often asked specific questions of certain people, he
rarely followed this information unquestioningly. This leads one to believe that
Roosevelt’s outward joviality was truly a persona and he made most decisions entirely on
his own. Few presidents would have the confidence to follow Roosevelt’s lead in this
arena.
The few relationships Roosevelt pursued within his staff seemed to be more for
his own use than personal respect associated with a trusted adviser or inner circle.
Roosevelt’s relations with General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and
Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, became more important from
1940 through 1941 when the United States was rearming for war. “Roosevelt established
very close and direct working relationships with both chiefs. He came to rely upon them
and their staffs for war plans, strategic and rearmament advice, legislative initiatives for
the armed forces, and getting those initiatives through Congress,” noted historian Mark
A. Stoler.67 Roosevelt’s manipulation of the Joint Army-Navy Board complicated the
idea of a truly close relationship, however. By using Marshall and Stark as military
experts, the president could push his own legislative initiatives through Congress without
a fight. The Lend-Lease Program, Cash and Carry, and the Destroyer-Bases Deal of
1940 that helped to propel the United States into World War II, even if unofficially, were
all orchestrated by Roosevelt and carried out with the backing of Marshall and Stark. To
emphasize this difference between an inner circle-type relationship and one of
66
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manipulation and deception, Roosevelt met with the Joint Army-Navy Board whenever
he pleased, which meant as a group or individually. There was little purpose for meeting
with the two chiefs individually, unless it was to play them, or their information, off one
another in typical Roosevelt style. Additionally, Roosevelt demanded that no one kept
notes of any of these meetings.68 It stood to reason that someone should have carefully
noted advice, which Roosevelt intended to use in whole, for future reference, but
Roosevelt flourished when he maintained uncertainty amongst his staff and complete
control in his decisions.
The lack of notes from Roosevelt’s meetings acted as another indicator that he led
a highly individualistic administration, which relied upon manipulative tactics and
neglect of an inner circle. In the 1946 Rowe memorandum on presidential relationships
with Congress, Rowe noted under “suggestions for improvement” that there be a
secretary appointed to take notes at meetings. Rowe avowed, “The serious flaw in the
Roosevelt conferences was that the five men had pleasant conversations and ‘settled’ a
great number of problems. But there was no one who wrote down what they agreed to”
or followed up on this information. This lack of notes caused “too much unnecessary
bitterness and frustration” between Roosevelt’s staff, Rowe noted.69 Purposeful creation
of tension that resulted in animosity was an inappropriate action for Roosevelt to take
with those who were supposed to be his closest advisers, yet he did it continually, hosting
regular Monday morning meetings. This again suggested that Roosevelt was using the
people and information for his own purposes and did not want agreements kept in notes
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to restrict him later. Finally, though Roosevelt appeared to rely heavily on Hopkins and
Secretary of State Henry Stimson as advisers whom he saw more frequently than any
other during World War II, it is impossible to know to what level Roosevelt truly relied
upon their advice as opposed to manipulating them for his own purposes.70
In contrast to Roosevelt, Truman relied heavily upon his staff, Cabinet, and other
advisers, showing great political skill in getting along with others. Unlike Roosevelt’s
self-led presidency, Truman focused on improving the institution of the presidency
through these close relationships. Truman also saw having and making friends as a major
priority during his lifetime. One prominent example of this trait can be seen in Truman
and his wartime companions in his unit during World War I. Though Truman only knew
these companions as fellow soldiers in a war, Truman remained friends with them for
life.71 Truman retained this skill inside the White House and sought to foster a close
inner circle of people who were true friends and confidants to the president. In his
confidential, post-Truman administration report from 1953, Neustadt claimed:
Truman was an exceptionally kindly man, a most considerate, even humble
human being in all of his relations with subordinates. …in the White House
office, there was always informality and at least surface friendliness, generally a
high morale, reflecting the President’s own attitudes and personality.72
Truman held a great respect for the institution of the presidency as well as the staff who
worked within it. While Roosevelt engineered everything and everyone within his
administration, Truman relied upon his staff members as a true inner circle and a part of
the structure of the executive branch on which future presidents would rely.
70

Rowe to Clifford, December 1946, CP, HSTL; Brinkley, Roosevelt, 79-80.

71

Greenstein, Presidential Difference, 40-41; Underhill, FDR and Harry, 37.

72

Neustadt, “Notes,” June 1953, TP, HSTL.

59
The increase in size of the presidential staff under Truman also illustrated to what
extent he relied upon them as president. Aside from Truman’s abrupt transition to the
presidency in 1945, the presidential staff grew steadily throughout his time in office.
Whereas Truman had sixteen staffers in 1948, prior to his reelection, his staff grew to
twenty-two full time members by 1952. In comparison, Roosevelt’s staff, even with his
reorganization of the Executive Branch and overall increase in Executive Branch staff,
only numbered seventeen members in 1944, which included those officials of the Office
of War Mobilization. In addition, under Truman, part-time personnel, officials of other
agencies, and private citizens may all have been included as executive “staff” at one time
or another on top of this official count. Truman met with his full staff and military aides
six mornings a week, in comparison to Roosevelt’s once a week meeting with important
officials. These daily meetings generally lasted around thirty minutes and staffers were
encouraged to bring up any issue they wanted, or the president might in turn quiz them
for information on certain issues. Truman was also able to move physically around the
White House to a much greater extent than Roosevelt, so he frequently stopped into
staffers’ offices to find out information or visit outside of these official meetings.73 Due
to the collegial nature of the Truman administration and the president himself, staffers
felt important to Truman’s decisions and readily offered their own advice. Truman,
unwilling or unable to play people off one another in the way Roosevelt did, often relied
upon this information to make decisions.
Truman also utilized the Executive Cabinet far more extensively than Roosevelt.
In a 1945 letter to Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Truman considered the idea of
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lunching at least twice a week with the full Cabinet at the White House. These lunches
“would keep all of us in closer touch,” Truman argued, and “also give me an opportunity
to have the whole Cabinet in my complete confidence as to what is going on.”74 Unlike
Roosevelt who practically disregarded his Cabinet members, Truman sought to direct the
Executive Branch through the Cabinet, creating a structured presidency that operated
outside of personal presidential attributes.75 Truman relied upon his Cabinet as experts
and regularly sought their advice, which he followed closely.
Management Style
Aside from each man’s individual skills as chief executive, Roosevelt and Truman
also utilized unique management styles based on their own personalities, prior
experience, and abilities. Even though Roosevelt and Truman were different in
management style, this difference marked a turn away from an individualistic perspective
of the presidency toward a more formal, structured institution that could support an
imperial presidency.76 Greenstein noted that “The United States is said to have a
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government of laws and institutions rather than individuals, but…it is one in which the
matter of who occupies the nation’s highest office can have profound repercussions.”77
Greenstein was correct in presuming that the man in office can make a difference, but it
is the underlying structure of power that any president might seek to utilize, which
controls the potentiality of an imperial presidency. In the case of Roosevelt, Roosevelt’s
competitive management style set up a vast amount of power housed in a single
individual, Roosevelt the mediator. Truman’s collegial style, which was more easily
copied and adjusted by future presidents, set up a more structured system that worked for
anyone in the position of president if they were willing to take advantage of it.
Additionally, because of Truman’s collegial nature, his policies focused on creating more
structured teams available at the president’s disposal for decisions and advice, such as the
National Security Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
In order to understand better the significance of this change in management style
from Roosevelt to Truman, one must better understand how each president instituted his
method. As previously mentioned, Roosevelt gleaned many of his executive skills from
his own personal upbringing and struggles. Roosevelt’s presidential management style
was no exception, and one might easily trace many of his methods to his background. As
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a young man with an overbearing mother, Roosevelt quickly learned how to use
misdirection or devious manipulation in order to both hide his true feelings and get what
he wanted. Likewise, Roosevelt’s struggle with polio and paralysis caused him to adjust
his relationship with his family members long before he became president. During his
initial recovery from polio, Roosevelt went to extreme lengths to avoid the demands of
his family. These moves included the pitting of one family member against another, such
as Roosevelt’s wife Eleanor and his mother Sarah. Eleanor and Sarah spent their time
nursing Franklin Roosevelt back to health embroiled in a bitter argument over whether he
should resign himself to being a disabled country gentlemen coddled by his mother for
the rest of his life or to working his way back into politics and dealing with his disability
head-on. Roosevelt preferred the latter but found it difficult to reason with his mother or
go directly against her wishes and her money. Since Eleanor felt equally strongly about
Franklin’s ultimate recovery and return to politics, he used her to fight the battle with
Sarah. Additionally, Roosevelt distanced himself from his family in order to avoid
confrontation on many issues. This included the permanent separation of Franklin and
Eleanor’s sleeping arrangements.78 Roosevelt used these same attributes in creating his
unique, competitive management style as president, in which he forced people against
one another, avoided confrontation on the issues, and created an impervious, deceptive
persona.
Just as Roosevelt did with his family, he sought to figure out a way to manipulate
his staff in order to get the best result according to his needs. Foremost, Roosevelt never
78
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lacked talented advisers, but his push for bipartisanship and the bringing together of
experts in a variety of fields outside of politics created instant turmoil in his
administration. While Roosevelt installed people he knew would be easy to control in
certain positions, such as Donald Nelson who led the War Production Board, he also had
to figure out a way to deal with the variety of advice and expertise coming from his own
coalition of the best and brightest.79 Roosevelt’s solution was a management style of
fierce inter-staff competition, in a “competitive adhocracy,” a term coined by Neustadt.
What Roosevelt discovered in appointing so many intellectual experts to his
administration was that they were extremely ambitious and he could make them very
competitive when played off one another. According to Neustadt, “Competitive
personalities mixed with competing jurisdictions” defined Roosevelt's competitive
adhocracy.80 Under this style, different officials, agencies, or staffers held responsibility
for identical tasks and policies.81 Their competition between each other to get the best
information the quickest yielded the greatest results to Roosevelt who did minimal work
to get the most information and held the final decision on the task. Since Roosevelt was
the only one who knew the extent to which he was orchestrating this competition, who
was involved, and exactly what would be the repercussions for a task undone, people did
as he told them to do. Competitive adhocracy “worked to make him [Roosevelt] the
referee and thus concentrate power in the White House.”82 However, as noted by the lack
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of an inner circle in the Roosevelt administration, this competitive management style
created bitter feuds and caused most to resent Roosevelt even as they followed his
command. No other president has ever used a competitive management style to the
extent of Roosevelt’s competitive adhocracy, which depended for its success on his
acquired background and skills.83
Despite Roosevelt’s lack of desire to make a clear-cut decision on an issue, he
was largely unable to give up his hold on the power of decision-making within the White
House. According to Truman’s diary from 1948 regarding his issues with foreign policy,
“I was handicapped by lack of knowledge of both foreign and domestic affairs—due
principally to Mr. Roosevelt’s inability to pass on responsibility. He was always careful
to see that no credit went to anyone else for accomplishment.”84 Truman knew that
Roosevelt could not possibly have done all the work himself, yet somehow Roosevelt
usually came out with the credit for successes. Roosevelt did not, in fact, like to make
firm decisions, leading to further and further complications surrounding an unresolved
issue. A decision made closed off an opportunity for the president, so Roosevelt kept
stretching the process.85
Roosevelt’s complicated competitive management style essentially allowed him
to engineer the White House staff for his own sole benefit. In a more hierarchical
management pattern, Roosevelt would have been the last to know the details and make
decisions, but Roosevelt set his own deadlines to fit his prerogatives and manipulated the
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information gatherers around him, so he was always the first or second to know the most
valuable information. As a result of Roosevelt’s placement at the helm of all information
and decision-making opportunities, he often gave the illusion that he did not need his
Cabinet and could effectively run everything himself. Most famously, Roosevelt
operated as his own Secretary of State, which seemed to fit with Truman’s above analysis
of the Roosevelt presidency. As a result of his time as Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Roosevelt felt that he had a special knowledge of foreign affairs and perpetually sought to
bypass advice from all Cabinet members dealing with foreign affairs and military
operations. Likewise, Roosevelt’s creation of the Joint Army-Navy Board, the precursor
to Truman’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, was in effect, his own method for disregarding the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. The Joint Army-Navy Board could provide
Roosevelt with military advice directly from members of the military instead of having it
filtered through his Cabinet.86 In a memorandum to Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt’s
formal Secretary of State, from March of 1944, Roosevelt discussed his desire to
establish a free port on the gulf of lower California below the Mexican-American border.
In a show of Roosevelt’s ability to be his own Secretary of State, Roosevelt planned to
disregard the State Department’s negative recommendation on this plan as the Mexican
Government stood in opposition. Roosevelt told Stettinius, “My information, which
comes from a better source, is to the contrary.”87 Likewise, Roosevelt’s distaste for note
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keeping at policy meetings illustrated his feeling that he did not need a record of
information he saw as less significant than that which he already possessed.88
In contrast, Truman’s management style was considerably more collegial than
Roosevelt’s, yet allowed him to hold a firm position as final decision maker. Truman’s
daily meetings with the White House staff promoted the camaraderie and loyalty that
Roosevelt’s administration had forfeited for competition. Most markedly, Truman’s
managerial style reflected that of a Senate office. Whereas Truman remained primarily
informal and accessible to staffers, advisors, and others inside the White House, he only
dealt with actual decisions as they came up. Unlike Roosevelt, Truman rarely pieced
together bits of information from a variety of sources in order to make a decision.
Instead, Truman was more likely to rely on those around him or what he read for the
information that allowed him to make decisions.89 Truman did not engineer the process
behind his information-getting but relied upon those with assigned duties to do as they
should. In a January 1946 letter to Secretary of State James Byrnes that Truman wrote
but never sent, Truman illustrated his managerial philosophy. Truman wrote:
As you know, I would like to pursue a policy of delegating authority to the
members of the cabinet in their various fields and then back them up in the
results. But in doing that and in carrying out that policy I do not intend to turn
over the complete authority of the President nor to forgo the President’s
prerogative to make the final decision.90
This position ultimately caused some problems for Truman as those around him learned
that they could much more easily manipulate him than his predecessor. People who were
not hardened supporters of the New Deal and Roosevelt philosophy swarmed around
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Truman. Men like Treasury Secretary and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Fred
M. Vinson, Matthew Connelly, and naval aide Jake Vardaman advocated a change from
many of Roosevelt’s earlier policies, pushing Truman further from the upkeep of his
predecessor’s legacy. Truman replaced many “New Dealers” from the Roosevelt
administration with more conservative administrators and these men soon pushed Truman
in a different direction.91 This change helped foster confusion over the administration’s
direction, especially when it came to the post-war world, creating a perpetual zone
somewhere between traditional peace and traditional war. Unlike Roosevelt, Truman
enjoyed making decisions once he had the information on a topic, but never claimed to be
an expert on everything like Roosevelt; Truman took the advice of those around him even
to his ultimate detriment.
Truman’s stubborn decision-making ability varied greatly when compared with
Roosevelt’s method of extreme complication and habitual delay related to making
decisions on the record. It was from this stubborn stance that Truman’s famous “buck
stops here” management style was born. Truman best illustrated this position in a July
1948 diary entry about a recent meeting with Secretary of State Marshall and Secretary of
Defense James Forrestal on the Russian situation in Germany. Truman noted, “I don’t
pass the buck, nor do I alibi out of any decision I make.”92 In this particular instance,
Truman kept telling his staff to stay in Berlin, reiterating his policy of making a decision
and sticking to it.93 Likewise, Truman made decisions quickly and moved on to other
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things. In a diary entry on the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, Truman
wrote that he “banged through” the proposals presented as part of the Minister’s agenda
in one day, which both surprised British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and pleased
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Truman wrote to himself, “I’m not going to stay around
this terrible place all summer just to listen to speeches. I’ll go home to the Senate for
that.”94 Whereas Roosevelt might have carefully weighed his options and information,
determining the best outcome for himself personally, Truman made a decision quickly
and stood by it. Greenstein implied in The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style
from FDR to Barack Obama that presidents are more likely to leave an individual mark
on the office since the modern presidency began with Roosevelt and underwent
fundamental changes.95 In Truman’s case, his decisions did steer the country in a
different direction than those of Roosevelt, but Greenstein’s analysis bypassed the
underlying structure of power that included the congressional check on most presidential
decisions. Whereas Greenstein’s argument implied a particular person might be a strong
president, further analysis of the Truman administration and its interaction with the other
branches showed that an underlying structure was necessary for an imperial presidency to
occur.
Knowledge of Foreign Affairs
Both Roosevelt and Truman’s knowledge of warfare, foreign affairs and the
subsequent relationship with the Soviet Union depended heavily upon their political
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methodology and their different backgrounds. Roosevelt often relied upon his own
personal knowledge and experience as president, much of it coming from his extensive
travel during his youth and early manhood. Principally, a young Roosevelt saw most of
Western Europe on regular family trips abroad. However much Roosevelt drew on this
past experience as president, the world geographically and politically varied a great deal
after World War I, leaving Roosevelt’s knowledge woefully out of date. Also, after
becoming ill with polio, Roosevelt did not leave the United States for years, retaining his
earlier understanding of geopolitical connections.96 Additionally, Roosevelt’s only
experience in the military before being Commander in Chief was his stint as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson from 1913 through 1920.
Although Roosevelt had never served as a sailor in the military, he had a fondness for
sailing and ships, and a detailed knowledge of the Navy, which impressed those around
him as assistant secretary.97 However, Roosevelt’s job mostly consisted of inspecting
Navy yards or ships, and making public appearances. Roosevelt did occasionally travel
in this position, though mostly to Europe regarding the British Navy and American naval
aide, so his knowledge of the world was again limited.
Roosevelt took away several things from his time serving in the Wilson
administration, however. Roosevelt developed a nationalistic view of American
government in part due to its advanced naval equipment and through an historical
connection with Theodore Roosevelt’s personal views as assistant secretary of the Navy.
Roosevelt also held a truly international view of the world and American relations due to
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Wilsonian internationalism. One important lesson that Roosevelt learned from the
Wilson administration was not to move too quickly on important international policy,
which he observed firsthand with the failed attempt at US membership in Wilson’s
League of Nations. Foremost, the experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during
World War I taught Roosevelt that isolationism, which was really the belief in American
exceptionalism, was over; the United States had to play a part in world affairs in the
future.98
As president, Roosevelt relished the potential of being a true Commander in Chief
and returned to much of his previous experience with foreign affairs. In a June 10, 1940
speech given at the University of Virginia commencement ceremony, Roosevelt warned
against isolationism. Roosevelt contended:
Some indeed still hold to the now somewhat obvious delusion that we of the
United States can safely permit the United States to become a lone island, a lone
island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force.
Such an island may be the dream of those who still talk and vote as
isolationists. Such an island represents to me and to the overwhelming majority of
Americans today a helpless nightmare of a people without freedom—the
nightmare of a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the
bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying masters of other
continents.99
Roosevelt pleaded that as a “lone island” the United States would not be left alone in a
safety of ignorance, which isolationists of the time believed, but would be drawn into
conflicts and left to the mercy of other more militant countries. Roosevelt recalled his
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time in the Wilson administration when isolationism had merely delayed US entrance and
ultimate preparedness for an inevitable place in the Great War. Even before giving this
speech, Roosevelt showed his international stance by taking an interest in the island of
Fernando de Noronha off the coast of Brazil in South America. In a memorandum to
Stark in April of 1940, Roosevelt discussed this island and his interest in making sure
European nations would not use it if the war spread.100 In reality, Roosevelt was
preparing for the war to spread as it was truly a global conflict, and was securing US
safety.
Although Roosevelt made preparations for war long before US involvement,
when he ran for an unprecedented third term in office, Roosevelt secured his place as a
wartime president. While all US presidents are additionally denoted Commander in
Chief at all times, the powers of the post are generally limited to periods of conflict.
Additionally, most presidents see their titles as implicitly interchangeable and
ceremonial, paying little heed to titles in peace versus war. Much like Roosevelt
envisioned the presidency with himself as president, he also viewed himself as the sole
Commander in Chief of all the military, and he jealously guarded the title. Roosevelt
even objected to its use elsewhere amongst members of the military, for example,
Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, Admiral Ernest King. Roosevelt first referred to
himself as Commander in Chief in a memorandum to Secretary of War Harry Woodring
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and Marshall in May of 1940 as the US prepared for rearmament, and he continued to do
so throughout the war.101
Roosevelt was not just concerned with the title of Commander in Chief, however,
but with the explicit powers that came along with the title during periods of conflict.
Much like Roosevelt controlled the government concerning domestic issues with his
complicated New Deal programming, unique management style, and personal skills, he
also sought to control all aspects of US foreign affairs and national defense with the
powers inherent in the role of Commander in Chief. In a 1940 memorandum from
Roosevelt to a White House economic advisor, Lauchlin Currie, Roosevelt discussed a
recent resolution proposed by Wisconsin Governor and presidential hopeful, Philip La
Follette. La Follette, an opponent of US entrance into World War II, sought a special
council to oversee executive orders that set aside legislation dealing with national defense
issues. Though the Congress could officially overturn any executive orders with more
legislation, Roosevelt felt that an outright restriction on executive powers regarding
national defense was unconstitutional.102 Roosevelt continued to seek legal advice on his
powers as Commander in Chief throughout 1940 and 1941 as a result. In a letter from
Attorney General Francis Biddle to Roosevelt, Biddle quoted an excerpt from Executive
Powers Under National Emergency published in October 1939. As Biddle stated:
‘The executive has powers not enumerated in the statutes—powers derived not
from statutory grants but from the Constitution. It is universally recognized that
the constitutional duties of the Executive carry with them the constitutional
powers necessary for their proper performance. These constitutional powers have
never been specifically defined, and in fact cannot be, since their extent and
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limitations are largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances. In a
measure this is true with respect to most of the powers of the Executive both
constitutional and statutory.’103
Biddle’s information coalesced into a later statement put together by the Office of the
Assistant Solicitor General and sent out to the heads of the executive departments in
October of 1942. This statement, titled “The Powers of the President in Time of War,”
confirmed that the president had special war and emergency powers from both the
Constitution and various acts of Congress. Most importantly, however, was the
president’s constitutional role as Commander in Chief. According to the statement, the
Commander in Chief Clause of the Constitution “gives him [the president] not only the
final decision in the conduct of actual military operations, but also empowers him to take
other emergency steps in order to ensure that those operations will be successful.”104
Roosevelt had his director of public relations send this statement to the heads of
the executive departments and of various government divisions to solidify his power as
president, specifically under the purview of his role as Commander in Chief. The
statement reiterated the powerful blur between civilian and military matters during
periods of conflict. “In total war, the line running through our ‘common strength,’
marking where the commands to the military end and demands upon the civilian begin,
grows ever fainter as it is crossed and recrossed by the needs of a nation fighting for its
life,” noted the statement. Whereas Roosevelt had to manipulate people carefully in his
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earlier domestic battles, his constitutionally sanctioned role as Commander in Chief gave
him more power over naysayers and a greater ability to control what happened in
government.
As Commander in Chief, Roosevelt, as always, paid close attention to
governmental and public relationships that might hamper his wartime goals, constantly
working to shift opinions toward his own. During his first and part of his second term in
office, Roosevelt focused on domestic issues and remained outwardly antiwar. The
public was largely concerned with the devastating effects of the financial collapse and
sought recovery, which Roosevelt reflected with his focus on New Deal legislation. In an
opinion poll taken in November 1936, ninety-five percent of Americans believed that the
US should not take part in another war like World War I, with seventy percent believing
that the US entrance into World War I had been a complete mistake. Roosevelt used
opinion polls regularly to judge how he should shift war sentiment in the public mind.105
Likewise, Roosevelt returned to his masterful use of radio to connect with the people and
convince them, over time, that US involvement in the war was imminent. In Roosevelt’s
fireside chat of September 3, 1939, in which he focused on the beginning of war in
Europe, he proclaimed, “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all
countries everywhere is in danger.”106 Roosevelt also played off the still heavily
isolationist tendencies of Americans later in the discussion. Roosevelt noted:
It is easy for you and for me to shrug our shoulders and to say that conflicts taking
place thousands of miles from the continental United States, and, indeed,
thousands of miles from the whole American Hemisphere, do not seriously affect
the Americas—and that all the United States has to do is to ignore them and go
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about its own business. Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are
forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails
the sea, every battle that is fought, does affect the American future.107
Roosevelt then pledged not to send American soldiers to Europe and advocated neutrality
legislation; however, he also emphasized his inability to prophesize the future.108
Through Roosevelt’s skills of manipulation, he knew that he could win loyalty
with time. What Roosevelt did not want to do was move too quickly, much as Wilson
had attempted to do regarding the League of Nations. Most likely, Roosevelt also wanted
to avoid the same backlash that had come with his “Quarantine Speech” of October 5,
1937, which had officially marked his personal move toward a focus on an active foreign
policy.109 Drawing on images of murdered women and children, and submarine battered
ships sinking in flames, Roosevelt had announced, “If those things come to pass in other
parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect
mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked.”110 Though European
politicians applauded this early speech and looked at it as a firm acceptance of US
support for China against Japanese aggression, those on the home front were not as
thrilled with the world reaction. As described in the Christian Science Monitor, the
public generally accepted Roosevelt’s speech for its utterances of peace, but many
newspapers questioned the true meaning behind his words claiming he really argued for a
personal mandate to do what he wanted regarding US involvement in the war or that he
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was on a crusade that involved the United States.111 The Boston Herald Tribune
commented, “It may be true that ‘the very foundations of civilization are seriously
threatened.’ But this time, Mr. President, Americans will not be stampeded into going
3000 miles across water to save them.”112 With such a backlash, Roosevelt quickly
understood that it took more than one inspiring speech to sway public opinion toward
another world war.
As Roosevelt slowly persuaded the public toward war while proclaiming US
neutrality, he also worked behind the scenes to involve the United States in something
akin to an undeclared war. Historiographically, traditionalist views of the United States’
entrance into World War II emphasized the reality of a true Axis threat to the United
States, which made US involvement inevitable. Revisionist perspectives, first
illuminated by Charles Beard in his 1948 work President Roosevelt and the Coming of
the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities, and popular in the 1950s,
suggested that the Axis Powers posed no actual threat to the United States but that
Roosevelt instead looked for a “back door” to the war.113 A back door entrance into the
war allowed the United States to participate without being an obvious aggressor,
reinvigorating the economy and propelling the US to the status of a world power.
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Warfare also allowed the president a unique opportunity to take advantage of his role as
Commander in Chief and solidify his historic place as a wartime leader.
Roosevelt looked for this back door, subtly, through legislative changes that
gradually involved the US more and more in the war effort before finally gaining
entrance through the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December of 1941.114
Evidence of Roosevelt’s willingness to utilize a “back door” or form of undeclared war
can be found as far back as 1938, when in a memorandum to his son, James Roosevelt, he
suggested that old fashioned declared war was not necessarily the best option in modern
warfare. “National defense is a current day to day problem of administration in the hands
of the President under our Constitution,” Roosevelt noted. “The safeguard is that war
shall not be entered into except by Congressional sanction.”115 However, Roosevelt
claimed:
National defense represents too serious a danger, especially in these modern times
where distance has been annihilated, to permit delay and our danger lies in things
like the Ludlow Amendment which appeal to people who, frankly, have no
conception of what modern war, with or without a declaration of war, involves.116
Prior to 1938, Roosevelt had signed into law the Neutrality Acts of 1936 and 1937. Both
of these laws effectively proclaimed the neutrality of the US, but the 1937 version held an
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amendment that allowed for a “cash-and-carry system” under the president’s
discretion.117 Cash and carry permitted the United States to trade war goods with
belligerent nations under the precept that they pay for the goods up front and carry them
on their own ships. Cloaked by the idea that war between other nations should not
hamper the US economy and its trade privileges, the cash and carry policy effectively
authorized Roosevelt to involve the US in World War II. Despite preaching neutrality,
the US began open trading in war goods in 1937.
Although Roosevelt understood that US entrance into war would be a slow
process, by 1939, when war in Europe was imminent, he began to look for a method of
breaking free from neutrality legislation. In a memorandum from Roosevelt to Secretary
of State Cordell Hull and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles dated March 28, 1939,
Roosevelt told them he wished to repeal the entire Neutrality Act without proposing any
substitute.118 A few months later in July of 1939, Roosevelt remarked to Attorney
General Frank Murphy that he wished to know how far he could go in ignoring the
current Neutrality Act if he could not get something better in its place, even though he
had signed it into law. Roosevelt asked Murphy, “If we fail to get any Neutrality Bill,
how far do you think I can go in ignoring the existing act—even though I did sign it?!”119
By 1939, Roosevelt had come to the realization that cash and carry would not last forever
as finances dried up due to war expenditures, and he instead sought a broader method of
“lend-lease.” A lend-lease system gave the president discretion to lend or lease war
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equipment to other belligerent countries in the interest of the defense of the United States
without directly involving the US in war. Roosevelt pleaded with Congress to amend the
Neutrality Act in mid-1939 to allow for lend lease, but the plan stalled. In March of
1941, Congress finally passed the Lend-Lease Act.120
Outside of looking for a back entrance to the war, Roosevelt also sought to
examine fully his role as Commander in Chief and take advantage of any power that went
along with it. Prior to formal US declaration of war, Roosevelt asked for and received
several reports on laws and powers that went into effect in times of war, national
emergency, and threat of war. In a memorandum to Biddle in October of 1941,
Roosevelt included a list of statutes he had received from the Judge Advocate General’s
Office that were not dependent upon a state of national emergency specifically but rather
“threatened war.” Roosevelt then requested that Biddle check on them and let him know
what additional powers the Constitution or statutory law might confer on the president
through an actual threat of war.121 According to Judge Advocate General W.B.
Woodson, “No determination is made with respect to the question of the authority to
proclaim that war is imminent, that war is threatened, and so forth.” Woodson noted, “It
is assumed such declarations are a function of the President.”122 Through this series of
correspondence between Roosevelt, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, and the
Attorney General, it became apparent that Roosevelt’s power as Commander in Chief
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was largely unrestricted as he, as president, was the one with the sole ability to determine
within what state of war, emergency, or threat the United States was involved. A later
memorandum by M.E. Gilford, Roosevelt’s director of public relations, to the heads of
various divisions affirmed this understanding. In Gilford’s 1942 memo, he enclosed a
statement on “The Powers of the President in Time of War” prepared by the Office of the
Assistant Solicitor General for reference. Biddle was quoted from September of 1941 at
the top of this statement. Biddle noted, “The magnitude of the threatened disaster is the
measure of the president’s power and duty to take steps necessary to avert it.”123
Roosevelt and Biddle had effectively connected the power of the president as
Commander in Chief to the determination of the magnitude of the threat, emergency, or
war. This connection, combined with Roosevelt’s skills and abilities as president, gave
him full reign over the US involvement in World War II. When Roosevelt asked
Congress for a declaration of war in December of 1941, he received a near unanimous
answer in favor of entering World War II, officially.124
After seeing the boom in the economy during World War I, Roosevelt sought to
create this same situation during periods of peace. Roosevelt attempted this primarily
through his cooperative of business, labor, and government most often associated with
the New Deal’s social, economic, and political liberalism. Like many of the time,
Roosevelt firmly believed that if given the choice, other countries would choose to be
like the United States. Roosevelt’s understanding of American exceptionalism or
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Americanism quickly became synonymous with the New Deal once he was president. In
turn, Roosevelt sought to extend the New Deal policies to the rest of the post-WWII
world.125
Since the New Deal was a program instituted during a period of peace, Roosevelt
intended for there to be a lasting world peace after World War II ended as well. In a
letter to Progressive newspaper editor William Allen White in December of 1939,
Roosevelt stated, “I do not entertain the thought of some of the statesmen of 1918 that the
world can make, or we can help the world to achieve, a permanently lasting peace.”
Roosevelt’s concept of a “permanently lasting peace” was “a peace which we would
visualize as enduring for a century or more.”126 This statement seemed contradictory to
what Roosevelt’s expressed as New Deal Americanism and to the later talks at Yalta near
the end of World War II, when Roosevelt noted that peace might be possible for fifty
years. However, Roosevelt’s policies had always been those of a realist.127 Roosevelt
did not know how to fix the economic collapse when he became president in 1933, but he
tried and tried again; the same was true of his wartime policies. While his ultimate goal
was peace, this might mean fifty years as opposed to a century, or it might mean some
countries remaining armed despite peace agreements.
Roosevelt’s policy regarding US-Soviet relations was very much along the same
lines as his plans for the postwar world, constantly in flux. According to Kimball,
Roosevelt did not have a set policy but rather “reacted, shifted, rethought, and

125

Brinkley, Roosevelt, 26; Kimball, The Juggler, 187, 186, 187.

126

FDR to William Allen White, December 14, 1939, in FDR Personal Letters, 967.

127

Kimball, The Juggler, 101, 186.

82
recalculated” constantly.128 Though Roosevelt’s military aides were trained to see the
world for what it was on a factual basis, Roosevelt often acted on a hunch when it came
to military and political policy. Roosevelt’s dealings with the Soviet Union were no
different from anything else, so he turned to public opinion polls and instinct to guide
him. According to a confidential opinion poll from the summer of 1944, a majority of
those polled believed that the US could trust the Soviet Union to cooperate with them
after the war was over. Roosevelt utilized opinion, hunches, and his natural assumptions,
based on personal optimism and reformist impulses, to frame his overall US-Soviet
policy of cooperation. Roosevelt continued to adjust his tactics and strategy in dealing
with the Soviets throughout the war, but this basic premise never changed.129 Though
Roosevelt followed a policy of cooperation with the Soviets even to a fault, according to
some politicos of the 1940s, those closest to him recognized this initially unfavorable
stance as a major piece in the bigger picture of future world peace. Felix Frankfurter
agreed with Roosevelt’s policies early on, noting in a personal letter to Roosevelt, that he
approved of Roosevelt’s recognition of the communist government and willingness to
cooperate with them. “[S]trange as it may seem to some of the politically myopic
opponents of your Russian policy,” Frankfurter contended, “your note to [Soviet leader
Mikhail] Kalinin is calculated to mark the beginning of a most important chapter in the
pursuit of world peace.”130
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As demonstrated by his lack of an inner circle and skills of manipulation,
Roosevelt saw relationships politically, including those with foreign government leaders.
Roosevelt likewise saw nothing wrong with maintaining a political relationship with the
Soviet Union, no matter how unpopular communism was in the United States. Roosevelt
told close associates that there was not a huge difference between the communist Soviet
Union and the United States. Logically, as the US leaned toward an increasingly planned
economy and the USSR became more democratic over time, the two countries would
come to resemble one another more closely. As a result, Roosevelt agreed officially to
establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet regime in November of 1933 after meeting
with Russian diplomat Maxim Litvinov in hopes of improving trade if nothing else. As
Roosevelt saw it, there was nothing to gain by refusing to recognize the communist
government of the USSR, but there might be opportunities with recognition. Along with
trade, Roosevelt believed that a US-Soviet friendship might encourage the USSR to
continue to keep control over her nearby warring neighbor Japan, and eventually join an
alliance of “great powers” that oversaw the world.131 Frankfurter gushed about this
possibility in his letter to Roosevelt in 1933. Frankfurter cited, “Apart from beneficial
economic consequences, your termination of the hostile and anomalous relations between
Russia and the United States may, in view of the new constellation of the Great Powers,
be of really momentous significance to the world’s peace.”132
After the United States became involved in the war effort, Roosevelt sought to
back the Soviets despite their initial pact with Germany. Roosevelt sent Hopkins to the
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USSR in July of 1941 to make a personal connection with Stalin. Hopkins returned with
a favorable impression of the Soviets, though he viewed those below Stalin as mechanical
or machine-like. Although Stalin appeared lacking in human emotion, Hopkins viewed
him as an “intelligent-machine,” and Roosevelt quickly promised aid to the Soviets. By
the end of July, Roosevelt had sent 6.5 million dollars in goods to the Soviet Union with
an estimate of 29 million dollars total sent by October. Roosevelt worked to send more
goods to the Soviets, but immediately began to feel the pull of those in his administration
who disliked the Soviets. Roosevelt kept pushing for a US-Soviet alliance, however, and
in November of 1941, shortly after Germany invaded Russia, he extended Lend-Lease to
the Soviet Union. This extension of Lend-Lease suggested that Roosevelt understood the
strategic importance of the Soviet Union, not just in creating a lasting world peace, but
also in winning the war for the Allies. Later, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to a policy
requiring unconditional surrender from Germany largely in support of Stalin, who
worried incessantly about a US-British alliance with Germany to end the war.133
In order to help foster his personal power as Commander in Chief and oversee
these somewhat unstable political relationships, Roosevelt created a foreign policy of
“personal diplomacy” when dealing with the Allies during the war. Personal diplomacy
fit Roosevelt’s style, and it depended on personal contacts with world leaders and a close
shaping of American foreign policy to reflect Roosevelt’s ever-changing criteria.134 As
an advisor, Frankfurter commented to Roosevelt:
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The impact of events on this side [US-Soviet policy] makes one thing more clear
than ever to me—that the guidance of foreign relations must substantially be in
your own hands…there is such interaction among various issues that do not seem
immediately related that vital decisions must be made by one who sees these
interconnections and is not too immersed in the specific problems as they arise
from day to day.135
Realistically, Roosevelt was the only one who truly understood the interconnections
between his outwardly haphazard ideas and policies, so he had to rely upon himself or
those closest to him to deal with the world leaders.136
Since Roosevelt’s own immobility prevented him from frequent travel abroad for
personal meetings with Churchill and Stalin, he relied upon certain emissaries who fit his
qualifications, mainly agreeing with his personal policy and expertise. One example was
Roosevelt’s reliance upon the advice of former Soviet Ambassador Joseph E. Davies
instead of those pegged as Soviet experts like George F. Kennan or Charles E. Bohlen.
Historians can trace Roosevelt’s reasoning behind this strange admission of outside
expertise back to Davies’ ability to predict early on that a German-Soviet pact would
form when England refused to create a united front against Germany. Roosevelt trusted
Davies and believed that his reports and observations about what went on in the Soviet
Union were those of an impartial observer, giving Roosevelt maximum decision-making
ability. Davies’ popular book, Mission to Moscow, which came out in 1941 and was
made into a movie during the war, showed the Soviet Union in an extremely positive
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light and served as political propaganda. Others within Roosevelt’s administration, like
Major General John Deane who served in the US Embassy in Moscow during WWII,
disagreed with Davies’ interpretation. In a letter between Deane and Marshall in
December of 1944, Deane noted that while he did not dislike the Soviets, he had never
seen the inside of a Soviet home, suggesting that Davies’ Mission to Moscow was an
over-the-top political piece designed to sell a US-Soviet alliance to the American
people.137
The anti-Soviet feelings within Roosevelt’s administration continued to increase
throughout the duration of the war and during peace negotiations, but Roosevelt sought to
fend off naysayers. One of the most common issues Roosevelt dealt with was the
complete disregard for the Soviets shown by US military leaders. In a memorandum to
Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy on January 6, 1944, Roosevelt noted, “I think the
Joint Staffs should always remember that Russia should not be overlooked when any
agreements are made.”138 This memo was in regard to military agreements over the
status of Italian prisoners of war, but a more serious issue came up less than a week later.
Roosevelt wrote to Hull on January 12, 1944, to reprimand the combined chiefs of staff
that they were exceeding their authority in not allowing the authorization for the Soviet
representation for the Allied Control Commission in Italy to go through. The combined
chiefs claimed they were holding out until there was a decision on the representation of
France, but Roosevelt had not given them this command.139
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One topic that caused repetitive problems for Roosevelt was Poland and the
Polish government in the postwar world. As early as March of 1942, Roosevelt told
Welles not to talk about the post-war position of small countries since it would “cause
serious trouble with Russia.”140 Welles originally wrote to Roosevelt about Polish Prime
Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski’s request to restore Poland’s original boundaries with
Russia.141 In 1944, the Polish Question came to the fore in discussions amongst
administration officials. In an interview between journalist Louis Fischer and Stettinius
in January of 1944, Fischer asked Stettinius for his opinion on the Soviets. Stettinius
replied, “we have to get on with the [R]ussians. We need them in war and peace.”
However, Stettinius also noted the concern over Poland when prompted by Fischer, who
commented, “[I]t seems to me that [S]talin wants a strong, independent Poland under his
control.” Stettinius quickly replied, “I see the possibility of their forming a puppet
gov[ernment]. [W]e are watching this carefully.”142 Fischer’s interview with Hull
echoed the same cautiousness as Stettinius. Hull noted, “All relations with [R]ussia have
to [be] handled with infinite care,” and the US was “in the dark” on many things related
to the Soviet Union’s postwar stance.143
It became evident by 1944 that Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation with the Soviet
Union was losing face value amongst his administration officials, aides, and Cabinet, but
Roosevelt continued this policy until his death in April of 1945. A memorandum from
Stimson to Roosevelt in January of 1945 contained a December 1944 letter between
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Generals Deane and Marshall emphasizing the need for a new policy in dealing with the
Soviets. According to Stimson’s memo, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union,
generals, chiefs of staff, and the Secretary of War all felt that the letter was an accurate
depiction of the problems and changes needed regarding the US-Soviet relationship.144
The December letter noted, “Everyone will agree on the importance of collaboration with
Russia—now and in the future. It won’t be worth a hoot, however, unless it is based on
mutual respect and made to work both ways.”145 Deane also noted that while he had sat
through numerous banquets where the friendship between the US and USSR was
espoused, it always came across as phony. Deane stated, “This picture may be
overdrawn, but not much.”146 Likewise, Deane reiterated, “The situation has changed,
but our policy has not.”147 What the December letter required was a distinct change in
US-Soviet policy that called for a greater distance between the two great powers. Deane
requested that the US only give help to the Soviets if they asked for it and if it was
justified to win the war. The US should grant any other non-war related requests from
the Soviets only if the US received something in return. The overall concept was to make
the Soviets come to the US, largely dispelling the Great Power, personal politics of the
Roosevelt Era.148 Deane additionally commented, “I feel certain that we must be tougher
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if we are to gain their [the Soviets] respect and be able to work with them in the
future.”149 While it was unclear what reaction Roosevelt had to this memorandum and
policy change letter with just a few months left to his life, what was evident is that
Roosevelt’s staff had already set up a drastic policy shift away from the careful Roosevelt
manipulation to a more open battle between the two countries much more fitting the
personality of Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman.
Unlike Roosevelt, Truman had firsthand experience in fighting war as a soldier
during World War I, which impacted his decisions on foreign policy throughout his
Senate career and presidency. When Truman was just twenty-one years old he joined the
National Guard and began training as a soldier. In August of 1917, Truman finally had
his chance to use this training when a presidential proclamation called the National Guard
into active duty. It was not until March 1918 that Truman, then a lieutenant, sailed for
Europe. Put in charge of his own combat unit, Battery D of the 129th Field Artillery
Regiment, 35th Division, Truman's troops soon headed to the heat of battle in France.
Later that fall, Truman’s troops joined the offensive in the Meuse-Argonne area, known
as one of the most decisive battles in the entire war. By August 1918, Truman had been
promoted to captain and saw combat near the village of Mittlach, France where he was
wounded by shrapnel. In Truman’s Battery D, only three men were wounded during the
entire Meuse-Argonne campaign with one dying later. Considering that half of the entire
35th Division had been killed in action, Truman’s group fared well.150 Truman attributed
this miracle to his National Guard training before combat had begun and later advocated
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universal military training as a senator and president as a result.151 Truman’s experience
in World War I, along with his experience in the military, laid a foundation for Truman’s
close connection with friends, his self-confidence in quick decision-making and his ideas
about politics and foreign relations by 1945. Though Truman remained in the Officers
Reserve Corps after World War I and rose to the rank of colonel, his next active duty
assignment would be as Commander in Chief of the United States.152
As a senator, Truman reflected on his own training as a soldier and the ineptness
of the majority of the United States military during World War I to promote a plan of
universal military training (UMT). During 1936 discussions in the Senate regarding
UMT, or “compulsive military training” as it was sometimes referred to, some senators
stood opposed purely on the compulsory basis, even though they noted that there was
most assuredly value in military training in general. Senator William King, a Democrat
from Utah, commented, “I am opposed…to compulsive military training, though I
concede that there are some advantages from a physical standpoint, if not from a moral
and health standpoint, in receiving reasonable military discipline and training.”153 King’s
son had some military training by choice while in college, which King applauded, but the
senator disliked the idea of making it mandatory for all men.154 During this same
discussion, which focused on various amendments to a War Department appropriations
bill, including those that would set aside funding for UMT, Republican Senator Lynn
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Frazier of North Dakota moved to amend the bill to include a ban on UMT for all men at
all land grant colleges.155
Undoubtedly, the idea of universal training was an unpopular concept during a
period of relative peace, but many, including Truman, stood opposed to any ban on the
concept of UMT. Truman along with fifty-nine others voted nay on Frazier’s proposed
amendment.156 By 1940, with war just around the corner, UMT was again the topic of
discussion in Congress where people like Senator George Norris, an Independent from
Nebraska, attempted to soften the edges by connecting UMT not to regular enlistment but
to the selective service program.157 Under Norris’ proposed plan, the military would train
all young men but they would not have to serve unless there was a draft, simply
accelerating the preparation for war without enlarging the standing army. “It seems to
me,” Norris noted, “we should think of it [UMT]…in terms of a permanent policy of a
democracy in time of peace…to fasten upon it a system of everlasting military
training.”158 Democratic Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona quickly chimed into the
conversation and advocated for this larger military force through compulsory universal
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training. In words that would later be reflected in Truman’s own during his presidency,
Hayden proclaimed, “The only thing which a dictator respects is armed force.” Hayden
added, “Failure to face the facts of modern methods of warfare will leave the United
States just as unprepared for a surprise attack as were France and all the other smaller
nations on the continent of Europe.”159 As early as 1937, Truman had himself claimed in
a speech as senator that we have to “go about war intelligently…[George] Washington
said, ‘To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.’”160
Truman saw the most effective preparation for war as the training of “soldier civilians”
universally who could be ready at a moment’s notice to transition from civilian life to
their military role. Though UMT reached a standstill again and again, Hayden’s
premonition seemed to come true with the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which stood as
solid reasoning for Truman’s own support for a UMT bill during his presidency.
As president, Truman appointed a fact-finding commission in November 1946 to
come to some conclusion about universal military training in the United States. On May
29, 1947, the President’s Advisory Commission on Universal Training issued its report.
The commission determined that universal military training was an absolute necessity for
the security of the United States and for maintaining world peace and the United
Nations.161 “We believe,” noted the commission, “that the adoption of universal training
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would assure the peace-loving countries of the world and enhance the influence and
authority of the United Nations.”162 Finally, the atomic bomb was cited by the
Commission as a problem of modern war that essentially eliminated “zones of safety”
and created a greater need for a readied military force. The commission recommended a
six-month training plan to be put into effect immediately. Just a few days later, Truman
transmitted a message to the Congress urging them to consider carefully a program of
universal military training.163
Truman leaned toward a more militarized nation in preparation for warfare as a
result of his own experiences. In the wake of Roosevelt’s death, this clear difference in
preference created a gray area between Roosevelt’s peace plans and Truman’s
preparation for war, a twilight zone between traditional peace and preventative war.
Whereas Roosevelt seemed definite in his post-war plans for long-term peace, Truman
found himself somewhat at odds with his predecessor. His attempt at meeting multiple
goals only brought on the confusing liminal zone between peace and war. As relations
with the Soviet Union faltered after World War II, Truman’s viewpoint became more
significant. In Midwestern states like Missouri, isolationism held a great appeal for many
people.164 Truman was exposed to this perception throughout the twenties and thirties,
but Roosevelt had forever altered American isolationism with his preparation for and
entrance into World War II. Still somewhat influenced by isolationist ideas, Truman
began to see the Soviet Union as a continual problem for the peace of the United States, a
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peace that was longed for by isolationists and fairly well guaranteed under the concept of
isolationism. Though Truman would not and could not bring the country back to an
isolationist state, he turned his bitterness toward the Soviets. At a May 1945 meeting
with Hopkins, not long after Truman had become president, Truman remarked to
Hopkins that “he could use diplomatic language, or he could use a baseball bat if he
thought that was a proper approach to Mr. Stalin.”165 Here, early into Truman’s
presidency, his remarks suggest a dislike of the Soviet Union, or minimally, its leader
Joseph Stalin. Later in that same month, however, Truman discussed with Ambassador
to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman a meeting between himself, Stalin, and Churchill to
“overcome the misunderstanding and difficulties which have risen since Germany folded
up.”166 During this early period of Truman’s presidency he appeared torn between
Roosevelt’s policies regarding the Soviets and his own natural intuition against making
agreements with them.
At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, Truman continued this
transition between Roosevelt’s ideas and his own. In his diary entry from July 16, 1945,
Truman showed this by negatively comparing the Soviet looters to the Germans.167 The
next day, however, Truman recorded in his diary, “I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but
usually said yes & no to questions after hearing all the argument. It pleased him. …I can
deal with Stalin. He is honest—but smart as hell.”168 Truman was getting along with
Stalin and may have even had an advantage in negotiations with the Soviet leader due to
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his proclivity toward quick decisions, in direct contrast with Roosevelt. What was
evident, early into Truman’s presidency, however, was that Truman’s contrast with
Roosevelt expanded well beyond his management style to include an abrupt shift in USSoviet policy and relations.
US-Soviet Relations
At the time of Franklin Roosevelt’s death in April of 1945, Roosevelt’s policy
toward the Soviet Union had changed little since the beginning of his presidency.
Additionally, Roosevelt’s concept of the post-war world had not changed since the
beginning of World War II. Roosevelt’s primary concern was not, in fact, the potentially
expansive post-war Soviet Union but limiting England’s empire.169 Although Roosevelt
had a close relationship with Churchill throughout the war, Roosevelt also used programs
like Lend-Lease to restrain England economically. With the United States’ limitation of
British expansion after the war due to financial debt owed, Roosevelt could effectively
curtail what he saw as a grab for world power through colonial domination. According to
Roosevelt, “America won’t help England in this war [WWII] simply so that she will be
able to ride roughshod over colonial peoples.”170 Beyond simple colonialism, Roosevelt
anticipated a sequence of revolutionary wars against England that would never allow a
regular program of peace to develop. In his first wartime meeting with Churchill, the
Atlantic Conference, Roosevelt pushed for precautions against this to be written into the
Atlantic Charter. “The peace cannot include any continued despotism. The structure of
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the peace demands and will get equality of peoples. Equality of peoples involves the
utmost freedom of competitive trade,” noted Roosevelt in one discussion with Churchill
at the conference.171 The third point of the charter further evidenced this US stance,
noting that the US and England, “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”172 Roosevelt
was not a cold warrior.173 Roosevelt’s feeling toward colonialism was strong evidence
against a world dominated by a cold war between the super powers or any US sanctioned
warfare. Roosevelt’s concern was that colonial power struggles would prevent lasting
peace plans, which ultimately required British involvement.
Instead, what Roosevelt proposed for the post-war world was a system of security
based around the leading countries in the world. Roosevelt’s idea was known as the
“Four Policemen.” Basically, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and
potentially China would police their sectors of the world. In Roosevelt’s concept, this
would fit into the plan of the United Nations, but would allow the UN to operate more
efficiently globally and avoid focusing on one central location. Roosevelt did not think
this idea would work automatically, however, but would have to be transitioned into after
the fighting had ended. In a letter to Senator Norris regarding postwar peace plans,
written in September of 1943, FDR wrote:
The real problem lies in the methods to be used to attain peace without hate.
…That is why I am inclined to believe that we should have a trial or transition
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period after the fighting stops—we might call it even a period of trial and error.
…Such a period might last two or even three or four years.174
Roosevelt’s comments foretold a postwar world torn apart by hatred and suspicion, but
his transitional period of relative peace, in essence a cooling-off period absolving
bitterness between winners and losers, quickly became the beginning phase of continuous
warfare after his death, when Truman’s more militant choices blurred peace with war.
What Roosevelt wanted was for the Four Policemen to be in charge of making sure no
country within their individual sectors was arming itself. Any country going against this
policy would promptly be quarantined economically and later bombed, if necessary. The
Four Policemen would act as “’guarantors’ of the peace” with the rest of the world
effectively disarmed. Roosevelt’s plan for the Four Policemen was not to be confused
with the later spheres of influence that developed during the Cold War. Instead,
Roosevelt’s plan was more akin to a global variation of the United States Good Neighbor
Policy with Latin America.175 By 1942, Roosevelt had already outlined his Four
Policemen plan for the post-war world illustrating his ability to think of both the future
situation in the world and the larger picture beyond winning World War II. This future
plan developed near the end of the war into the United Nations’ peacekeeping force but
continued to maintain a clear inclusion of the Soviet Union as one of the leading
countries.176
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Roosevelt’s overall policy toward the Soviets and their inclusion in postwar plans
differed a great deal from both public opinion and the opinion of those within his
administration who were suspicious of communists. Roosevelt viewed the Soviet
Union’s policies as “more nationalist than communist, more practical than
ideological.”177 In many ways, the Soviet Union was looking out for its best interests in
whatever way it saw fit, much as the United States was doing under Roosevelt.
Roosevelt convinced his military chiefs to maintain the relationship with the Soviet
Union throughout the 1940s in order to avoid postwar collapse and a protracted cold war.
Additionally, Roosevelt had purposely left certain aspects of the Lend-Lease policy to the
discretion of the president so that he could engineer postwar peace negotiations through
economic restraint. Likewise, Roosevelt knew the Soviets wanted Poland above all else,
and since they occupied Poland by the time of the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt knew
they could easily sidetrack a peace agreement or the UN organization, so he let the
Soviets keep control of Poland. In Roosevelt’s larger scheme, peace was far more
significant than the Polish Question, despite the fact that many in Roosevelt’s
administration and the United States believed he had made a mistake in giving in to
Soviet demands. After Roosevelt’s death in 1945, however, the supposed post-Yalta
breakdown in US-Soviet relations and the defeat of Germany created an increasing call
for a change in policy regarding the Soviet Union.178
Overall, Roosevelt wanted to maintain a peaceful alliance with the Soviet Union,
despite continual US negativity toward communism. Creating and executing his own
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policy plans, Roosevelt was also extremely conscious of public opinion. As a result,
Roosevelt hedged his dealings with the Soviets by withholding a major element to the
postwar peace, the secret of the atomic bomb. Those closest to Roosevelt who knew of
the Manhattan Project pushed him in both directions regarding the bomb. In a
handwritten letter from Frankfurter to Roosevelt on September 8, 1944, Frankfurter told
Roosevelt three reasons why the US should not keep the atomic bomb project from the
Soviets. He proclaimed, “knowledge of the pursuit of our project can hardly be kept
from the Russians” because they had excellent scientists, some leaked information has
undoubtedly already traveled to the Soviet Union, and the German science on the same
type of project would soon be open to the Soviets.179 Frankfurter continued, “appropriate
candor would risk very little. Withholding, on the other hand, might have grave
consequences.”180 Though Roosevelt erred on the side of caution, either not
comprehending the true potential of the bomb or not fully trusting the Soviets, as was
supported by public opinion, his lack of honesty regarding the bomb was another of his
major mistakes. It later became apparent to the US Government that Stalin and the
Soviet Government were well aware of the atomic bomb. Despite Roosevelt’s desire for
a peaceful postwar world, his withholding of bomb secrets may have helped to catalyze
the division between the United States and Soviet Union in the years that followed World
War II.181 Roosevelt certainly did not intend for this division to happen, however, and in
a final letter to Churchill, written the day before Roosevelt’s death, he wrote, “I would
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minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible.”182 Until the very end,
Roosevelt maintained that cooperation between the great powers took precedence above
all else.
When Truman took over the presidency after Roosevelt’s death, he altered the US
policy in dealing with the Soviet Union due to his attempted navigation around
Roosevelt’s less-than-articulate legacy, personal feelings of animosity about Stalin and
the Soviets, and the realities of the post-war world. More often than not, Roosevelt
pieced bits of information and ideas together in his mind and resigned himself to act upon
them. While Truman was definitely aware of what had been happening with US-Soviet
relations, he was not aware of what Roosevelt might have done to halt any problems that
might arise in the transition between war and peace. Foremost, Truman had not been
privy to much of Roosevelt’s work on foreign affairs prior to 1945 so he had to do an
incredible amount of catching up. Additionally, Roosevelt, who strictly limited the
taking of notes at meetings and conferences, was never one to voice the details of his
plans, leaving those around him, including Truman, baffled as to his ultimate intentions.
As a result, when Truman first entered the presidency, he found himself torn between
competing notions, ending war and nebulous ideas for future peace.183 In line with what
appeared to be Roosevelt’s plan, Truman attempted to work with the Soviets as long as
he could, but lacking Roosevelt’s foresight for the future, US-Soviet relations broke
down as Truman experienced frustration with Soviet actions. For instance, in his diary
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entry for July 26, 1945, Truman wrote about Soviet communism, noting that it “isn’t
communism at all but just police government pure and simple. A few top hands just take
clubs, pistols and concentration camps and rule the people on the lower levels.”184 Here
Truman illustrated his distaste for the Soviet form of government, yet just a few days
earlier at Potsdam, Truman had noted that he could work with Stalin. In a reflective
speech given in Little Rock, Arkansas, in June 1949, Truman mentioned his “friendly
feeling for Russia” at the time of Potsdam.185 This difference in attitude within a few
short days illustrated Truman’s inner struggles between Roosevelt policy and his own
natural instincts, which confused the period directly following WWII, ushering in a zone
of twilight between the end of traditional war and start of traditional peace.
US-Soviet policy continued to shift during the Truman administration as a result
of Truman’s set of advisors, who were also not party to Roosevelt’s master plan for world
peace. Though many of these men had served under Roosevelt, they had been severely
underutilized and their thoughts on Soviet policies were often disregarded by Roosevelt if
they did not correspond with his personal ideas. Truman served as a more active listener
than Roosevelt had been and Truman’s advisors took advantage of that to press him in a
different direction regarding the Soviet Union. In a decoded cable between George
Kennan, Deputy Head of the US Mission in Moscow, and Ambassador Harriman from
April 23, 1945, Kennan detailed the Soviet neutrality agreement with the Japanese to
avoid war as long as the US was at war with Japan. According to Kennan’s sources, the
Soviets had agreed to maintain this agreement until it ran out in a year’s time, but the
184

185

HST diary entry, July 26, 1945, Ferrell, ed., Off the Record, 56-57.

Truman’s handwritten speech notes for a speech at Little Rock, Arkansas, June 11, 1949, box
39, file 9; CP, HSTL.

102
Japanese wanted more than just an agreement that the Soviet Union would not go to war
against Japan. Kennan’s source suggested that the Soviet Union was strongly
considering this, which directly conflicted with US plans to have the Allies defeat Japan
as quickly as possible after Germany. In the cable, Kennan relayed the message that he
believed his source planted this rumor, but it was just what one might expect the Soviets
to say in this instance.186 Kennan’s opinion on the Soviet Union differed a great deal
from that of Roosevelt’s key advisors on this topic, Davies and Hopkins, who believed
there was a very workable relationship between the US and Soviet Union. Kennan
continued to push the Soviets and communism as a threat to the US and the world
throughout Truman’s administration.
Less than two weeks after Truman became president he met with Soviet diplomats
for the first time and was under pressure from his administration to take a firm stance
against Soviet influence. Prior to this meeting, Secretary of State Stettinius, Secretary of
War Stimson, Chief of the US Military Mission to Moscow John Dean, Secretary of the
Navy Forrestal, Commander in Chief of the US Fleet Admiral King, King’s Chief of
Staff William D. Leahy, Marshall, and Harriman pressured Truman that a hard line with
the Soviets was the only option.187 By August of 1945, Harriman expressed to Truman in
a secret cable his concern over the Soviet’s taking of “war trophies” from Japan, mainly
Manchuria’s light and heavy industry, just as it had done in Germany. In regard to the
impending Japanese defeat and the future of Manchurian industry, Harriman noted, “This
186
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is another case where Stalin has increased his appetite and I recommend that we resist his
demands.”188 Harriman’s discussion of Stalin suggested that there was no longer the
subtle understanding that the Soviet Union was simply looking out for its best interest,
but rather planning a wider domination. Then Undersecretary of State Acheson reiterated
the change in US attitude in November in an address to a National Council of AmericanSoviet Friendship rally. Acheson proclaimed:
[T]here are certain conditions that usually exist between friends, and where they
don’t exist, you are almost certain to find something less than complete
friendship. One of those conditions might be described as an absence of
tension…friends are not forever taking each other apart—until each becomes
obsessed and exasperated with the contradictions in the other’s personality…there
is a good deal of this sort of thing going on in both countries [US and USSR].189
Despite Acheson spreading the blame to the USSR as well as the United States,
there was little evidence to suggest that the Soviets felt the same way; instead, they
focused on an obvious shift in attitude between Roosevelt and Truman as the main issue.
Hopkins had sought to smooth over any tension earlier in the year by meeting with Stalin
in May of 1945. Hopkins informed Truman in a secret cable that same month that Stalin
believed the attitude of the US toward the USSR had cooled after German defeat, noting
Stalin’s concern over the admission of Argentina to the UN despite the admission
standards discussed at Yalta, the inclusion of France in the postwar reparation committee
despite the Yalta decision of including only the Big Three, the abrupt curtailment of the
Lend-Lease Program, the US attitude toward the Polish Question, and failure to hear
from the US and England on the division of the German fleet. Truman had effectively
188
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cut off Lend-Lease on May 8, 1945 without notice to the Soviets, and he had remained
curt with Soviet envoys Vyacheslav Molotov and Andrei Gromyko in his first meeting
with them as president, claiming that the Soviets did not carry out their side of the Yalta
agreements.190 Hopkins informed Truman in his cable that he tried to convince the
Soviets of continued positive sentiment by the US for Russia, claiming, “Stalin expressed
himself as entirely satisfied with my explanation as to the reasons for our action in regard
to lend lease.”191 Hopkins also noted, “He [Stalin] emphasized he had never questioned
the right of the United States to curtail or reconsider the lend lease program to the Soviet
Union, but merely felt that more warning could have been given to the Soviet
Government.”192 Additionally, Hopkins attempted to convince Truman that Stalin did
not take seriously the complaints against the US but was more concerned over the
evidence of an increasingly unfavorable American opinion of the USSR that might lead
to problems.193

Hopkins’ cable, if accurate, contradicted most historical analyses that

point to the end of Lend-Lease as a major pitfall in US-Soviet relations. Instead, it was
evident that the Soviets became aware of the change in attitude between the Roosevelt
and Truman administrations and tried to bring the problems to the forefront of diplomatic
discussion.
When Truman received the Clifford-Elsey report on US-Soviet relations on
September 2, 1946, his perception of US-Soviet issues thoroughly solidified around his
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own personal distaste for the Soviets, finally disregarding Roosevelt’s path and moving
toward a liminal zone between traditional war and traditional peace that afforded greater
flexibility. The report, formally titled American Relations with the Soviet Union, put
together at Truman’s request by Clifford with the help of White House Map Room
military advisor George Elsey, included “[f]actual statements, studies and opinions” from
some of the foremost experts on the US-Soviet situation within the government.194 The
report claimed, “Soviet leaders appear to be conducting their nation on a course of
aggrandizement designed to lead to eventual world domination by the U.S.S.R.,” which
could lead toward a third World War if left unattended by the US.195 What Truman read
in the report was a strong recommendation, not just to avoid acquiescing to the Soviets,
but to prepare a military force against them. “The language of military power is the only
language which disciples of power politics understand,” the report noted. “The United
States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government
is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations,”
continued the report.196 Undoubtedly, the report convinced Truman to continue along his
path toward complete disagreement with the Soviet Union. Emphasizing increased
military strength, economic and political support to smaller nations not in the Soviet
sphere, and coordination of government actions toward understanding the USSR and
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informing the people, the report essentially laid out what became Truman’s plans for the
national security state, the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and increasing use of the
language of war.197 The advent of preparations for war during what should have been a
period of peace prompted a break with traditional notions of war and peace, creating a
liminal area between the two that was susceptible to various interpretations by political
actors. The report also alluded to the policy of containment that became the mantra of
Truman’s foreign policy. The report noted, “the United States should maintain military
forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its
present area.”198
Although the Clifford-Elsey report solidified Truman’s stance on the Soviet
Union, it merely offered suggestions that Truman had already considered and begun
putting in place by the latter half of 1945, though the details remained unarticulated,
confused by fuzzy language. In Truman’s handwritten outline of his message to
Congress on universal military training, he articulated, “Our strength makes it incumbent
upon us take a vital part in molding the future of the world.”199 Truman continued, “We
intend to use that strength to work for a just peace and a lasting peace. We can ensure
that kind of peace only so long as we remain strong.” In this draft from August 1945,
Truman began to articulate, through his fuzzy language, the concept of continuous
warfare. A buildup of military strength, suggestive of war preparations, underscored the
overwhelming message of peace repeated throughout Truman’s administration. In a
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phrase that did not make it into his final speech on universal military training but that
condensed his new attitude toward the Soviet Union with his plan for what became
continuous warfare, Truman proclaimed, “We must face the fact that the house of peace
must be built on the rock of power.”200
Conclusion
The abrupt shift between Roosevelt and Truman, two men with obvious
differences in skill, management style, and knowledge of foreign affairs, led to a hazy
zone somewhere between peace and war that typified continuous warfare and with it, the
foundation of the imperial presidency. Roosevelt’s duplicitous and manipulative nature
combined with his competitive management style added to his knowledge of foreign
affairs, and helped him work best through personal collaboration with leaders of the great
powers of the England and the Soviet Union. This collaboration essentially relied upon
Roosevelt himself and his personal plans for world peace to maintain strength and
viability. In Roosevelt’s absence, the simplistic though collegial Truman began to
reshape US-Soviet relations around his Midwestern mentality, information from
opinionated advisors, and his own perception of a looming Soviet threat and the necessity
of a strong military force. Railroaded into creating a lasting world peace orchestrated
though unarticulated by Roosevelt and supported by the public, Truman cloaked the
United States’ buildup to continuous warfare and later inculcation of the Cold War in a
language of peace, creating a malleable zone of twilight between war and peace utilized
by government players for their own agenda. The convoluted language of this twilight
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zone served as a point for extending the political benefits of war under the pretext of
peace. As a result, Truman built his “house of peace” upon the rock of presidential and
military power, supported in its foundation by the creation of a new continuous warfare.

CHAPTER II

POURING THE FOUNDATION: CONTINUOUS WARFARE AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Harry Truman stood in the unique position in April 1945 of not only gaining the
position of president but also gaining the full powers of his new role as Commander in
Chief, amplified by World War II, still raging in the Pacific. According to the 1850
Supreme Court Case, Fleming v. Page, as summarized by Special Counsel to the
President Charles Murphy, “In time of war, the powers of the President as Commander in
Chief are full and complete.”1 What Truman experienced was practically indisputable
executive control over all things foreign and domestic. At home, Truman set in place the
bipartisan Council of Economic Advisors, and abroad, Truman altered the global position
of the United States with his use of the first atomic bomb.2 Warfare allowed the
president more leeway with domestic issues when intrinsically linked with war, such as
the economy.
New to the presidency, Truman knew no other way to achieve his agenda without
this imbalance of power and sought to extend it. In the post-war world, the United States
stood alone at the top as a target for hostility. In order to address this lingering threat,
Truman sought to extend his wartime powers past the end of World War II hostilities,
first under the extension of wartime statutes then under a period of continuous warfare,
concealed by the confusing manipulation of the language of peace and war. Global threat
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and increased defense marked the often murky, liminal zone between peace and war
known as continuous warfare. This “war” mimicked the beginning phase of a preventive
war militarily and the political benefits of a traditional war while maintaining a rhetorical
exterior of peace. It was through this continuous warfare with its subtle expansion of
executive power that Truman poured the foundation for his house of peace, later a façade
for the imperial presidency.
Truman’s continuous warfare allowed for the permanent uprooting of the
governmental balance of powers in favor of the executive. This current state of executive
power, in turn, has caused the president to become imperial. In Schlesinger’s The
Imperial Presidency he noted, “It is the assertion of inherent powers that defines the
Imperial Presidency and creates precedents for the future.”3 Inherent powers are those
powers not specifically written into or defined by the Constitution, but assumed through
extra-constitutional means by an executive.
The defining feature of executive power as laid out in the Constitution, the
Commander in Chief Clause, yielded the most likely assumption of inherent powers.
Article 2, Section 2 stated, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States.”4 Since wartime generally assumed an emergency
state, the executive was able to make decisions and take action under his role as
Commander in Chief without the express consent of Congress. Legally speaking, these
inherent powers fit into the role of a “military necessity,” which allowed the president or
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government in general to employ all military tactics or procedures not prohibited by law
in order to defeat the enemy. Likewise, military necessity might include various aspects
of public necessity, such as invading private property rights, as well, blurring the
warfront and home front within the president’s role as Commander in Chief. 5 As a
result, warfare became the key to unlocking executive power through the inherent powers
that accompany the Commander in Chief Clause of the Constitution.6 Truman
experienced this traditionally increased power when he became president during WWII,
but in the postwar liminal zone somewhere between traditional peace and traditional war
he took advantage of similar powers.
Like Truman, many presidents have assumed inherent powers, but their use of
such powers has always come within the timeframe of a limited, emergency situation.
According to President Franklin Roosevelt, as quoted in The Imperial Presidency, “When
the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—to
whom they belong.”7 Roosevelt, while often cited as one of the most powerful presidents
in the twentieth century, assumed power through his own skill and manipulation of the
office within the bounds of the Constitution. Upon attempting to step outside these
bounds, governmental checks deterred Roosevelt, mainly those powers of Congress and
the Supreme Court.8 When the president attempts to act “contrary to congressional will”
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his power as Commander in Chief would be at its “lowest ebb” and under direct threat of
restriction by Congress.9 Roosevelt knew that working with Congress was a safer
political route. Roosevelt also intended that his powers of Commander in Chief would
subside after World War II and the nation would demobilize fully, returning to a
peacetime state. Roosevelt’s plans for peace did not include the continuous warfare that
developed upon his death. In effect, since the cessation of the Second World War, the
United States has never fully returned to traditional peace, instead entering into a state of
continuous warfare that straddled both peace and war; therefore, the Executive Branch
has never fully had its Commander in Chief powers rescinded. It is from here that the
foundation of the imperial presidency was constructed.
The period surrounding the end of World War II and the shift from the Presidency
of Franklin Roosevelt to that of Harry Truman was the murky zone where war merged
with peace, marking the beginning of continuous warfare for the United States. A
number of factors coalesced to cause the United States to abandon traditional warfare,
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marked by armed conflict and a formal declaration of war, in all but name.10 The
situation that Truman perpetuated after WWII was, in some manner, preventive,
essentially mobilizing and preparing for armed conflict in order to avoid war, yet
continuous warfare did not yield a clear-cut confrontation for which to prepare or
prevent. Truman and others in the government couched continuous war in the language
of peace initially because it lacked a precipitating enemy, but it would eventually develop
into the Cold War with the Soviet Union.11 The cause of this continuation of war from
traditional warfare, to preventive war, and finally cold war, rooted in the period of 1945
through 1950, is the combination of suspicion of and discord with the Soviets, the use of
the first atomic bomb, and Truman’s extension of the military and creation of the national
security state. Combined in these factors lay the origin of continuous warfare and the
beginning of the imperial presidency.
Fuzzy Language and the Twilight Zone
When Truman ascended to the Presidency, he proclaimed an agenda for settling
World War II and for organizing the post-war world that would follow closely the wishes
10
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of the deceased Roosevelt. One of Roosevelt’s main objectives in the post-war world had
been the establishment of a lasting peacekeeping organization known as the United
Nations. On April 16, 1945, less than a week after Roosevelt’s death, Truman addressed
Congress with a pledge to carry out the former president’s desires. “I asked for public
support for a strong and lasting United Nations organization,” Truman claimed in his
memoirs. “I called upon all Americans to help me keep our nation united in defense of
those ideals [peace and security] which had been eloquently proclaimed by Roosevelt,”
Truman noted.12 With the United States still very much embroiled in armed conflict,
Truman began to confuse the language of war and peace with this first formal address to
Congress. While the word “peace” traditionally implied a period without the threat of
armed conflict, Truman’s “security” subsequently implied a necessary build-up of
protective military forces, implying threat and preceding war. Despite Roosevelt’s
intended military component of the United Nations to give it staying power, unlike the
failed League of Nations, the notion of peace and security together as equal components
seemed paradoxical. Roosevelt had originally intended a traditional lasting peace secured
with offensive methods by the prevention of global rearmament by the Four Policemen—
the US, England, Russia, and China—who would each secure their individual sectors of
the world. Truman’s version of security paired with his plans for the national security
state connoted defense, not true security. If there were a lasting peace, there would be no
opposing forces from which to defend the nation.
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Roosevelt’s intentions aside, Truman made the United Nations out to be a body
not for keeping the peace but for preventing traditional war. Traditional warfare implied
armed conflict, but the type of war that would become prevalent in the post-WWII United
States was not traditional but preventive war. Reflecting in his memoirs about the role of
the United Nations, Truman contended, what “we wanted to accomplish was to set up an
international organization to prevent another world war.”13 This comment realistically
showed that Truman did not intend to keep the peace, but merely prevent another
traditional world war, in which the United States, as an emerging super power, would
undoubtedly have to play a role.

Historian Richard F. Haynes agreed with this analysis

in his book The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief, where he
stated, “The president envisioned a new military and foreign policy that rejected
traditional isolationism and projected the United States into the role of defender of the
peace.”14 Likewise, in a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in March of 1948, Truman discussed
his troubles with the Soviet Union and need for a strong military policy. Truman noted,
“I think if you will go over the history of the relationship between Russia and us you will
find that every effort was made by President Roosevelt and by me to get along with them.
…Russia has not kept faith with us.” Truman continued, “The Charter of the United
Nations is a document under which we could work and have peace if we could get
Russian cooperation. …our Military setup is the only hope we have for peace in the
World.”15 This new role would place the United States in the awkward position of
13

Truman, Year of Decisions, 46.

14

Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 117.
15

HST to Eleanor Roosevelt, March 16, 1948, Ferrell, ed., Off the Record, 125-126.

116

constant preparation for war on the off chance of an armed conflict occurring despite the
considerable lack of an opponent prior to the break with the Soviets. Preceding this idea,
the citizens of the United States were used to demobilizing following wars to a state of
relative isolation, able to avoid entrance into armed conflict unless directly attacked. The
resulting period of relative peacefulness created by the strain between this peace/security
and defender/peacekeeper dynamic was not traditional peace at all, but rather part of the
twilight zone of continuous warfare that government could manipulate for the public.
Truman’s intention was to give the illusion of peace while still maintaining the added
powers and extra constitutional authority conferred during traditional war, mainly the
expanded powers of the president, which in this era allowed Truman to build the national
security state. Truman accomplished this goal by manipulating and maintaining the postRoosevelt continuous warfare for his purposes.
This illusory duality between traditional peace and traditional war finally found
expression by 1946, a year after Roosevelt had died and several months after the
cessation of armed conflict with Europe and Japan. During a debate in Congress over the
extension of selective service and introduction of universal military training,
Representative John Vorys (R-OH) articulated the situation. Vorys claimed:
While we use the expression “peacetime soldier” and compare them with the men
who bore the brunt of battle and while this is not a war period in which there is
fighting going on, yet so far as the Congress and the President have expressed
themselves, we are still at war and insofar as the international situation is
concerned, it is quite a bit different from how we ordinarily think of peacetime.16
Representative James Wadsworth (R-NY) put a name to the situation Vorys expressed.
Wadsworth stated that the current condition was a “twilight zone,” which meant that the
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United States was at neither peace nor war, but in-between—an “interim period.” “The
war is not over in a technical sense,” Wadsworth noted, as the government had not yet
signed a peace treaty, yet the fighting was over. However, the United States was not at
peace as it still squabbled with the Soviet Union over post-war agreements, adjusted to
the nuclear age, and continued the military apparatus at home.17
Following Wadsworth’s twilight zone analogy, those associated with the military
continued to discuss this new “war” for the prevention of traditional armed conflict. One
of the most prominent of these discussions was included within a series of lectures given
by George F. Kennan, former deputy chief of the US mission in Moscow and Soviet
expert, at the National War College in Washington D.C. during 1946 and 1947. At the
War College, Kennan served as the first Deputy for Foreign Affairs, and the
administration prompted him to discuss the growing confusion in warfare terminology
amidst the current hostility between the United States and Soviet Union. Originally
classified, Kennan’s “Measures Short of War (Diplomatic)” talk of September 16, 1946,
emphasized non-traditional methods of warfare that aligned with Wadsworth and Vorys'
analysis. Kennan’s description of war was traditional. He argued that measures of
pressure and adjustment might be suitable methods of getting the US what it wanted from
its opposition. However, he contended that these ideas would only be effective if the US
maintained a preponderance of power, which required strength militarily. Historian
Melvyn Leffler dedicated his larger work, A Preponderance of Power to this very idea.
In Leffler’s perspective, “Preponderance did not mean domination” but rather creating a
situation in the world that was positive for US interests and negative for opponents’
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interests. Though Leffler’s analysis focused on financial and economic dominance along
with strategic air control, his general perspective meshed well with the idea that US
superiority was necessary and might be achieved in a variety of ways. Leffler articulated
that Soviet communist expansion “threatened to transform the American way of life”
eventually, though he noted there were no immediate threats in 1945, illustrating that
government analysts initially minimized any potential Soviet threat. In Kennan’s lecture
he held on to the idea that strength’s effectiveness came from a nation’s readiness to use
it.18 “We must cease to have separate patterns of measures—one pattern for peace and
one pattern for war,” Kennan claimed.19 Kennan’s grand strategy was essentially
preventive war, through pressure and adjustment, but also through the building up of the
military as in traditional wartime mobilization. He continued, “The price of peace has
become the willingness to sacrifice it to a good cause and that is all there is to it.”20 The
merging of peace with war or using war to create peace reflected a new twilight zone of
continuous warfare.
While it became clearer to those in the government and the military that warfare
was changing and the current terminology was confused, Truman continued to utilize
abstract concepts of peace and war in order to further his own understanding of what
powers belonged to the president and achieve his agenda. In an address before a joint
session of Congress in the spring of 1948, Truman continued his rhetoric of the
18
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synonymy between peace and war. “We will face the problems of peace with the same
courage that we have faced and mastered the problems of war,” he said.21 Continuing,
Truman proclaimed, “It is not enough to yearn for peace. We must work, and if
necessary, fight for it.”22 In this statement to Congress, Truman placed peace and war on
the same continuum and then perpetuated the confusing idea that the United States could
achieve peace by its polar opposite, war. Truman’s contorted use of language was
purposeful and made sense under the parameters of continuous warfare, in which war did
not mean traditional armed conflict and peace did not mean a traditional reversion to the
safety of isolationism.
As it became more apparent that there must be some underlying need for
discussing war in terms of peace, Truman’s own motives crystallized around his concept
of a strong yet flexible presidency. Years later, he recalled his first impression of the
office of president in his memoirs. “As I took the oath of office I was conscious of how
vast in scope the presidency had become,” he claimed, noting that the president was not
just the Commander in Chief but also the major leader of the newly allied United
Nations.23 Truman saw war, first as armed conflict in World War II then as continuous
war, as the means to an end. By entering the office at the time he did, he assumed an
extraordinary amount of power as Commander in Chief and saw a way of maintaining
this power and using it to orchestrate the creation of his national security state through
the flexibility of the Constitution. Leffler argued that the US had no real threats in 1945
21
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and that the creation of the containment policy and national security state were in
response to potential Soviet economic aggression. What Leffler failed to take into
account in his analysis of the Cold War, however, was Truman’s background and skillset,
especially in relation to the concept of the national security state.24
In a book that Truman penned during his post-presidential years, which his
daughter Margaret later edited and published, he discussed the job of the president
candidly. In Where the Buck Stops, Truman noted that there were limits to presidential
power, mostly Congress’ ability to pass laws over a presidential veto. He then went on to
say, “At the same time, there’s an escape valve in a time of real emergency, which is the
president’s emergency powers…decisions have to be made here and now [sic] they can’t
wait.”25 Truman’s interpretation of the constitutional powers granted to the president,
explicitly or inherently, focused on extreme flexibility without actually being breakable.
As a result, just about anything the president wanted to do during wartime could be
tucked into the emergency powers of the president, mainly that of Commander in Chief.26
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Though Truman may not have consciously intended executive power to expand,
he would push for this expansion throughout his actions from 1945 onward. In an article
originally published in the 1962 issue of Military Review Truman returned to the idea of a
strong executive. He stated that under the U.S. Constitution it is not possible to distribute
the president’s powers, even though there are so many, and that the “President of the
United States is now the Commander in Chief of the Free World.”27 Truman saw no
issue with a strong executive and the expansion of executive power, though he never
readily stated that was his intended goal in continuing an emergency beyond the bounds
of traditional warfare. However, in the 1962 article Truman also proclaimed, “We need
to use every new technique available, every bit of new knowledge, so that in the end the
President will always be prepared to face with confidence the many decisions that our
position in the world and his position in the Nation require him to make.”28 This
statement suggested that continuous warfare really was a means to an end, a “technique”
to allow the president to utilize fully his role in the modern world. Due to Truman’s
interpretation of his position as president, continuous warfare served the beneficial, yet
unintended, purpose of extending executive power indefinitely. Despite Truman’s great
respect for the office of the president as an institution, he saw a necessity at the time due
to perceived threat in extending his powers; in doing so, however, Truman disregarded
the permanence of continuous warfare and the precedent this would set for future
executive use.
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The twilight zone that would bring lasting continuous warfare and develop into
the Cold War could not exist forever on rhetoric alone, however. The factors that lay at
the heart of continuous warfare served to develop a permanent emergency state, which
was far enough away from the traditional warfare of the past, yet close enough to a
preventative war to warrant the maintenance of executive power so Truman could build
his security establishment.29 In a 1950 remark, Secretary of State Dean Acheson alluded
to the existence of continuous warfare. “The only way to ‘call the bluff’ of the Soviet
Union would be to declare preventative war ourselves—to provoke a military
showdown,” Acheson noted. He continued, “This is not a possible policy for a
democracy. The Soviet Union knows that.”30 Instead, the United States sought to
prepare indefinitely and covertly for warfare through a continuous war that mirrored
armed conflict but remained elusive under the pretense of peace. What would eventually
become the Cold War played an important role in continuous warfare as it solidified the
defense buildup around a decisive Soviet threat. As a result, the first step toward
continuous warfare was the suspicion and discord that arose from the deteriorating
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the latter half of
World War II, which increased as the hostility escalated in the post-war world.
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US-Soviet Discord
The agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States started to break
down at the Yalta Conference when discussion of the division of post-war Europe first
took place. Subsequently, the shift from Roosevelt to Truman also exacerbated the
tension. According to an article in the Russian Review from 1949, “the barometer of
American-Soviet relations has been falling continuously since the Yalta Conference and
the end of the war.”31 Truman backed up this observation in his memoirs when he noted
that then US Soviet Ambassador Averell Harriman saw this deterioration at his post in
Moscow. According to Harriman, the Soviets saw the United States’ desire to cooperate
as softness, for which they had little respect. Concurrently, Truman claimed that the
Soviet’s attitudes had bothered him throughout the latter part of the war.32 According to
Leffler, “the Soviets now became the particular target of his [Truman’s] venom because
they alone had the potential to capitalize on their wartime gains, exploit postwar vacuums
of power, and endanger US security.”33 When Harriman took the new president aside in
April of 1945 to tell him that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was breaking his agreements,
Truman realized the truth of his concerns.34
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With tension already underlying US-Soviet relations as Truman took office, he
turned to those around him for answers to his questions. The day after Truman became
president, he requested a report by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius regarding the
“principal problems confronting this government in its relations with other countries.”35
Stettinius’ report placed the majority of concern with the relationship between the United
States and Soviet Union. He confirmed Harriman’s observation that the breakdown first
began at the Yalta Conference but also pointed out a problem with the uncompromising
position of the Soviets on every issue of concern. Primarily, Stettinius brought up the
Polish Question as a major worry. In Poland, the Soviet Union had taken control of the
government, recognizing the Warsaw Provisional Government (WPG) as the rightful
leadership of Poland. Previous agreements between the World War II Allies allowed
Poland to hold elections in order to decide on a permanent government. The Soviets now
refused to allow elections to take place, as the WPG was sympathetic to the Soviet
Union’s desires. As a result, Truman continued to gather more information about the
situation with the Soviet Union. He met with Harriman to discuss the situation further
and plan a trip to Moscow involving former Secretary of Commerce and Roosevelt
advisor Harry Hopkins as soon as May 18, 1945. This same day, Truman also met with
Anna Roosevelt Boettiger to discuss her father’s dealings with the Soviet Union, and he
was in steady contact with Eleanor Roosevelt for the same reason. He made it known to
the former first lady that he was trying carefully to keep his agreements with the Soviets
because of their suspicious, touchy nature when it came to the United States.36
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However, as Truman gained a better vantage from those around him of what was
really going on with the Soviet Union, he became more suspicious of them himself.
Realizing that part of the problem was undoubtedly the death of Roosevelt, which had
caused a schism between the Allies, Truman opted to send Roosevelt’s preferred envoy,
Harry Hopkins, to Moscow to meet with Stalin. At the same time, however, Truman
noted that a baseball bat might work just as well as diplomacy.37 In this regard, Truman
had given up any true motivation for working with the Soviet Union, instead letting the
tension fester. It already seemed to Truman as if the Soviets were completely unwilling
to work with the United States by the end of World War II. By the cessation of the armed
conflict, Truman saw the communist Soviet Union as a menace every bit as threatening
as Nazi Germany had been.38
The first real illustration of this Soviet menace that went beyond suspicion and
general feelings of hostility had to do with Truman’s ending of the Lend-Lease Program.
Truman signed an order to cut back on Lend-Lease in the first part of May 1945, after
World War II had ended in Europe. The program had supplied the Allies with American
war materials and supplies, benefiting the war-torn Soviet Union most of all. The
military took Truman’s ending of the program too literally, causing some ships already in
the process of moving supplies to the Soviet Union to turn around. Truman claimed in
his memoirs that the Soviet Union took the action as a purposely unfriendly move by the
United States, specifically aimed at the Soviets.39 However, in Hopkins’ meeting with
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Stalin on May 27, 1945, the Soviets saw the Lend-Lease fiasco as proof of a “cooling off
attitude of America toward the Soviets” but did not believe it was a diplomatic
breakdown.40 The hostilities with the Soviet Union may have started with the haphazard
move by Truman to end Lend-Lease, supposedly without reading the order he signed.
However, such a misunderstanding was not that significant because a working
relationship was still operating between the United States and Soviet Union, and Truman
quickly rescinded the order. The disruption of the Lend-Lease program was just the first
physical action that escalated the hostilities between the two super powers, as Truman
later reflected.41
The next immediate conflict with the Soviets came with the division of Germany.
In a meeting with Harriman on May 21, 1945, Truman was ready to discuss what he
called the “Russian situation,” largely the “misunderstanding” and “difficulties” in the
post-German world.42 Despite the surrender of Germany less than a month earlier,
Truman was already concerned with the Soviet Union because of prior mistrust and the
Polish Question. By late July at the Potsdam Conference in Germany, which would settle
the question of the division of Germany, Truman was already against the Soviets. These
feelings were partly due to a paper that Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote for
Truman during the Potsdam conference, where he claimed, “no permanently safe
international relations can be established between two such fundamentally different
40
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national systems.”43 Joseph Davies, a member of the US delegation at Potsdam, noted
this change in attitudes toward the Soviets. He noticed both the change in Stimson’s own
opinion on the Soviets, but also believed it reached “the white house.”44 In other words,
Truman, influenced by those around him, was equally concerned about future dealings
with the Soviets because of their possible underlying intentions and because they had
failed to keep some of their agreements in the past. This rapidly shifting opinion of the
Soviets soon after World War II was evident in the language of one of Truman’s draft
speeches on foreign affairs written in 1948. Truman wrote that he initially liked the
Soviets when he met them at Potsdam. However, he added, “I found after a very patient
year that Russian agreements are made to be broken.” Additionally, Truman went on to
refer to Soviet Minister Vyacheslav Molotov very derisively as “Molly” throughout the
speech.45 Though Truman never delivered this speech, it put into words his feelings
about the Soviets less than a year after World War II had ended and suggested that
despite actual Soviet intentions, there was a growing mistrust by the US.
This suspicion spread from Potsdam and further infiltrated those in Washington.
In a State Department report that summarized Kennan’s observation of an interview held
between Ambassador Patrick Hurley and Stalin, Kennan recommended that the United
States objectively study Soviet aims.46 In a top-secret Central Intelligence Group (CIG)
paper, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” produced in the summer of 1946, the
government speculated on Soviet intentions. The paper noted, “The Soviet Government
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anticipates an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world. It therefore seeks to increase
its relative power by building up its own strength and undermining that of its assumed
antagonists.”47 The paper suggested that the United States was at risk if it did not take a
strong stance against this Soviet buildup of power. However, later in the paper, the
author noted, “The Soviet Union needs to avoid such a conflict for an indefinite period.
It must therefore avoid provoking a strong reaction by a combination of major powers.”48
Here the CIG suggested that the Soviet Union, while preparing for a war against
capitalism, also had to avoid said war. The CIG’s analysis of Soviet intentions was
remarkably like what would become the United States version of continuous warfare.
Kennan’s lecture series at the National War College throughout 1946 and 1947 was
further evidence of an interest in Soviet aims and intentions directly following World
War II negotiations. Kennan’s talks included the true nature of the Soviets as
nonresponsive to diplomatic measures. According to Kennan’s infamous “X” article in
Foreign Affairs, Americans tended to think that the Soviet Union might change as a result
of bargaining for its objectives. Any obvious change, however, would stand out as an
attempted smokescreen with their true motives moving to the background. The Soviets
believed, Kennan claimed, that capitalism did not allow for any means of preventing war
and that the United States was destined for warfare.49 Foremost, Kennan argued that:
[The US] must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love
of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of permanent happy
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coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent
pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival
power.50
As a result, the Soviet Union did not share the United States’ non-warring objective of
maintaining the illusion of peace through the advent of preventive war. Instead, the
Soviet Union intended to cause great harm to the United States openly through whatever
means necessary. This perceived threat eventually solidified generalized continuous
warfare as the specific Cold War against the Soviets for the following four decades.
Kennan’s lectures on Soviet thought, power, and diplomacy likewise reinforced
these arguments. In a lecture from January 1947, Kennan said that the Soviets saw the
outside world as hostile. Kennan’s belief was not generalized but rather an expert
opinion on the Soviet national tradition of self-preservation. Included within this
tradition was also the fact that the Soviets desired to conquer the world, which would lead
to an eventual conflict between the socialist state and the capitalistic countries
surrounding it.51 The CIG’s 1946 paper also emphasized this point when it contended,
“the peaceful coexistence of Communist and capitalist states is in the long run
impossible…the U.S.S.R. must be considered imperiled as long as it remains within an
antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement.’”52 The fact that the Communist party in the Soviet
Union was designed to be militant in order to overthrow capitalist Russia only further
incited this conflict, as this militancy was still a perceived characteristic of the Soviet
Union. As a result, Kennan called for war as the only real means of dealing with the
Soviets. However, he did not necessarily endorse a traditional war, instead referring to
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those things he considered counter-pressures, like the buildup of military forces, which
also served as part of continuous war.53 “[T]he main element of any United States policy
toward the Soviet Union,” Kennan claimed in his Foreign Affairs article, “must be that of
a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies.”54
The 1946 CIG paper supported Kennan’s analysis by purporting that the USSR
saw conflict as inevitable; therefore, it isolated its citizens from foreign influence and put
strict police controls in effect, maintained a huge military, and tried to create a selfsufficient economy. The CIG also noted that the Soviet Union would take every
opportunity to expand Soviet control over areas and create discord among other countries
allied against her. “The ultimate objective of the Soviet policy may be world
domination,” the CIG contended.55 Overall, Kennan’s policy suggestion, known
collectively as “containment,” became a major aspect of US-Soviet relations in the postWWII environment and led to the shift from preventive continuous war to defined cold
war against the Soviets. Containment did not have to lead to traditional war, in Kennan’s
analysis, but it did require the United States to maintain its world dominance. The
Soviets could not make an attack because of this US preponderance of power and the
repercussions it would cause for the Soviet Union. In an article from the Washington
Post critiquing Kennan’s containment policy, the author agreed that “The United States
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cannot afford to relax,” and pointed out the fact that this was a dire, “dark analysis.”56
However, the author also contended that this analysis was nothing new but had been
building over the past few years, suggesting that Kennan’s ideas and the Cold War itself
were based on earlier notions of global hostility and tension against the US, which
defined continuous warfare.
The Polish Question continued to linger as the best example of Soviet
untrustworthiness. American sentiment toward the Soviets shifted as they saw the Soviet
Union’s desire to dominate Poland and leftover tensions from the Red Scare of the 1920s
came to the surface. In Dale Sorenson’s 1979 article, “The Language of a Cold Warrior,”
he created a chart based off public opinion polls concerning pro-Soviet feelings between
1946 and 1948. His findings showed a drastic decline in pro-Soviet feelings directly after
WWII ended and a steady decrease thereafter. Harriman also saw Poland as a key
component to the breakdown of US-Soviet relations, noting as early as April 1945 that
there was little chance of a solution to the problem and that Poland could be the break
between the two superpowers. The potential rift that Harriman saw regarding Poland was
a view shared by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who described what the
world might look like if it were divided into two camps.57 According to Truman in his
memoirs, Churchill stated, “It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to
pieces.”58 Truman backed Churchill’s ideas and saw the Polish Question as a very
56
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dangerous situation because the impasse could lead to a civil war in Poland between the
anti-communist Poles and the Soviet-backed Warsaw Provisional Government.59 In
1945, despite what seemed like an inevitable clash between the US and Soviet Union,
Roosevelt, prior to his death, still saw England as the larger threat. Roosevelt’s
viewpoint implied that the US would not define the Soviet Union as a threat until much
later.
Though Poland served as the major concern during the end of World War II and
into the post-war world, Russia continued to cause problems for the United States in
other geographic regions as well. Directly after the war ended in Japan, the Soviets
wanted to occupy Japan as one of the victorious Allied powers. However, the Soviet land
invasion after the first atomic bomb had become moot in light of the real power of the
weapon. As a result, Truman saw no reason why the Soviet Union should have any right
to occupy Japan, and General Douglas MacArthur agreed. MacArthur relayed the
information that “Japanese communism is dominated from Moscow” and that there were
pro-communist elements brewing in Japanese society after their surrender, creating a
Soviet threat to US initiatives. The 1946 CIG paper likewise reiterated that the Soviet
Union would also seek to gain influence in China, Korea, and Japan at the same level or
more than the United States in order to prevent these areas from becoming bases of attack
against the USSR. It would have been detrimental to the US to allow any Soviet
occupation to take place, which could result in a situation similar to Poland where the
Soviets were steadfast in refusing to leave. In the same regard, Truman had requested a
temporary base for land and sea crafts on the Kurile Islands, which the Soviets did have
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under their control. The Soviets looked at this as an insult, interpreting it as a jab at a
defeated nation. Truman recalled the Kurile situation in his memoirs as another step
toward complete distrust between the US and Soviets. Although the situation was
eventually treated by both sides as a misunderstanding (Stalin thought Truman wanted a
permanent military base), it revealed the Soviet Union’s own hostile feelings toward the
United States and that they did not want US influence so close to the shores of Russia.60
Further disagreements continued to stem from the Soviet military’s propagation of
communist governments wherever they happened to advance, despite any agreements
made at Yalta.61 As early as April 17, 1945, Truman found Stalin to be disagreeable
about this topic. Stalin maneuvered around the Yalta agreements in order to get his way
in Poland, and at the Potsdam Conference, he insisted upon negotiating everything that
might benefit the Soviet Union, while tossing aside issues that the other Allies found
important. One of these important issues concerned British and American rights to oil
equipment that the Soviets seized from Rumania without compensation. Soviet troops
occupied Rumania and Bulgaria, insisting upon recognition as communist nations, which
continued to go against Allied agreements for holding elections to create stable
governments for these countries. More and more satellite nations in Eastern Europe
collapsed under the weight of communism and Soviet troop occupation, which caused
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alarm for the other Allies and the United States especially.62 Since all previous
governmental analysis of Soviet intentions had predicted their grab at world power and
desire to control the majority of the world, their actions regarding these satellite nations
seemed to confirm the fears of those in the US Government.
In the post-war world, the Soviet military also focused on Greece, Turkey, and
Iran, which brought immediate reaction from the United States’ leadership. Largely
created to deal with the Soviet incursion in Greece and Turkey, the 1947 Truman
Doctrine provided economic, political, and military aide to democratic foreign countries
under the threat of communism. Prior to this in mid-1946, the United States government
had threatened the Soviets with United Nations action if they tried to make the Turkish
Dardanelles an object of aggression. At this same time, Stalin refused to withdraw from
Iran per agreements made at the London Conference, instead sending in more troops and
complicating US oil concerns.63 On top of these strategic areas, Stalin also refused to
negotiate on the occupation of Manchuria and the economic problems in Korea that
might lead to civil war.64 By the beginning of 1946, Truman had already become fed up
with Soviet actions, telling then Secretary of State James Byrnes that “I do not think we
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should play compromise any longer…I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”65 Truman
advocated letting the US position on Iran be known and refusing to recognize Rumania
and Bulgaria along with settling any remaining Lend-Lease debts with the Soviet
Union.66 Despite all previous discussion of trying to work with the Soviets and maintain
a friendly relationship, Soviet actions had pushed the already hostile Truman to make a
final break with the Soviets.
This break finally came in 1948 when the Soviets and the United States reached
the brink of a traditional war over the occupation of Berlin, Germany. During the Soviet
Berlin blockade and subsequent US airlift of supplies, the language of war returned
despite the lack of a true, armed conflict. Essentially, the Soviet Union had flooded West
Berlin with currency in hopes of creating massive inflation and general unhappiness, but
the other Allies changed the German mark. This caused the Soviets to blockade the
supply route into West Berlin until the Allies agreed to stop exchanging currency.67
According to Truman in his memoirs, “The blockade of Berlin was international
Communism’s counterattack.”68 A statement by Molotov in May of 1948 reinforced
Truman’s thoughts. In a State Department telegram from Moscow to the Secretary of
State George C. Marshall, American Ambassador to Moscow General Walter Bedell
Smith quoted Molotov:
USSR has always considered that it could live in peace and in good relationship
with US and with all other countries. It has never pretended to interfere with the
internal policies of other nations, but it cannot ignore the actions and
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developments which have taken place during the past years which infringe on its
legitimate interests.69
Despite the illusion of peace that the United States had tried to maintain during this postWWII period, the situation in Berlin prompted Truman’s language of traditional warfare
to reappear, seemingly legitimized by a physically threatening situation. This
counterattack was supposedly retaliation for a combination of Soviet setbacks, including
Yugoslavian desires for independence and the success of the European Recovery
Program or Marshall Plan, which funded the rebuilding of Europe in an effort to deter
communist influence. Truman further utilized war language when he cited that “the
Russians were ready to retreat” by March of 1949. The Berlin blockade finally ended on
May 12, 1949. 70 While the situation in Berlin placed the US and Soviet Union the
closest to war since the buildup of hostility during the twilight zone, Truman’s own
language in describing the situation shows that there was a “war” of some kind taking
place during this period of supposed peace though armed conflict never occurred.
The Atomic Bomb
During this twilight zone period, the recent invention and use of nuclear weapons
increased US hostilities and discord with the Soviets. It was not solely the existence of
nuclear weapons that made the situation so ominous, but also the United States’ actual
use of an atomic bomb. Until the US used the bomb against Japan, the true nature of its
existence was largely misunderstood or disregarded. Both Secretary Stimson and Byrnes
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told Truman within the first two days of his presidency of the top-secret project
Roosevelt had commissioned to create a massive explosive. Truman, however, was
much more concerned with the San Francisco Conference that Roosevelt had slated to
take place, and evidence of a 1943 telephone conversation between Truman and Stimson
suggested that Truman may have already known some information about the bomb.71 By
the end of April 1945, Stimson had met with Truman to discuss, in detail, the effect that
the bomb might have on future foreign relations. Stimson told Truman that the bomb was
“certain to have a decisive influence on our relations with other countries.”72 More
specifically, Stimson’s focus was on the United States becoming a superpower and being
able to dictate its own terms at the end of World War II.
However, there were those who tried to warn Truman of what could lay in store if
the United States left nuclear weapons unregulated. One such report by James O. Franck,
a German Nobel laureate and scientist on the Manhattan Project, specifically warned of
Soviet mistrust and a possible arms race if the United States did not regulate atomic
weapons before using them on Japan. The Franck Report also included valuable options
for regulating nuclear weapons and materials, and for using the first atomic bomb that
might have mitigated future hostility toward the United States.73 Likewise, in a report,
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“Atomic Bomb and the Postwar Position of the United States in the World,” by Leo
Szilard from the spring of 1945, Szilard contended that the “First bomb that is detonated
over Japan will be spectacular enough to start a race in atomic armaments between us and
other nations.”74 According to this report, the concern was not an immediate Soviet
threat, but the generalized global threat in response to US dominance. Although the postwar relationship with the Soviet Union eventually illustrated that the US government
should have heeded Franck and Szilard’s warning, the Executive Branch largely ignored
these reports.75
Even after the United States used the bomb, Truman attempted to cloud its
military significance in the language of peace. In his memoirs Truman reflected on his
intention to make atomic energy a “weapon for peace.”76 Once again, Truman
convoluted the language, offering paradoxical images of both war and peace. The
concept of using bombs to keep the peace persistently reflected a period of continuous
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war and the changing nature of war and peace in general. The popular media reiterated
this same idea as well. According to Boyer, the media offered both a surge of war
hysteria and peaceful uses of atomic energy, but eventually created a cultural shift that
led Americans to accept atomic energy and overlook its militaristic uses.77 In a political
cartoon from The Call, a New York socialist newspaper, a bulky football player denoted
“atomic energy,” ran toward the goal of “war profits” and away from the opposing
“peace and plenty for all” (see fig. 2.1).78 This was a particularly interesting depiction
because it did not focus on war or peace as the outcome of atomic energy but included
both as possibilities. The overall impression the cartoon conveyed was that government
had chosen war over peace. In a Washington Post article that discussed things to be
reconsidered since the dropping of the bomb, the author noted that the existence of
atomic energy should lead to reconversion back to a domestic economy and
demobilization immediately because the atomic bomb was the only weapon of war worth
using. This author also went on to say that atomic energy would create a global world
and possibly lead to more scientific discoveries, such as a cure for cancer.79 As a result
of these competing aspects of atomic energy, both military and civilian use, the author
concluded that “military policy in peace as in war will have to be thoroughly revised.”80
Boyer argued that the media’s pronouncements of the positive uses of atomic energy
allowed Americans to “turn from the immediate reality of its military use.” However,
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what the Washington Post and The Call articulated was murkiness between peacetime
and wartime uses of atomic energy that Boyer denied.81 This murkiness would become
official policy during the Eisenhower administration as the “Atoms for Peace Program”
shrouded the New Look’s military component. This begged the question of whether a
military policy should have been applicable for two distinct phases or if the atomic age
dictated that the government adjust its policy for a twilight zone period of continuous
warfare.
Truman continued the illusion of peace during this period of non-traditional war
by keeping atomic energy, a supposed weapon of peace, under the strict control of the
United States only. Truman recalled in his memoirs that he never intended to give Russia
the plans to make an atomic bomb. Secretary of War Stimson agreed with Truman at the
time, that the United States and England should maintain the secret of how to harness
atomic energy.82 Attorney General Tom C. Clark told Truman, “Our entire purpose is to
preserve world peace. For the present it is my belief that world peace can best be
preserved by keeping this scientific information a secret.”83 Szilard and Alexander
Sachs, two major participants in the Manhattan Project, completely disagreed with those
in Truman’s administration. Szilard noted in his 1945 report that if the Soviet Union
could not be included in the secret of the atomic bomb, then the US should destroy all its
bombs and installations, and make an agreement with England and the Soviets to outlaw
the building of such equipment. Inclusion of the Soviet Union was the key to control
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over atomic energy in the world. In Szilard’s opinion, inclusion or destruction were the
only avenues of maintaining US security for at least the next twenty-five years.84 Sachs
argued that the US origination of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact against warfare “places
us [the US] in an anomalous position with reference to the possession and use of a
weapon that is the archetype of aggression and surprise.”85 If Truman really meant for
atomic energy to be a measure of peace, keeping it secret seemed a strange choice.
Likewise, while a general threat would exist after the bomb’s use, secrecy could give rise
to a definitive threat from the USSR, which could only interpret US secrecy as an act
against them. In Congress, the absurdity of this fantasy continued as discussion of the
Selective Training and Service Act turned to preparation for war. Representative John
Folger (D-NC) read a statement from scientist Harold C. Urey during these congressional
debates in 1946. Urey claimed:
We are all crowded together in a single house. Beneath the floor of our house
there is a time bomb ticking away…Those who even think of an atomic arms
race, those who boast of battleships and air power, those who speak of using
national force to maintain peace, simply do not understand this crowded house of
fear.86
While what Urey claimed was true, that the bomb was a motivation for war, not peace, it
was unlikely that Truman did not understand this, but likely that he purposely
downplayed atomic weapons to correspond to his own agenda and quell public fear.
Truman later recalled that the power of atomic weapons did not “necessarily do away
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with political-military objectives.”87 Politically, Truman was attempting to maintain his
power as the executive under the guise of the Commander in Chief Clause in order to
build up US defense within the national security state apparatus. Sachs noted in a 1945
letter to Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace that “the totalitarian character of the new
weapon threatens to obliterate the opportunity for the time-borrowing inherent in defense,
and by imperiling the democratic institutions, with their delays and deliberations, renders
imperative the task of making the weapon safe for us.”88 One way of making the weapon
safer for the United States was Truman’s personal control of military decisions inherent
in his role as Commander in Chief, bypassing time-consuming congressional oversight.
Truman understood Urey’s house of fear analogy but sought instead to manipulate
decisions in order to build his “house of peace” supported by a firm foundation in
continuous warfare and the flexible powers of the Commander in Chief. Militarily,
Truman also feared that the Soviets would launch an atomic armament race, destroying
the US military advantage if the United States released plans for an atomic weapon.89
Essentially, this new type of weapon, combined with America’s growing
suspicion of the Soviet Union, further influenced a distinctive change in the nature of
warfare. Foremost, the atomic bomb created a global world, ending isolationism forever.
This argument played itself out in Congress as the battle between the isolationists and
internationalists finally subsided. The bomb’s very existence made it necessary for the
United States to prepare itself for war even without an adversary. The US preponderance
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of atomic power instilled fear into nations that stood in opposition to American policies
and made those technologically capable (the Soviet Union) rush to complete their own
atomic weapons.90 Szilard contended in 1945, “The greatest danger arising out of a
competition between the United States and Russia, which would lead to a rapid
accumulation of vast quantities of atomic bombs in both countries, consists of the
possibility of the outbreak of a preventive war.”91 In reality, this preventive war
remained covert as continuous warfare until, as part of the Cold War, it was temporarily
exposed. Use of the first atomic bomb forced the US to develop perpetually more
effective nuclear weapons, because despite Truman’s efforts, the US would not maintain
the secret forever, at which point the country would become the target of hostilities
because of its military stronghold. According to Secretary of War Robert Patterson in a
1945 memorandum to Truman, scientists claimed that waging atomic war might equal an
end to civilization.92 However, faith was strong within the Truman administration that a
US preponderance of atomic weapons would last for many more years to come.
Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson told Truman in September of 1945 that he had
his doubts regarding Soviet atomic capabilities. Anderson noted:
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I listened carefully to the testimony that the Russians might be able to make an
atomic bomb in five years. I have my doubts about this…We know that in the
production of the atomic bomb there was a certain element of American
mathematical and mechical genius which has given us the automotive industry,
and countless other inventive processes which are not always developed in every
land, and which seem to be peculiarly the result of long years of mechanization of
industry within the United States.93
According to Anderson and many others like him in government, the United States was
safe for years to come from certain nuclear annihilation, making the concept of
continuous warfare both feasible and much more desirable than straightforward,
aggressive rearmament.
Furthermore, the US could continue demobilizing from World War II without
risking the advantages of being in an emergency state. Since nuclear weapons were now
seen as more important, perhaps more useful, than large fighting forces, demobilization
could occur to a certain extent in the army, while the air force picked up the slack by
preparing itself for an entirely nuclear war. The army itself might be able to become
smaller, but would have to become highly skilled technical specialists. According to the
congressional record from 1946, Representative Dewey Short (R-MO) maintained that
the next war would be scientific. Young people that the military previously desired as
draftees should serve in technical schools instead, in Short’s opinion. Along these same
lines, a post-war military report published by the House Select Committee on Post-War
Military Policy in May 1945 already advocated extending the relationship between
science and the military into the post-war environment. According to the committee, this
alliance was the key to future national defense. Sachs suggested to Wallace that this
spectacle of war-augmented expenditures and war-induced acceleration of scientific
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implications was going to create a needed revision to the role of government involvement
in long-term national defense. Coincidentally, in Truman’s later initiatives to create the
national security state, the National Security Act cited the “advance of science” and
“magnitude of modern war” as reasons for altering the military organization.
Furthermore, the nation’s intelligence community also became the object of military
discussion. In a National Security Act preliminary hearing before the House Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Rear Admiral Thomas Inglis gave his
opinion that the government needed a central intelligence agency due to nuclear weapons.
The government could not allow attacks like Pearl Harbor to happen in future wars
because of the ramifications of the use of nuclear weapons; therefore, the government
needed to organize a central intelligence group in order to warn of these oncoming
attacks.94
The National Security State
The centralization and reorganization of the national defense and intelligence
communities was the final step in the creation of continuous warfare. While the USSoviet relationship crumbled, creating hostility between the two superpowers, which was
then reinforced by the existence and use of the atomic bomb, the national security state
apparatus would put the United States in a permanent period of twilight when not
engaged in armed conflict. According to a memorandum between Murphy and Truman
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on the powers of the president to send troops abroad, “In time of peace the President is
just as much Commander-in-Chief as he is in time of war…But in time of peace the
exercise of that power is directed not at subduing an enemy, but at broader considerations
of national policy in general.”95 This new national policy was one of broad “defense,”
easily created out of the fear of subversion of American democracy and capitalist
endeavors, most likely by the communists. Historian Melvyn Leffler argued that the
national security state was a reaction to the bureaucracy needed to administer the
Marshall Plan as part of the US preponderance of power and that Truman had little
interest in national security personally.96 However, Leffler’s analysis again lacked
perspective by ignoring Truman’s background in World War I and his subsequent
articulation as a senator of many of the basic principles that would become the national
security state. Leffler also made no note of the inclusion of the essential tenets of the
National Security Act in several executive orders prior to the bill’s official passage,
which suggested it was truly a Truman initiative. By constantly focusing on the nation’s
defense, and placing excessive power in the hands of the president at the highest level
because he was the Commander in Chief, the national security apparatus created a
constant state of emergency that stood in a liminal period between peace and war but
could easily morph into actual armed conflict.
The national security state did not develop solely to deal with the growing tension
between the United States and Soviet Union but was a concept of the Truman
administration that depended upon continuous warfare for viability. Reflecting on his
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concept of the national security state, Truman contended that he came into office
believing the government had to reorganize the defense system to insure future safety and
world peace. As early as 1944, Truman cited the attack on Pearl Harbor as the worst
example of what could happen because of disorganization. In an article written by
Truman during his days as a senator, he noted that “lack of a single national security
setup” was the root of Pearl Harbor. In this same article, Truman called for centralization
of this reorganized system under “one command,” presumably that of the president.
Once Truman became president, he also set out to reorganize the executive branch to give
the president broader and more flexible powers. The War Powers Acts (1941 and 1942)
served as Truman’s prototype for executive power during these initial phases, giving the
president expanded powers like those utilized during wartime.97 In 1942, During
Roosevelt’s administration, Director of Public Relations M.E. Gilford sent out a
statement, “The Powers of the President in Time of War,” prepared by the Office of the
Assistant Solicitor General, to all the heads of the various divisions within the Executive
Branch. This statement included information on how Congress could delegate widely
discretionary powers to the president in times of war, which were sometimes permanent
as part of the national body of law or sometimes temporary. The statement also noted
that while some actions taken by the president as part of his duty to protect had been
challenged as unconstitutional, “the general approval of the American people…and the
frequent recognition and ratification of such acts by Congress have conclusively
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answered the arguments of those who would make the President powerless in a time of
national crisis.”98
Through continuous warfare and its partner the national security state, Truman
sought to convince the people and Congress that the heightened hostility was akin to war
and with it, the president and a sophisticated defense system should have more power.
Truman also claimed that the Reorganization Act of 1939 set in place greater leeway for
presidential action, but it seemed unlikely that this law put in place nearly as much power
as Truman wanted, his own executive power already amplified by World War II when he
came into office.99 In a special message to Congress on May 24, 1945 regarding this
executive reorganization, Truman asked Congress to extend some parts of the War
Powers Act that would be useful to the president past the six-month post-war expiration
date.100 In a report issued to Truman by Clark in August of 1945, Clark commented that
the president was the only one who could decide when to end the war and therefore,
determine the timeline for the cessation of presidential powers associated with wartime.
Clark noted that such wartime laws were in effect “until such war is terminated by a
treaty of peace proclaimed by the president and for six months thereafter.”101 This stance
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again emphasized the legal understanding that the president was the sole determiner in an
end to hostilities. Clark underscored this again in November when there was some
question of whether the president had the ability to transfer smaller war plant
corporations to the other executive agencies. Although the First War Powers Act of 1941
said that the president’s actions must be in relation to World War II, Clark reiterated that
the wartime powers of the president did not cease with fighting.102
Truman and those in his administration came to believe that the president
proclaimed an end to warfare and hostilities with few parameters to follow. In a
preliminary draft of a letter from the Attorney General to Truman in June of 1946, Clark
noted, “The broad basis of governmental powers on which the various emergency and
wartime statutes rest cannot…be said to have been terminated by recent developments,
including unconditional surrender of our enemies.”103 Clark emphasized to Truman the
flexible and technical nature of war, reiterating that surrender or an end to hostilities was
not necessarily the same thing as an end to the war. Additionally, Clark cited the Civil
War era Supreme Court case of Stewart v. Kahn. “[The President’s war power]…is not
limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it
inherent the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy
the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress,” according to Stewart.104 In
Truman’s 1945 Special Message, he continued, “In some instances it will be necessary to
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delay reversion beyond the period now provided by law, or to stay it permanently.”105
Truman was literally asking Congress to extend the president’s powers as Commander in
Chief into a period of what should have been peace, but Congress did not concede to the
president’s desires.106 Attorney and Administrative Assistant to the President Richmond
B. Keech told Truman in October 1946, “abrupt termination of all emergency authority
and activities might well paralyze certain functions of government still essential to the
change-over from a state of war to peace.”107 Truman took Keech’s warning and relied
upon the advice of his Attorney General, seeking to perpetuate a twilight period of
continuous warfare where he could reasonably extend his powers as part of the lingering
emergency period and use them to build the national security state.
During this same 1944-1945 period, Truman continued to lay out his plans for a
national security state, even before becoming president. This dedication further
illustrated that continuous warfare and the origination of the imperial presidency began
with Truman. In a 1944 article, “Our Armed Forces Must be Unified,” Truman noted the
consolidation of the army and navy and complete integration of national security along
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with a strong centralized commander. Truman claimed that these ideas were not his own,
instead taken from American Legion suggestions, but Truman would come to own the
concept of the national security state by the end of his service as president. By late 1945,
Truman was already attempting to establish a Department of Defense, which was the first
step toward unifying the military.108 On December 19, 1945, he pleaded with Congress
to create the Department of Defense as the most effective organization for “employment
of our military resources in time of war and most effective mean of maintaining
peace.”109 With World War II not yet a distant memory, Truman was already advocating
a twilight zone state for the nation where the national security state could serve as both a
military and peace apparatus. According to historian Michael J. Hogan in his book A
Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 19451954, “it was no longer possible to base the ‘nation’s security establishment…on one
organization in peace and another in war.’”110 The peculiar nature of a war without
armed conflict or without so much as a defined enemy allowed Truman to float the idea
of the national security state in government, but it would not come to fruition until 1947.
Prior to that time, Truman and Congress explored other options for building a strong
defense without giving the appearance of mobilization for war.
Truman risked losing his extended powers as Commander in Chief immediately
after the fighting of World War II ended, and demobilization brought other concerns that
one could tie into the creation of a period of continuous warfare. In a special message to
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Congress on September 5, 1945, Truman pushed for a continuation of the draft,
continuation of his war powers as president, and for Congress not to pass a resolution
declaring the war over. Even before Truman made his speech to Congress, the Cabinet
discussed concerns over demobilization.111 On October 26, 1945, the Cabinet considered
demobilization “a threat to the country’s strategic position.”112 With World War II
essentially over, it appeared that the only motivation for an extension of the wartime state
and avoidance of demobilization was a need to continue the benefits of warfare during a
period of peace. Truman agreed with his cabinet, but could not stave off demobilization
for long. Families demanded that the military return their soldier and sailor sons to them
since the war was over. As a result, public opinion forced Truman to demobilize to some
extent, decreasing the size of the military. However, Truman did avoid complete
demobilization to the extent of the interwar period between World War I and World War
II, which corresponded with the end of US isolationism. Overall, Truman saw
demobilization, marked by a decrease in troop numbers, as a complete disintegration of
the armed forces by January of 1946. In the Soviet Union, the military had actually
increased from one million troops in 1935 to an astonishing four and a half million men
after World War II with little likelihood of further reduction.113 The Soviet military
strength prompted an even stronger administration backlash against demobilization.
Truman claimed, “The future of the country was as much at stake as it had been in the
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days of the war.”114 At this point, with the armed conflict over for only a few months,
Truman cited his responsibilities as president for keeping the country secure by building
a strong military foundation. Once again, the convoluted language of the twilight zone
served as a reason for extending the benefits of war under the pretext of peace. There
was no other reason for this, other than the expansion of executive power and with it,
Truman’s creation of the national security state.
Demobilization was still a topic of concern in 1948, when the world situation
began to take a turn toward what historians and the public would recognize as the Cold
War. The US Government never fully dismantled the arsenal and military forces after the
German and Japanese surrender following World War II. However, 1948 marked a low
point in troop numbers with one and a half million soldiers in the US military. In
comparison to the twelve million man military fully mobilized in 1945, the statistics in
1948 seemed grim for a country concerned with defense in terms of traditional armed
conflict. Realistically, the size of the military in 1948 was still the largest peacetime
force in all of US history and stood at nearly four times the size of the 1939, pre-World
War II numbers.115 Truman had effectively demobilized the military from World War II
while actually increasing the size of the military overall and adding more non-traditional
weaponry that did not rely on troop numbers for effectiveness. This move suggested war
intentions in the 1940s but came to define American defense in the future.116 In an
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undelivered speech composed in April 1948, Truman wrote that after World War I “we
proceeded to sink our half finished then modern ships and cut our land army to the bone.
…Some people would do the same thing today.”117 In this particular portion of the
speech, Truman suggested that the United States was not demobilizing, although it was
effectively three years since the end of World War II hostilities. Truman commented on
the period directly after World War II later in the same speech. Truman claimed, “We
had demobilized completely—in fact too completely—but mamma and papa and every
Congressman wanted every boy discharged at once after Japan folded up.”118 This
statement directly contradicted the earlier one in Truman’s speech, but what this
contradiction illustrated was the distinctive difference between demobilization after
World War I and what the government considered demobilization after World War II.
The post-World War II era ushered in a new version of demobilization that
emphasized a decrease in troops compared to periods of traditional armed conflict but an
overall increase in the size and strength of the military compared to former periods of
peace.119 A memorandum from John H. Ohly, a special assistant to the Secretary of
superiority with armed forces that are agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies and
threats. …over the past 10 years, since 9/11, our defense budget grew at an extraordinary pace. Over the
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Defense, to the military leadership in March 1948 noted that Secretary James Forrestal
wanted each of them to reevaluate current demobilization activities and determine which
should be “discontinued or slowed down” in light of the world situation.120 This
memorandum reinforced Truman’s confused version of demobilization, here showing
that even without an armed conflict, the United States was planning to end or slow down
its demobilization, contributing to continuous warfare. In a speech given in Little Rock,
Arkansas on June 11, 1949, Truman argued, “We must maintain an adequate national
defence [sic] on land, at sea, and in the air…in order to keep the peace of the world.”121
Truman’s words supported the subtle remobilization going on with the military while
pairing it with motives of peace instead of war. Additionally, disarmament played a
distinct role in this post-World War II period of continuous warfare. Endorsed by people
from former Secretary of State Byrnes, former Ambassador Davies, and General Dwight
D. Eisenhower to Republican Senator Robert Taft, Professor Urey, and Democratic
Representative Jerry Voorhis, disarmament was not the same as demobilization. Many,
including the list above, believed strongly that the atomic bomb had served to antiquate
regular arms.122
Despite some moves toward demobilization, plans for remobilization began
almost immediately with discussion of extending selective service and instituting
universal military training. In 1946, bill S. 1907, which aimed to increase the enlisted
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strength of the regular navy and Marine Corps, to enlarge the military overall through
selective service and training, and to authorize permanent military appointments, came
under discussion by the House and Senate. The debate largely focused on the purpose of
this military enlargement.123 Representative Adolph Sabath (D-IL) attempted to
downplay the concerns over the bill when he stated, “I hope no one will feel this
legislation aims to increase or strengthen our Army because it is going to be needed in the
near future.”124 However, the very mention of the concern over another war showed that
it was a significant part of the debate concerning the bill. Sabath and Republican
Representative Clare Hoffman (MI) actually escalated this debate by arguing whether or
not Congress should settle the issue during the same session or if representatives should
take the issue back to the constituents first.125 Representative Andrew May (D-KY)
initially supported Hoffman’s argument for delaying the bill, claiming, “when we were at
war, we yielded…But when the time comes that we are at peace, I think I have the right
to reserve my opinions and not follow blindly.”126 May clearly recognized that the period
was not one of traditional war; however, he also noted that he was aware of the anxiety
about the world situation and that the US had not signed a peace treaty with anyone yet.
Selective service could serve as a “safeguard” in May’s view, because of the uncertainty
of the times. Representative James Wadsworth (R-NY) agreed with this plan because he
did not want the troops to be short on number come the beginning of 1947 on account of
elements that were unfriendly to the United States. Wadsworth was referencing
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communists, specifically the Soviet Union.127 This debate between Sabath, Hoffman, and
May confirmed that there were increasing hostilities toward the Soviet Union and that
there was the possibility of a war in some regard. However, the lack of traditional war
still caused some degree of hesitance to increase the size of the military.
In actuality, the real question concerning Congress was what this twilight zone
period meant for the military. The reluctance to expand the military, especially through
selective service, came from a lack of knowledge concerning whether the military should
be kept at a wartime or peacetime state. Legislators were unsure if the liminal period the
United States was experiencing was a prelude to war or peace, and as such, were hesitant
to increase military strength. According to Democratic Representative Overton Brooks
(D-LA) in 1946, “we are either sowing seeds of permanent peace or sowing seeds of
war.”128 An increased military apparatus seemed to reflect a period of war, but this idea
was largely unpopular amongst the public and Congress so soon after the end of WWII,
so the illusion of peace was continued. May continued his argument by quoting President
Theodore Roosevelt’s well known mantra, “speak softly and carry a big stick,” claiming
that this concept was necessary because of the world situation. 129 Theodore Roosevelt
was also a president who loved war and power, so it seemed no small coincidence that
May should cite him as a representative of these two concepts in a more modern era.
However, others easily saw through the confusion of the twilight zone. As one example,
Republican Representative Walter Brehm (OH) stated, “our emphasis should be on peace
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and not on war,” and the US should not practice one thing yet preach another.130 In
Brehm’s view, similar to that of Franklin Roosevelt, universal disarmament seemed a
more appropriate route to securing world peace than continuing the draft and expanding
the military.131
Opponents of this expansion of the military also realized that an increased
military might mean increased executive powers as well. Republican Representative
Joseph Martin (MA) brought up the reason for expanding the executive’s powers during
wartime as a means of having a single leader over all manpower, a true Commander in
Chief. However, Martin contended that there was “no just ground for extending those
powers to the executive branch and taking them away from Congress in peacetimes.”132
Truman disagreed with Martin’s contention, and he noted in a 1937 speech during his
senatorial days, “In times of great stress such as war or the great depression, it becomes
necessary for Congress to delegate some of its power to the executive branch of the
government.”133 Truman made no clear distinction between foreign or domestic issues.
Instead, Truman argued that the president deserved greater powers during any stressful
time for the nation. However, Martin also believed that by extending the draft into
peacetime it gave the president undue power over citizens during peace, creating an
imbalance not only between the branches of government, but also between the president
and the citizenry. The problem that Martin saw with the president and the troops was that
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the president did not have any war making ability but did have the ability to control the
armed forces. As a result, Martin realized that an increased military during a period of
twilight gave the president more control over bringing about an act of war through troop
usage, possibly usurping the war making power of Congress.134 A 1951 memorandum
between Murphy and Truman reinforced Martin’s concern. Murphy contended:
While the Congress has power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and
other powers important to the conduct of foreign policy and to the defense of the
United States…these powers are not to be so construed as to curb or cripple the
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief.135
Murphy sent this memorandum during the Korean conflict, when Truman used his
powers as Commander in Chief to involve the United States in a war without ever
Congress’ approval and declaration of war. In 1946, however, Martin thought it was
reasonable to disapprove of selective service but instead advocate universal military
training, which would allay the concerns of war and peace advocates alike.136
Universal military training, which advanced the theory of preparing a highlytrained military force waiting to be called up from the citizenry during a war, seemed like
a better alternative to continuing selective service into a period of peace, but it did not
actually address the larger concerns over executive power and continuous warfare
expressed by Congress. In his memoirs, Truman claimed that he advocated a universal
training program from the point of demobilization, believing that it would allow the
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United States to be strong militarily despite decreased military enlistments.137 In
Truman’s outline of his message on universal military training written in 1945, Truman
noted that modern war required highly trained men and complete mobility of industry
with no further reliance on geographical barriers to stop an attack. Truman reasoned that
universal training would allow the Government to fit men into the overall needs of the
nation in relation to aptitude and qualifications without extra training after such an
attack.138
Truman’s structure for universal training relied upon the stipulations setup in the
1920 National Defense Act.139 This structure consisted of Army supervision of
instruction of all physically able men between the ages of seventeen and twenty over a
one-year timeframe. The Army and National Guard remained the first groups for
deployment in the case of an attack. Those with previous military training, such as
veterans, or those who had completed the preliminary universal military training
previously and chose to join the reserves, fell into an organized reserve that was available
in the case of an attack. Added under Truman’s plan were all others trained by the Army
and Navy through universal training. These trainees would first fall into general reserves
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ready for action and expansion of the military in the case of an attack and after six years
downgrade to a secondary general reserve.140
Additionally, under Truman’s plan, military service academies would no longer
focus on undergraduate military training, which the Government would sanction, but
instead shift toward becoming officer training schools. These schools would now
guarantee an increased military leadership when an attack came. Universal military
training overall would guarantee the safety of the United States against potential
aggressors without appearing to be a preparation for war. Those in Truman’s
administration touted universal military training as an opportunity to increase the
physical standards of US labor, to lessen illiteracy, to develop character and
understanding of citizenship, to strengthen educational status, for self-improvement, and
to develop skills needed for other occupations.141
Truman realized that universal military training fit more succinctly into his own
agenda for the creation of the national security state through an expansion of executive
power while maintaining an exterior of peace, and in November of 1946, he appointed an
Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training to research the option. Six months
later, the Commission reported exactly what Truman had hoped, that by stripping itself of
its troops, the United States would encourage other nations to plan aggressive actions and
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that the atomic bomb had made war universal and immediate, necessitating the readiness
of trained men for use in the military at a moment’s notice.142
In many regards, however, universal military training did not squelch executive
power ambitions, but reinforced the availability of a large number of troops when the
president needed them and perpetuated the idea that the United States was still involved
in a continuous war, despite the end of armed conflict from World War II. On the other
hand, private organizations like the National Security Committee attempted to bolster the
peaceful aspects of universal military training through their “Peace through
Preparedness” program (1947-1948).143 In one National Security Committee publication,
they claimed that through support of universal military training, “The nation’s leading
advocates of preparation for war will be shown as fighting for peace on two fronts, not
just one—for armed resistance to aggression and for maintained disarmament that would
prevent all aggression.”144 The Peace through Preparedness program only served to
misconstrue further the relationship of peace and war. Due to the threat of executive
power and confusion over the status of peace or war, Congress never fully explored the
idea of universal military training, though Truman would ask for it again in 1948.
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Truman claimed in his memoirs, years later, that the availability of a well-trained pool of
men might have prevented Soviet expansion.145 While it seemed more likely that a lack
of continued selective service or universal military training may have delayed the United
States’ inevitable involvement in an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, it did lead to
protracted continuous war.
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (M.D.A.A.) also served to fulfill part
of the larger obligations set in place through the United Nations’ goal of promoting
international peace and security, but it also formed an intricate part of the United States’
own desire for self-protection. The M.D.A.A. furnished military assistance to foreign
nations that were under the threat of communism, which provided for the larger defense
and welfare of the United States. The US would provide weapons and training to
threatened nations, thereby making it more difficult for an aggressor like the Soviet
Union to gamble on an attack. During the House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearings
on the M.D.A.A., Secretary of State Acheson told the congressmen that the failure of free
nations to defend themselves was an invitation for political and military aggression.
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson expressed similar concerns during the hearings, and
brought up the war/peace discussion when he noted that peace in the world was only
possible with a strong, armed United States.146 Acheson added, “a strategic plan is based
upon forces.”147 During the M.D.A.A. hearings both the secretaries of state and defense
saw a strong military force as a necessary prerequisite to keeping peace, but their
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prompting to provide foreign countries with military weapons and training in order to
increase their troops seemed more like a preparation for war than peace.
Problems with this muddled concept were first brought up during the discussion
of extension of selective service and universal military training, once again made an
appearance during the M.D.A.A. hearings. Democratic Representative Helen Douglas
(CA) was concerned that the military would have too much power under this plan instead
of being a safety valve, mirroring earlier concerns over similar programs.148 Douglas
noted, “the armed forces are set up to protect us in case of war and…they must always
think in terms of war.” “[W]e must not lose sight of the goal—which is peace,” Douglas
also added, making it clear that military strength was a reflection of war, not peace.149
By 1949, the Cold War, as referenced in the M.D.A.A. hearings, was well underway,
though still without traditional means of warfare. Without a traditional war that would
utilize troops and invoke the Commander in Chief powers under the Constitution, the
M.D.A.A. served as an exception, giving the president exclusive powers to control the
military apparatus, not for US armed conflict, but under the concept of keeping peace.
Under the framework of the M.D.A.A., the powers of the president were greatly
increased. This framework focused on replicating a state of emergency for the United
States through the vulnerability of other nations. According to Republican Senator
Arthur Vandenberg (MI) as quoted in The Awesome Power, “the bill was too costly and it
was ‘almost unbelievable in its grant of unlimited power to the Chief Executive.’”150 The
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M.D.A.A. gave the president control, not just over actual troops serving in the capacity of
training specialists, but also over military equipment, resources, and the setting of rules
and regulations for each country, along with entering into individual contracts. The
language of the M.D.A.A. articulated “The President shall” before nearly every
stipulation, and in a later report on the M.D.A.A., a diagram of the organizational
structure of the program illustrated that all levels of the program’s staff were responsible
solely to the president (see fig. 2.2). Due to the M.D.A.A.’s grant of extensive powers to
the executive, its placement as a program within the liminal state between war and peace,
and its overall militaristic intentions, Congress looked at it with much scrutiny. It was
only after the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear bomb in 1949 that Congress
finally agreed to send it to the president for his signature.151
The creation of the national security state most notably marked the onset of
preventive war, which started the United States along the path of continuous warfare.
Truman remarked in a 1937 speech, “I believe in an adequate national defense
program.”152 Continuing, Truman gave a speech on national defense and its relationship
to peace several years before he became president and advocated for the national security
state. Quoting President Andrew Jackson, Truman quipped, “’We shall more certainly
preserve peace when it is understood that we are prepared for war.’…I hope we shall
never have to fight again, and the best way to keep it is to be adequately prepared for all
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contingencies.”153 Truman’s senatorial speech illustrated his support for the concept as
well as his early desire to formulate a so-called house of peace built upon defense.
The national security state apparatus that Truman had been advocating since his
time as a senator finally came about in 1947. As president, Truman had instructed
Secretary of State Byrnes as early as September 20, 1945, to “take the lead in developing
a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal
agencies…This should be done through the creation of an interdepartmental group,
head[ed] up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my
approval.”154 Byrnes’ initial plan called for a National Intelligence Authority chaired by
the Secretary of State, with the Secretaries of War and Navy as members. This group
would have the ability to bring in other members on matters of special interest and
theoretically coordinate funding covertly through existing agencies, avoiding the
necessary separate budget for an independent agency. Byrnes’ plan would circumvent
publicity surrounding this National Intelligence Authority as well as reduce competition
or duplication between existing departments and agencies. What Truman and Byrnes
wanted to create was an early combined version of two main components of the National
Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.
For the most part, executive orders put in place most of the parts of what would become
the National Security Act of 1947 over the first two years of Truman’s presidency.
Executive Order No. 9635 of September 29, 1945, for example, set up much of the
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defense organization of the National Security Act.155 According to Truman’s memoirs,
he claimed, “It was my opinion that the Commander in Chief ought to have a coordinated and co-operative defense department that would work in peace and war.”156
Kennan agreed with Truman’s ideas. He too called for strong unity and decision within
the United States brought about by a unified military and a strong executive.157 In a
report to the president, Peacetime Preparedness for National Emergencies, from 1946,
this combined agency for both peace and war was under discussion, “The defense and
security of the United States depend upon adequate and comprehensive preparedness in
peacetime for all the foreseeable eventualities of war.” The Report continued, “The truth
of this principle, in its relation to the military phases of national defense and security, is
recognized by the continuous operation in peacetime of an agency such as the War Plans
Division of the War Department General Staff.”158 The continuous operation of an
agency grounded in warfare during peacetime further supported the existence of
continuous warfare.
The twilight period at the end of World War II may have allowed the overhaul of
the nation’s military apparatus via E.O. 9635 to go largely unnoticed, but as the world
discussion turned toward peace, it became more difficult for Truman to go through with
his intentions for creating a national security state. According to the Washington Post,
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“The United States never has had such a system in peacetime. …In the past, even during
wartime, the Nation’s intelligence units have been piecemeal.”159 The National Security
Act itself was really an integration of the “Nation’s war potential,” according to the
House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments June 1947 report.
Foremost in this integration was the permanent expansion of presidential powers by
formally creating a permanent state of emergency. As Commander in Chief, the
president would serve as the unitary leader during a time of relative peace, just as he
would serve in order to win a battle during a time of armed conflict.160 According to
Greenstein, “The power of modern American presidents manifests itself in its purest form
in the global arena, where their actions as commander in chief can determine the fate of
the human race.”161 By 1947, peace and war had officially merged into one concept in
the language of the government. Peace now became a period free from armed conflict but
inundated with hostility, tension, and threat from global enemies. On the other hand, war
was no longer exclusively armed conflict but also global hostility and tension, a
preventive and continuous war, now called the Cold War.
The president relayed the National Security Act (N.S.A.) in draft form to
Congress on February 26, 1947, encompassing ideas of expansion of executive power
under a cohesive military and defense program. The focus of the N.S.A. was
coordination between military, domestic, and foreign policies so that the United States’
resources and capabilities were known at all times and dispensable at a moment’s notice.
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In addition to traditional control over the military, the N.S.A. also gave the president
control over economic and political aspects of policy that the government could couch as
security and defense. This was a new expansion of power beyond the simplistic control
of the troops that the Constitution granted the president as a war power. Truman did not
want to disperse any of the inherent powers he found as Commander in Chief in the new
security state either. Leadership of the N.S.A. considered the National Security
Resources Board, which had the responsibility of planning coordinated mobilization in
peacetime for wartime, to be an advisory board only, with the president retaining the
power of decision and action. Similarly, the Secretary of War became the Secretary of
Defense due to the complex and expansive presidential tasks in the new state of
continuous warfare. However, the Secretary of Defense did not reduce the power of the
president but served his needs entirely, again aiding the expansion of executive power
instead of detracting from it.162 In this regard, it became apparent that the National
Security Act was written to allow for the expansion of executive power, not just by
giving an emergency pretense that allowed the role of the Commander in Chief to be
“activated,” but also by setting up a framework that allowed the president to take on these
new expanded powers and be successful at maintaining them. This fit succinctly within
Truman’s building of an infrastructure within the executive branch. Traditionally it
would have been impossible for one person to control such varied and extensive aspects
of the United States war machine at a modern, global level, even with advisors, but the
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national security state put in place mechanisms to allow one person to maintain the
control without doing as much legwork.163
The national security state continued to expand over the next two years facing and
solving very real problems of a new government agency. The first problem encountered
by this new apparatus early in 1948 was budgetary. During periods of traditional armed
conflict there was little problem gaining funds for military expenditures, but during a
period of covert continuous warfare, it proved more difficult to conjure these funds while
the government preached peace. In a report to Truman from Secretary of Defense
Forrestal in February of 1948, Forrestal commented:
In wartime, the only real limitations are the human and material resources of the
country, and it is proper to draw plans for the conduct of war, once started, which
will utilize virtually all these resources. In peacetime, the situation is very
different, and our military planners have an additional problem—to draft, within
probable budgetary limitations, a security plan which will give us, for the money
available, the best possible base from which to begin to conduct a war if one
should occur.164
In this same report, Forrestal complained that the Department of Defense had neither an
idea of what a future war might look like nor any real idea of what type of military
establishment would be required as a guarantor of preparedness against said war.
Confusion over the organization needs of the national security state became a major issue
during the first few years of its operation. Organizational charts from 1947 and 1948
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help to illustrate this problem by first placing the Secretary of State at the top of the
organization and then later placing the president at the top. With the president in the
uppermost position, the 1948 chart gave him the power to bypass all others. The same
was true of the intelligence wing of the national security state, where according to a 1948
organization chart the president could circumvent the National Intelligence Authority and
go directly to the Intelligence Board or Central Intelligence Agency. Likewise, by 1948
an additional presidential representative sat on the National Intelligence Authority along
with the Secretaries of State and War. In the margins of an early 1948 draft of the
“Directive Regarding the Coordination of Intelligence Activities,” where White House
Counsel Clark Clifford recommended the addition of this presidential representative, a
note stated that an executive order could put this directive in place until Congress could
pass legislation. By March of 1949, Truman called for the official establishment of a
Secretary of Defense and to make the national military establishment, now known as the
Department of Defense, a department within the Executive Branch. In a draft speech to
Congress on March 1, 1949, Truman recommended Congress provide this new Secretary
of Defense an undersecretary and three assistant secretaries.165 Truman initially claimed
in his speech that these recommendations were beneficial to the “President, the Congress,
and the American people by providing better means of assuring their defense needs and
administering the defense program.”166 Truman then edited his draft, moving “President”
to the end of the list. Truman engineered the Department of Defense to serve the
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president and the new American involvement in continuous warfare. On March 2, 1949,
Clifford noted changes to Public Law 253, a set of amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947, which altered all mention of military elements and changed them to the
ubiquitous word “defense.”167 Two years after its inception, the national security state
rapidly increased executive power and solidified continuous warfare under the guise of
peace and defense.
Conclusion
By the time that hostilities in Korea peaked, the United States had already been in
a state of continuous warfare since the end of World War II. As a result of increasing
hostilities with the Soviet Union, the advent of nuclear weapons, and the final creation of
the national security state, the government was able to perpetuate warfare and expand the
powers of the president as Commander in Chief through a twilight zone of continuous
warfare. Though the warfare of the interim period between World War II and Korea had
been nontraditional, without armed conflict, it still produced all the potential advantages
of war regarding executive power. The elaborate convolution of the terminology
regarding war and peace partially created this scenario, and the government debates
regarding the extension of selective service, universal military training, and the mutual
defense assistance act took place because of this confusion over war and peace that began
with Roosevelt’s death. The answer to the question of whether the United States was
maintaining peace or preparing for war remained elusive throughout the 1945-1950
period. In Truman’s 1948 State of the Union address, he continued discussing the
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conundrum of how the United States could be an effective world peace force only if it
were militarily strong. Military strength “leads to peace—not war,” Truman reiterated
twice.168 However, US involvement in Korea seemed to solidify both the necessary
expansion of the military and executive power during the twilight zone as well as
reinforce the language of defense, security, and war that the government had been
preaching for five long years. The maintenance of peace and mobilization for war were
synonymous during the twilight zone that marked the beginning of continuous warfare
and would allow this continuous war to extend into future periods of armed conflict and
periods of relative peace.
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CHAPTER III

INSTALLING THE FLOOR: THE END OF CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWER

Despite presidential aspirations to power and the most sophisticated executive
skills, the US Legislature still holds the constitutional power to check the Executive
Branch. This legislative ability was not only possible but also entirely necessary when it
came to the proposition of war. According to the United States Constitution, Congress
has the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence [sic] and general Welfare of the United States…To
declare War…To raise and support Armies…[and] To provide and maintain a Navy.”
This section of Article I made it clear that Congress had both the “power of the purse,” or
the ability to control the budget for both foreign and domestic affairs, and the power to
declare war. Both of these abilities served to check the executive’s role as “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”1 Foremost, Congress
controlled the appropriations necessary to run an actual war, but Congress also,
theoretically, controlled the ability formally to declare war.
Marked by ambiguity but revered as the most powerful document in the country
and the supreme law of the land, the Constitution of the United States of America has
long stood as a challenge to historians, politicians, and legal scholars alike. The very
conception of the American Constitution led to an ongoing debate over executive power.
The Framers carefully debated the division of power between the three branches of
1
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government, taking into consideration an elaborate system of checks and balances. Leery
of monarchical tyranny, the Framers understood the necessity to word carefully the two
clauses dealing with the war power. While Congress’ overall powers were much more
decisive and detailed than the Commander-in-Chief Clause, they still caused a great deal
of debate. The exact meaning of “declare,” versus other options like “make” or
“conduct,” has caused scholars to attempt to deconstruct the two war powers clauses in
an effort to determine which branch has the power to go to war, through either
declaration or the actual sending of U.S. forces into a warzone. According to the records
of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, delegates James Madison and Elbridge Gerry
moved to change “make” war to “declare” war after the explanation that the president
should be able to repel sudden attacks but not commence a full-scale war. Likewise,
Oliver Ellsworth argued that it should be easier to get out of war than into it, and George
Mason agreed that war should be “clogged” rather than “facilitated.” Although delegates
discussed giving the power to make war to the president alone, they all agreed that
avoidance of war was the ultimate goal.2 The delegates split the powers between the
president and Congress in order to complicate purposely the ability to go to and stay at
war. Constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar argued, “By balancing military power
between two levels of government, the American people would in theory retain greater
control over both.”3 The delegates’ intentions and Amar’s analysis only stand true when
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Congress executes its constitutional responsibility, however—a responsibility easily
neglected or given up in the face of other potential benefits and political maneuverability.
After World War II, the United States ceased to utilize the congressional
declaration of war. The president’s constitutional ability to lead the country into war in
the modern era of imperfect (or undeclared) war became questionable along with
concerns over the president’s growing war powers in a country perpetually at war.4 In a
period of increased tension without actual violence, the line between war and peace was
blurry. In an era of possible atomic attack, people were willing to deal with a strong
government.5 Neustadt agreed in his “Politicians and Bureaucrats,” claiming, “the most
critical of government decisions, the war-or-peace decisions, have been snatched away
from Congress by technology, despite the plain words of the Constitution.”6 Congress
should hold the ability to control the executive’s powers under the Commander in Chief
Clause, because in the absence of congressional interest, there was almost no way to
check executive power.7 This violation of the separation of war powers could have
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untold negative effects on American warfare. Government must maintain a proper
separation of powers, including war powers, for efficiency and protection of the people.
A separation of power was anathema to authoritarian regimes, such as the USSR. The
Cold War threatened a “permanent state of emergency,” which impinged on liberty. By
creating a permanent scenario that only the national level could handle, the executive
gained power by default, because he was the only one equipped to lead the country.8
While the legislature subsequently lost constitutional power, its members gained greater
political maneuverability in exchange. The necessity of a strong executive in imperiled
times was a common thread in later Cold War scholarship, which often ignored
Congress’ role.
Prior to the world wars, Congress largely operated under the pretext of nonintervention abroad. Cold War scholarship often downplayed or ignored the relationship
between the executive and Congress as a result, which developed from this early
isolationist stance toward a significant shift during continuous warfare. According to
political scientist Jerrold Schneider, “No question is more central to understanding
Congress and the presidency, than the question of the structure of power within
Congress.”9 The structure within Congress was vastly different prior to WWII. Before
World War I, the accepted stance of most legislators was a position of US isolation from
the rest of the world, from which they viewed warfare as a limited conflict between few
countries. This isolationism did not call for complete retreat of the US from world affairs
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but instead offered the concepts of “non-entanglement” and “Americanism” as key
components.10 Isolationists in Congress argued for non-entanglement as a foundational
principle of American society. In a speech delivered by Ohio Senator Atlee Pomerene
(D) in 1917, he conjured the memory of George Washington. “Much has recently been
said about the dangers of militarism and the necessity of avoiding entangling alliances
with foreign countries. What was said by Washington on these subjects is as true to-day
[sic] as it was during his lifetime,” Pomerene contended.11 Quoting Washington’s
Farewell Address, Pomerene noted, “Our detached situation invites and enables us to
pursue a different course [from being entangled in other countries’ affairs].”12 What
Pomerene said later in his speech was that Washington was under no grand illusions
about the United States completely avoiding war through the practice of isolationism.
In reality, isolationist tendencies often wavered when warfare was a possibility,
quickly overshadowed by wartime patriotism.13 In the case of World War I, isolationist
tradition, and familial and financial connections to Europe tore Americans apart.
According to testimony by German-American publisher Horace L. Brand before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
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It is a mistaken impression that the movement, now Nation wide, in favor of
prohibiting the exportation of weapons, ammunition, and munitions of war from
this country, is one with the sole object in view of helping one of the belligerent
sides, or of injuring some other belligerent.14
Brand went on, “As will be proven by me, this is an American movement, based upon
American principles and championed by Americans everywhere.”15 A letter to the editor
published in the Detroit Free Press in 1917 pointed to more nefarious objectives by the
American immigrant population. The author claimed, “The sum that has been deposited
by our immigrants for transmission [to Central Europe] is enormous. …Has some of this
money been used for the fomentation of the Mexican and Cuban revolts? Are the moneys
of our immigrants being used to create trouble for the United States—the adopted
country?”16 Americans of recent immigration vehemently defended their “Americanness” or worried about their family back home in Europe, which increased suspicion of
these peoples. These two sides made isolationism a difficult stance to take as the United
States moved closer and closer to involvement in the First World War.
Likewise, lingering memories of the valor of the Civil War and rapid conduct of
the Spanish-American War led many to desire warfare for seemingly nationalistic or
imperial reasons. Emotional reasons often related economic, political, and strategic
justifications for war to each other. At the beginning of the twentieth century, this
emotional connection revolved around a nationalistic mindset that the United States was
uniquely set apart from other nations in the world. However, during World War I, many
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senators thought internationally and continued so during the 1920s. According to
historian Thomas N. Guinsburg, isolationists continued to fight against this shift,
however, claiming that US strength came from its independence and that standing as an
example to others and avoiding direct involvement furthered American aspirations.
Guinsburg implied in his book The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate
from Versailles to Pearl Harbor that isolationism remained the US policy standard during
the interwar period after World War I due to the vehemence of the isolationists in the
Senate. Guinsburg argued in favor of the flexible nature of interwar isolationism, but
contended that isolationism remained a solid position for some in Congress until the US
entrance into World War II.17 What Guinsburg failed to include in his analysis was the
movement away from isolationism that began to form during this early period.
In the post-Progressive era United States when the government sought a more
active role in the lives of its constituents, members of Congress began to take interest in
potential political benefits. These benefits included such things as greater political
bargaining ability, greater chance for reelection, federal money and job creation for home
districts and states. Congressional politicians effectively gave up their power to declare
war during the “twilight zone” period because of the changing nature of war and its
insecurity regarding new methods of war (related to the shift from isolationism to
intervention), but also due to a set of political benefits that occurred through the
deliberately lax use of congressional power. This congressional curiosity yielded power
to the executive, stabilizing the structure of the imperial presidency.
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Isolationists and Interventionists
During the interwar period, leaders in the US Congress argued incessantly over
lingering issues from World War I that continued to split the internationalists from the
isolationists, specifically the irreconcilables in Congress. However, to say that the
isolationist stance was the majority position of Congress during this period is misleading.
After the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles until mid-1924, the United States entered
into forty-five international treaties, conventions, and agreements, to which the Senate
consented.18 This international involvement would suggest that isolationism was moot,
but heavily publicized battles over the League of Nations, the Four Powers Treaty, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the findings of the Nye Committee suggested that isolationism
still played a strong role in the US Legislature.
The battle over US membership in the League of Nations illustrated the strong
isolationist influence still present in the Legislature in 1919. Isolationists in this period
were largely xenophobic, often racist, and generally anti-Catholic.19 According to
Guinsburg, “Evidences of parochialism in the campaign against the League seem to
dovetail neatly with a ‘Middle Western’ interpretation of isolationism.”20 Arguments
over the League initially coalesced along partisan lines, placing the Republicans squarely
against the League. According to Republicans, membership in the League might only
serve to bolster the Democrats in the 1920 elections who had already claimed the political
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boost of winning World War I.21 However, the League was not a purely partisan issue.
In a debate over the League, Senator James Reed (D) of Missouri proclaimed, “I
protest…it is not only our high duty to keep free from European quarrels in the future,
but it is our duty just as soon as this war can be honorably ended to call back to this
country as fast as ships will bring them the last one of our American soldiers.” Reed
continued, “It is our duty to give notice now and here that the Republic will continue to
adhere to her ancient policy of isolation and of independence.”22 According to Guinsburg
and demonstrated by Reed’s comments, the confrontation of Reed with Henry Cabot
Lodge over the League of Nations demonstrated “that the senatorial isolationists, whose
motives were not primarily partisan, capitalized upon political circumstances to buttress
their strength.”23 Senator Frank Kellogg (R) of Minnesota likewise drew on political
circumstances in support of the League. Kellogg argued:
[T]he establishment of a league of nations is, I believe, now foremost in the minds
of statesmen as well as in the minds of the people of the civilized world. It is
being discussed by publicists and journalists the world over. The impelling
causes which at this time bring this ancient and honorable subject before the
public are too fresh in our minds to need extended discussion.24
The struggle also illustrated that not all isolationists were total isolationists. Washington
Senator Miles Poindexter, a Republican, suggested an informal entente among wartime
allies.25 Poindexter was concerned about the formality of the League of Nations
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infringing upon the US tariff system in particular. “If Great Britain could secure as a
consideration for going into this league of nations the power of such a league to regulate
the United States tariffs she would be a great gainer by it,” Poindexter remarked.26
Republican Senator from Nebraska George Norris liked the idea of a League that would
end arms races and secret diplomacy and offered up the concept of judicial arbitration,
not force, as the alternative.27 These complexities foreshadowed the future convolution
of congressional debates during continuous warfare.
The strong desire for world peace, accompanied by disarmament, during the
interwar period also sparked debate over the Four Power Treaty of 1921. The agreement,
eventually signed by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, created a loose
connection between the four countries involved as far as Pacific interests were concerned.
By signing the treaty, each nation pledged to meet and discuss options in the event of a
disagreement between the signatories or an aggressive action against any one of the
signatories by another nation.28 Article II caused the biggest uproar in the legislature
amongst the isolationists. The article stated:
If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the
High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in
order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken,
jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.29

26

Cong. Rec., 65th Cong., 2d sess., 1918, 56: 11570. See also John Fischer Williams, “The
Covenant of the League of Nations and War,” Cambridge Law Journal 5, no. 1 (1933): 1-21.
27

Guinsburg, Pursuit of Isolationism, 23; Stone, “The Irreconcilables’,” 163-173.

28

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1922, vol. 1 (Washington, DC :
Government Printing Office, 1938), 35. (Hereafter FRUS).
29

FRUS 1922, 35.

184
Lodge argued, “There is no provision for the use of force to carry out any of the terms of
the agreement, and no military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or
under cover of these plain and direct clauses.”30 Republican Senator Robert M. La
Follette of Wisconsin called the treaty “dangerous,” and he noted that it “had all of the
iniquities of the League of Nations with none of the virtues claimed for that document.”31
In an official statement released to the press, La Follette claimed:
Under the cloak of a conference, made possible by a world-wide sentiment for
disarmament, the diplomats, represending [sic] reactionary sentiment in Great
Britain, France, Japan and the United States have hatched in secret a treaty of
alliance which morally binds this country to go to war.32
Unfortunately for the isolationist faction, public enthusiasm for peace via disarmament
expressed through the support of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921 and 1922
meant that the isolationists would ultimately fail to block the Four Power Treaty. 33 On
March 27, 1922, a Senate vote of seventy-three to zero with five abstentions ratified the
Four Power Treaty as amended. Senator La Follette and other Republican isolationists,
finding minimal support, voted for ratification, illustrating the flexible and political
nature of isolationism. Isolationist Democratic Missouri Senator James Reed and Idaho
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Republican William Borah abstained from voting in lieu of a solid majority against the
treaty.34
In the late 1920s, the proposed Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing warfare appeared
as the definitive isolationist agreement. The pact sought to “condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national
policy,” and ordained, “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever
nature or of whatever origin they may be…shall never be sought except by pacific
means.”35 Hailed as a major milestone in world peace negotiations, the pact was an
isolationist document because in its final version it required no US involvement in any
controversy and did not limit any previous policies, such as the Monroe Doctrine. In
addition, the Senate ratified the pact only after affixing a diplomatic reservation that
allowed for warfare in the case of self-defense. Senators James Reed (D-MO) and
George Moses (R-NH) voiced several reservations to the original pact that sounded these
traditional isolationist ideas. The Moses-Reed Reservations included a special
amendment that would exclude the Monroe Doctrine from any alteration by the pact and
a non-coercion clause that kept the United States from having to enforce the pact. This
paradox brings into question the benefits Reed and Moses might have sought by opposing
Kellogg-Briand initially. In the end, it was too difficult for anyone, isolationists
included, to argue against peace, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact passed with only one
dissenter.36
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The argument between the isolationist and interventionist factions gradually gave
way to a more deceptive picture of American warfare that Congress would carry with it
into World War II. During the mid-1930s, historical revisionists flooded the market with
literature aimed at highlighting World War I as a dramatic blunder instead of the US
government’s alleged patriotic fight for American democracy.37 Historian Warren I.
Cohen detailed these interpretations in The American Revisionists, citing in particular
journalist Walter Millis. In Millis’ book Road to War (1935) he argued, “[t]he United
States had fought without reason and had drifted into [WWI] as a result of a national
psychological binge rather than as a result of deliberate national policy.”38 In
conjunction, the Senate created a Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions
Industry, known as the “Nye Committee,” in 1934. Led by the enthusiastic young
Republican Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, the Nye Committee set out to prove that US
munitions manufacturers aimed to disturb the peace and prolong war for their benefit.39
According to the Nye Committee’s 1936 Report:
The Committee finds…that almost without exception, the American munitions
companies investigated have at times resorted to such unusual approaches,
questionable favors and commissions, and methods of "doing the needful" as to
constitute, in effect, a form of bribery of foreign governmental officials or of their
close friends in order to secure business…[N]ot only are such transactions highly
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unethical, but…they carry within themselves the seeds of disturbance to the peace
and stability of those nations in which they take place.40
What Nye and his co-committee members found was that the nature of munitions
marketing helped incite violence and warfare around the world. In the end, the Nye
Committee concluded, “the constant availability of munitions companies with
competitive bribes ready in outstretched hands does not create a situation where the
officials involved can… be as much interested in peace and measures to secure peace as
they are in increased armaments.”41 The findings of the Nye Committee propped up the
isolationist stance by illustrating the correlation between global involvement and warfare.
The Nye Committee findings would also foreshadow the ultimate end for isolationists as
it became apparent that US companies specializing in the materials of war were already
globally involved and that these companies could offer incentives to legislators to
promote company interests. A figure marked “International Relations in War Materials
or Processes” from the Nye Report illustrated this deep involvement of the US munitions
industry with Western Europe by 1936 (see fig. 3.2).42 The lines on the figure connecting
the United States to Europe created a near cyclical relationship in the interchange of war
goods, and with this relationship, the ability for actual war.
As illustrated by the interwar period, Congress played a decisive, though
discombobulated, role in creating American foreign policy, including its stance on
warfare. The 1930s ushered in a new era for isolationists, however. Vehement in their
stance against warfare, the isolationists found their efforts bolstered by the Great
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Depression. The Depression acted as an element of proof in the ongoing debate over the
validity of the Great War that warfare was unnecessary and only led to problems.43
Noted historian Charles A. Beard claimed, “Violence and tyranny cannot create a
spinning machine or operate one after it is built.”44 Beard suggested in his “’Five Year
Plan’ for America” that a well-planned economy would prevent the United States from
being involved in international trade or relations with foreign countries, thus avoiding the
violence and repercussion associated with war, such as depression. Even Roosevelt, a
steadfast interventionist, gave some concessions to isolationists during his election, and
avoided pressing the issue of adding a discretionary embargo to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
What isolationists and Roosevelt came to find, however, was that the Depression
ultimately served to draw attention away from foreign affairs toward domestic policy.
After the great foreign policy debates of the 1920s, congressional leadership, especially
in the House, transformed from commanders to “bargainers and brokers.”45 Political
scientists Joseph Cooper and David Brady argued, “From the late 1930s on, the
leadership was forced to place even more reliance on brokerage and bargaining than had
been necessary in the early 1930s or 1920s.”46 Bargaining also meant a greater reliance
on benefits outside the walls of Congress. What Cooper and Brady did not discuss was
the enhanced power this lack of leadership gave to the president. Roosevelt found it
much easier to control Congress when he was able to be the sole leader. By giving up on
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early foreign policy notions, Roosevelt extended his honeymoon period for domestic
policy and forged his New Deal and all the power included with it.47
Congress and World War II
As previously discussed, Roosevelt held a great deal of power over Congress due
to his personal skills as chief executive. Even after the court-packing debacle of 1937
and the failed purge of 1938, Roosevelt enjoyed a relatively harmonious relationship with
Congress. After considerable losses for New Deal Democrats in 1938 and 1942, southern
conservative Democrats and Republicans in both the House and Senate gained a large
enough majority to block effectively New Deal legislation. This “conservative coalition”
appeared to emerge between 1937 and 1939 and operated informally, sometimes banding
together against liberal legislation. A separate shift within conservatism itself during this
period, from a phase of “obstructionist” conservatism based on isolationism and small
government, to “resurgent” conservatism that focused on the needs of twentieth-century
global society where conservative fiscal policies and trade took precedence, made it
difficult to track the conservative coalition’s actual power. A study conducted by
political scientist Mack C. Shelley likewise suggested that the conservative coalition was
irregular at best during the 1930s. However, just as the Great Depression ushered in a
period of domestic focus and moved Congress away from the isolationist versus
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interventionist battle, December 1941 propelled a renewed interest in foreign policy.
Political scientists Jerrold Schneider noted that one has to assume there was a broad
underlying ideological coalition in Congress even when legislators occasionally appeared
to switch sides on certain issues. Yet party unity was traditionally higher when the party
was in the majority and had the presidency, all of which were the case in 1941. As
Roosevelt’s perceived power over the Congress began to wane, he regained control
through his role as Commander in Chief during World War II. After a carefully laid
campaign of manipulative language and government propaganda, the people and their
representatives in Washington were prepared to back President Roosevelt’s war aim.
Additionally, since 1933 all legislative initiatives and most of the actual content had
come from the executive, not Congress, illustrating Roosevelt’s executive usurpation of
congressional power during this period.48
Under the guise of neutrality, Congress backed the Cash and Carry policy in early
November 1939, clearly going against old isolationist standards of noninvolvement. In a
message to Congress on January 4, 1939, Roosevelt contended, “[w]e have learned that
when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly
and unfairly.”49 Roosevelt’s argument for doing away with neutrality legislation was that
it unfairly punished those countries drawn into war through personal defense and
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subsequently punished the United States economically because of its creation of trade
restrictions. Senator Henrik Shipstead (F-L) of Minnesota empathized with Roosevelt’s
latter argument. Shipstead, a member of the Farmer-Labor party, argued:
In my opinion, we stand at the parting of the ways as we did in 1917. One course
leads to active participation in Asiatic and European wars. …There is another
road open to us—our traditional policy. …We should make ourselves strong
economically, strong to defend our country. Then when the war menace of Asia
and Europe subsides, as it must, we will stand as the world’s chief hope for
freedom and justice.50
Shipstead’s traditional, and functionally isolationist, values were becoming intermingled
with a shifting understanding of warfare. Whereas Shipstead’s statement implied the
negativity of war and the clear benefit to remaining isolated as an example to the rest of
the world, he also combined the idea of a strong US economy with a strong defense, a
common theme in later Cold War analyses.
During the beginning phases of US involvement in World War II, the obvious
economic benefits to involvement in war versus the negative implications of overt
entrance into warfare tore the Legislature apart. During the beginning of 1939,
Representatives Melvin Maas (R-MN) and Louis Ludlow (D-IN) both introduced bills in
the House “to keep America out of war” and “establish the neutrality of the United
States” respectively. Maas proposed a repeal of the 1937 Neutrality Act while Ludlow
advocated the creation of an entirely new bill. Representative Charles Faddis (D-PA) and
Senator William King (D-UT) both pushed to repeal the Neutrality Act of 1937 as well.51
Despite Roosevelt’s earlier radical Quarantine Speech in the fall of 1935, in 1939 he
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groomed the public to adjust to the idea of war while continuing to pledge neutrality. In
his only fireside chat of 1939, Roosevelt espoused, “When peace has been broken
anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.” In that same speech,
Roosevelt contended, “At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of
American neutrality. …And I trust that in the days to come our neutrality can be made a
true neutrality.”52 Roosevelt easily manipulated both sides of the neutrality argument and
continued to do so until the US entrance into World War II, helping to persuade
congressional isolationists as well as the public that US entrance into the war was
necessary.
In the months leading up the passage of the Neutrality Act of 1939, including the
Cash and Carry policy, the Legislature continued to waffle over the neutrality issue,
however. Senators Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), Millard Tydings (D-MD), Robert Taft
(R-OH), Hattie Caraway (D-AR), and Representatives Joshua Johns (R-WI), John
Houston (D-KS), and Andrew Schiffler (R-WV) all brought citizen petitions favoring
neutrality with them to Congress, and noted the public desire for the US to remain
nonaligned. While legislators had seen a clear distinction between the concepts of peace
and war in 1939, they were confused over the somewhat paradoxical notion of neutrality,
which had meant peace during the interwar period, but now meant involvement in the
war, even if through financial means only. In order to address this dilemma, groups such
as the Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts suggested altering the language of the
Neutrality Act to eliminate the word “war,” instead opting for “hostilities.” Senator
Elbert Thomas (D-UT) proposed the Committee’s idea as Joint Resolution 67 in February
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1939. The Legislature never voted on Thomas’ resolution, and the confusion over the
committal aspect of the Neutrality Act of 1939 filtered into a largely partisan vote (see
table 3.1). Formerly staunch isolationist Senators Taft and Norris voted in favor of the
so-called Neutrality Act, marking an end to isolationist control over the Senate, as they
were the strongest holdouts.53
By the time Congress had decided upon the Lend-Lease legislation in early 1941,
which in many ways ended any doubt over the US position in the war, the debate over the
war began to lessen in fervor. Nearly as many Republicans in the Senate voted for H.R.
1776, the Lend-Lease Act, as voted against it. The subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor in
December 1941 served to unite the country and encouraged Congressmen to work
together toward the war effort.54 According to Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY), a
self-defined pre-war “noninterventionist,” “the Republican National Committee
considers that such pre-war controversies as nonintervention versus intervention to be
dead issues, and that any attempt to revive them…promotes disunity and impairs our allout war effort.”55 Likewise, Senator C. Wayland Brooks (R-IL) proclaimed, “The issue
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of isolationism is dead—it was sunk at Pearl Harbor.”56 Arguments between isolationists
and interventionists still arose during WWII, but they surrounded policy debates and
were generally reflective of a more significant partisan split. Foremost, the two parties in
Congress thoroughly agreed that the United States had to win the war, but they tended to
disagree on which policies the United States should follow in order to win. A series of
telegrams between Edward J. Flynn and Joseph W. Martin, Jr., chairmen of the
Democratic and Republican National Committees respectively, illustrated the partisan
agreement on winning the war, known as “America’s armistice on politics.”57 According
to an article from the Washington Post:
‘There is no suggestion that the rival organizations either disband or merge,’ the
Democratic committee announcement said. ‘They will preserve their identities
and, presumably, will function as usual in the Congressional campaign next year.
But they will be agencies for the national defense, working cooperatively for the
most part, at least, in the field of civilian defense.’58
This partisan agreement to work together served a number of purposes. Foremost, it
allowed both parties to claim any victories in the war effort and it signaled the end for the
isolationists. Isolationism would truly be dead once the United States claimed victory
and a global position, backed by nuclear weapons.59 As a result, isolationism would soon
be completely gone from Congress once the US position solidified as global in nature
after the use of the atomic bomb.
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Delegating Power to the Executive
While the political armistice initially earned Congress a windfall of public
support, its position of respect with the public quickly declined. The “pensions-forCongressmen plan,” which reached its final stages early in 1942, was an amendment to
the Civil Service Retirement Act of 1930 that aimed to extend retirement benefits to
members of Congress.60 Though it had been in the works for a number of months, the
timing of the passage of the bill, just over a month after the US declaration of war,
wreaked havoc on public opinion about Congress. Although Senator James Mead (D) of
New York claimed, “I do not believe that the American people want to penalize those
who are bearing such a heavy share of the duties and responsibilities of these stirring, yet
infinitely trying times,” the plan met with criticism.61 The LaFayette, Georgia Messenger
harped, “our congressmen and senators in Washington thought they had better feather
their nests while the going was good, when they voted themselves pensions for life.”62
Likewise, the Augusta Chronicle claimed there was a “snowball of wrath” forming in the
country. According to the Chronicle,
This snowball represents the growing indignation of a wrathful people—the rank
and file of the American people who, asked to make unprecedented sacrifices, to
save and be thrifty, are perfectly astonished at the spectacle of their $10,000-ayear congressmen voting themselves a life pension under what they slyly call a
‘retirement plan.’63
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The fiscally concerned Wall Street Journal preached the idea that “If we would consent
to pay our legislators more, we would get better legislators.” The Wall Street Journal, in
support of the pension bill, also asked, “If we are not willing to do that [pay legislators
more], why should we not lift from the men from whom we expect independent action,
the specter of poverty for themselves and their families?”64 The public was not, however,
willing to pay for what they perceived as a backdoor wage increase for Congress, when
the Government intended to ask them to restrict their lives for the duration of the war.
On February 24, 1942, ninety percent of the House voted to repeal the amendment to the
Civil-Service Retirement Act benefiting legislators.65
Though quickly doing away with the retirement fiasco, Congress made another
mistake by taking full advantage of the ‘X’ cards issued as part of the fuel-rationing
program. X cards entitled holders to unlimited gasoline and were reserved for only those
vehicle owners who used their cars substantially for official business. Controversy
sparked in the summer of 1942 when the public discovered that forty-seven senators and
219 representatives held X cards and the whole of Congress was offered X cards freely.66
The New York Times noted that according to Leon Henderson, administrator of the Office
of Price Administration in charge of fuel rations, “’the use of a private car by a member
of Congress…in order to transact business with a government agency is official
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business.’”67 The Washington Post noted that there was a “furor created by the issuance
of X cards to some members of Congress.”68 In one letter to the editor of the Washington
Post, the writer, “‘A’ Card Holder,” angrily wrote:
[H]olders of A gasoline allotment cards are not comforted by the fact that Price
Administrator Henderson seems to think that gas rationing was a great success
and that apparently he intends to do nothing very much about the thousands of
cheats and chislers [sic] (and who doesn’t know at least a dozen) who obtained
high allotment cards to which they were not in the least entitled.69
This public disdain against the perceived abuse of congressional advantage sparked a
number of legislators to return their X cards for B cards. Additionally, Senator Sheridan
Downey (D) of California proposed a resolution that would have eliminated special
privileges for Congress in regard to gasoline rationing. However, the “Downey
Resolution” failed miserably with a vote of two against sixty-six on May 15, 1942.70
What Congress gleaned from the pensions-for-congressmen and X card
controversies was that positive public opinion was necessary in order to achieve desired
policy, and that they did not gain the same leniency in wartime as the Commander in
Chief. In addition, congressmen required the frequent votes of their constituents in order
to have any chance at creating policies, unlike a sitting president, who only dealt with
election issues every four years. During World War II, neither party could take credit for
wartime victories or production achievements because the support of both parties was
required to get things done; additionally, Roosevelt as Commander in Chief was a
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formidable part of foreign policy considerations. Congress kept the partisan bickering to
a minimum due to the war effort and due to the lack of desire for either party to make
commitments that might harm them publicly. With extremely high public support,
Roosevelt only served as competition to Congress regarding foreign policy, causing
Congress to move away from these types of policy prerogatives. Political scientist
Donald R. Matthews added that most Americans had little faith in legislators during the
post-WWII period anyway because the public believed politicians to be crooked and
unethical. Instead, Congress delegated a majority of their tasks to the president.
President Roosevelt then served as the uniting force among Congress.71
Roosevelt, with his great propensity for power, did not refuse the allocation of
power by Congress and made himself indispensable in the realm of foreign affairs
through his use of competitive adhocracy and personal penchant for acting as his own
Cabinet. As previously discussed, the president gained increased power as the
Commander in Chief during times of war in the arena of foreign affairs; however,
Congress’s agenda crystalized through the delegation of domestic power to Roosevelt
during World War II as well. According to political scientist Roland Young, “During the
war, there was an inclination to delegate power to the President in somewhat sweeping
terms so that, whatever else might happen, the government would have a plentitude of
legal authority for carrying on the war.”72 Senator Joseph O’Mahoney’s (D-WY)
statement in the Congressional Record that “war is an executive function; it is not a
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legislative function” supported Young’s opinion.73 O’Mahoney’s desire to delegate
congressional power to the president also illustrated the United States’ increasingly
significant position in world affairs, which constitutionally fell under the purview of the
executive.74
As a result, Congress left many of its regular duties to the executive during World
War II. For example, Roosevelt himself created several agencies through executive
orders during the war. Traditionally, Congress usually acted to create agencies, though
executive in function, through legislation. During the war, however, Roosevelt created
the National War Labor Board, the War Production Board, the War Relocation Authority,
and countless other agencies under the purview of the First War Powers Act of 1941 and
his role as Commander in Chief.75 A broad base of executive power, the First War
Powers Act, allowed Roosevelt to reorganize the duties and functions of executive
agencies within the government, but did not specifically allow for the creation of new
agencies. According to the Act:
That for the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the
war, for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, for the better
utilization of resources and industries, and for the more effective exercise and
more efficient administration by the President of his powers as Commander in
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Chief of the Army and Navy, the President is hereby authorized to make such
redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary.76
Young argued that the war powers acts of 1941 and 1942 both allowed the president to
administer the war while Congress focused only on specific agencies. However, the First
War Powers Act was not unique. It largely reiterated the tenets of the Departmental
Reorganization Act of 1918, which gave identical power to President Woodrow Wilson
during World War I. What Young ignored in his argument was the significance of the
rapidity with which the president received such extended executive power. Roosevelt
may have received the same powers as Wilson, but he received them less than two weeks
after the attack at Pearl Harbor. Wilson, on the other hand, received his powers more
than a year after the US declaration of war and only six months before the end of the
war.77 Roosevelt was given, and took, full advantage of his increased powers almost
immediately after the beginning of World War II. The rapidity of modern war, including
the abrupt and unforeseen attack on Pearl Harbor, altered the way Congress perceived
wartime administration. The slow legislative process quickly gave way to executive
control, which the specter of modern atomic warfare would later solidify.
After giving up much of its legislative power, Congress also declined any
involvement in military or military-political conferences, which reinforced executive
wartime control. Unlike earlier congressional involvement in the Washington Naval
Conference, Congress fully gave the power during World War II to Roosevelt. Although
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Congress occasionally received reports about the goings on of conferences such as Yalta,
they received little else. Congressional interest in military information was restricted in
order to halt any partisan debates that might occur as a result and to maintain the secrecy
of the information.78 “The failure to inform Congress of major decisions and significant
developments in the military-political sphere of action may lead to an erosion of
confidence between the President and Congress,” noted Young.79 While Congress
seemed confident in allowing Roosevelt to wield the power during World War II,
Young’s insight would prove true during the post-World War II period of continuous
warfare as Congress wrestled with Truman’s decisions and its depreciated congressional
power.80
Though Congress seemed to acquiesce completely to Roosevelt, only to have its
power further eroded during the Truman administration, the World War II period was, in
reality, a period of transition for Congress. Congress gradually changed from having a
firm though divided grasp of international affairs in the 1920s to a powerless wartime
body during World War II, only to have its war-making power taken from it during the
1950s. After the 1942 elections, Congress experienced some flux as Democrats faced
decreased majorities (see table 3.2). Largely what this meant was that Democrats would
have to rely on some Republicans to achieve desired legislative goals.81 According to
political scientist Jerrold Schneider, the first law of politics was the law of anticipated
response. Just as presidents tried to maximize their success, so did legislators.
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“[H]owsoever much a senator or a congressman might be disposed to act in one way, he
will act in quite another should the configuration of political forces confronting his
contemplated actions make failure probable,” argued Schneider.82 Although this shift in
Congress might have, in respect to vote counts, signaled public concern over Roosevelt’s
policies, a 1943 study done by Drs. Hadley Cantril and John Harding of the Princeton
Public Opinion Research Office concluded that the real explanation was that voters voted
along party lines and more Republicans than Democrats came out to vote in 1944. Those
who would typically vote Democrat were serving as soldiers overseas, or working long
hours in factories and were unable to take an interest in the midterm elections. The
failure of the Third War Powers Act in December of 1942 illustrated the sudden friction
between Democrats and Republicans. The act, which concentrated on removing all
barriers at the president’s whim to the movement of people, goods, and information,
would have superseded regulations and procedures already in place through the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Customs Service, and military.83 Representative Roy O.
Woodruff (R) of Michigan remarked in Congress, “There is no question but that the new
Congress will give the executive departments and the military authorities all the power
and all the money actually necessary to the efficient prosecution of the war.”84 Woodruff
added:
There is no doubt that we are approaching the end of the era in which laws have
been tossed aside and broad grants of power have been made merely because
somebody persuaded the President to demand that these powers be granted. …The
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unanimous decision of the House Ways and Means Committee to postpone action
on the President’s demand for power to waive immigration and tariff laws and
restrictions on the free movement of persons and information in and out of the
country, will go down in history as the first great step in the restoration of action
by constitutional methods and procedure.85
Unfortunately for Woodruff and his Republican associates, their elevated power in
Congress would be short lived. In the elections of 1944, the Democrats would regain
some of their lost numbers due in large part to the predicted victory and postwar peace
planning (see table 3.2).86
However, perhaps the greatest congressional assent to the president’s control
came with the top secret funding for the Manhattan Project. The budgetary system
throughout the thirties, forties, and fifties had a great deficiency in that it was difficult, if
not impossible, to trace exactly how departments spent allocated appropriations. As a
result, modern-day methods of distributive politics analysis are unsuitable due to the lack
of oversight on congressional appropriations. Congress usually allocated funds in lump
sums toward specific types of projects or departments but left it entirely up to the
individual department or agencies for spending. Additionally, legislators offered
reciprocity to one another through such activities as “vote trading” or building up “vote
credit” for future bargaining on a bill that was more important to their individual policy
interests. These activities were too extensive and informal to track. During World War
II, Congress frequently passed military appropriations with little public debate,
suggesting that agreements were made behind closed doors. In this respect, members of
Congress maintained their support of the war effort without argument. The Manhattan
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Project to build the first atomic bomb was no exception to these other military
appropriations and Congress funded it through regular congressional legislation. Senator
Styles Bridges (R) of New Hampshire recalled that only five senators knew the details of
the bomb project. Secretary Stimson told these senators in 1942, shortly after Roosevelt
established the Manhattan Project, that the project would need vast amounts of funding in
order to be successful. Bridges claimed Stimson informed these senators in order to
manipulate the appropriations allocated toward military projects and vouch for the
increased funding without revealing the true nature of the project.87
The few informed legislators secretly hid the Manhattan Project’s final cost,
around two billion dollars, within the more than 300 billion dollar military expenditures
over the duration of the war.88 The project, considered at the time to be a vital necessity
to winning the war, came to several standstills along the way, but congressional
understanding of both the rapid nature of modern war and subservience to executive
protocol assured its success. According to the Atomic Energy Council’s controller in
1949, “The weapon—not the expense—was properly the primary consideration during
the war.”89 After Congress allocated the first two million dollars in small amounts under
subsections such as “engineering” in the appropriations bills, the representatives and
senators involved in the financial wing of the project worried that the military was
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wasting the money. Convinced by Stimson to visit the Oak Ridge bomb facility in
Tennessee, the legislators agreed, though they held reservations, to allocate more funds
toward the project. When Congress discovered a discrepancy between the military funds
allocated and the amount spent on traditional military projects, they contacted General
George Marshall for answers. Marshall, well aware that the missing funds went toward
the Manhattan Project, maintained the project’s secrecy. When faced by members of
Congress, Marshall noted that the funds were going toward a “war-winning project” that
the US needed to complete before Germany. Congressional leaders never questioned the
discrepancy again for the duration of the war, leaving control to the executive.90 After
the switch between Roosevelt and Truman, Congress would retain the same courtesy for
the remainder of the war, yielding control to Truman.
Truman and the Congress
Partially due to his collegial aptitude and his knowledge of the inner workings of
Congress and partially due to his loyalty to the Senate, Truman had a relatively smooth
transition from vice president to president as far as Congress was concerned. With postwar peace plans already in the works, Truman continued to follow through with
Roosevelt’s foreign policies until the end of 1945. As a result, Congress was supportive
of the required international commitments, such as joining the United Nations, for which
Roosevelt had already primed them.91 However, the dwindling Democratic-majority
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Congress was continuing on a downward spiral and Truman’s administration began to
predict a Republican majority in the near future (see table 3.3). In a December 1946
memorandum from James H. Rowe, Jr. to Clark Clifford, Rowe outlined the potential
problems that the Truman administration would run into with the incoming Republican
Congress in 1947. “The realpolitik of the situation requires that there be some gestures
toward cooperation and, where it is workable, active and intelligent cooperation,” noted
Rowe.92 Truman, with his self-assured connection to Congress, especially to the Senate,
was not concerned about a battle between the two branches. In the House, Truman’s
close friend Sam Rayburn served as speaker, and offered a type of personalized
leadership that meshed well with Truman’s own collegial style. Rayburn formed
personal relationships with other congressmen and offered favors, both political and
personal, to members of both parties as political bargaining chips.93 Rowe warned
Clifford, however, that Congress still held the power of the purse and could reject the
president’s legislative recommendations. “The probability of conflict, not cooperation, is
the political reality with which the President must work for the next 2 years,” Rowe
concluded.94 In his memorandum, Rowe emphasized that the president’s only powers
when dealing with an opposition Congress were the veto power, rarely overridden even in
a majority Congress, or utilizing the power of public opinion.95 “Unlike majority
Presidents who are able to ‘do business’ with their own party through judicious use of
patronage, the minority Presidents are forced to fall back to their chief weapon—the
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marshaling of public opinion—which they do through the veto message and the press
conference,” noted Rowe.96 From 1947-1949, Truman focused on his creation of the
national security state and needed congressional support to back his goals.
On February 26, 1947, Truman transmitted a copy of his proposed bill for military
unification entitled “National Security Act of 1947” to the newly Republican Congress. 97
Unification of the armed services had been under consideration since the last year of the
war, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a study to determine ‘“[w]hat is the
organization which will provide the most effective employment of our military resources
in time of war and their most effective preparation for war, in time of peace?”’98 Though
the proposal aimed at postwar peace plans, the objective emphasized a more rigorous and
unified military establishment whose utility was war. The proposed plans for unification
never solidified under the Roosevelt administration but continued to flourish under the
Truman administration. The Eberstadt Report, issued in the fall of 1945, opposed a single
Cabinet-level secretary, which unified the military branches, instead vying for three
separate Cabinet-level positions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Policy advisor
Ferdinand Eberstadt was the first to see this need for an organizational structure that
would work in the ambiguous world of continuous warfare.
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After some debate and disagreement in Congress over the details of the Eberstadt
Report, Truman issued a message on unification in December of 1945, in which the
convoluted language of the twilight zone again surfaced.99 Truman noted:
[A]ll nations…know that desire for peace is futile unless there is also enough
strength ready and willing to enforce that desire in any emergency. Among the
things that have encouraged aggression and the spread of war in the past have
been the unwillingness of the United States realistically to face this fact, and her
refusal to fortify her aims of peace before the forces of aggression could gather in
strength.100
Truman argued in his message for a single Department of National Defense headed by a
cabinet secretary who would oversee the three coordinate branches of the military (see
fig. 3.3). Further blurring the nature of this unification project, Truman couched his
argument in a discussion of both war and peace. “I am certain that when the task is
accomplished,” Truman contended, “we shall have a military establishment far better
adapted to carrying out its share of our national program for achieving peace and
security.”101 Again, the nature of postwar peace became synonymous with an ongoing
preparation for continuous warfare. Michael J. Hogan claims in A Cross of Iron that it
was this move toward a national security establishment that dissolved the “usual
distinction between war and peace in the minds of American policy makers.”102
However, the fuzzy language blurring war and peace had been occurring for years under
the Truman administration and Congress. By the time of Truman’s officially proposed
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bill in 1947, the position of Congress on this proposed national war machine was still in
question.
In the Senate hearings on Truman’s proposed bill, it became evident that the
senators looked upon the National Security Act favorably. The Armed Services
Committee Chairman, Senator John Chandler Gurney (R) of South Dakota, cited that,
“we have, as the No. 1 objective, to have the armed forces as effective as possible. We
are looking for effectiveness in time of need, and efficiency to show the world even in
time of peace.”103 Gurney’s comment suggested that Congress was fully aware of the
military necessity of unification, despite the clouded nature of the discussion of peace
that permeated the National Security Act’s foundations. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal,
under question by the Senate Committee, admitted that unification was economic in
nature as well as part of a plan to administer effectively military appropriations.
“[W]hatever contributes to our being able to retain all of those elements [economic,
industrial, fiscal], including our financial strength, keeps us fit and competent to wage
war,” Forrestal contended, again revealing the inherently warlike nature of unification.104
Senator Bridges (R-NH) showed concern over the nature of the proposed Secretary of
National Defense position (a “super de luxe Secretary”) in place of three separate military
secretaries. Bridges asked Forrestal, “are you not by this bill merely preparing a path, or
making a bed of roses for such a man [a demagogic president], or perhaps preparing the
ground in which such a man can flourish?”105 Bridges worried that a single secretary
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would be unable to stop a powerful or “superambitious” president, whereas three might
be more effective.106 Later on during the questioning of Secretary of War Robert
Patterson, Bridges worried that this super-Secretary might also be able to control the
budget for the three branches of the military so much so that he could effectively
eliminate one.107 Though Patterson assured Bridges that Congress had the final say on
appropriations and could make sure this did not happen, Bridges remained concerned.
“[I]f you come in here with a recommendation which if the Congress modified
immediately the hue and cry goes up that we are interfering with the defense program of
the country, the security of the country…Congress certainly would be starting under a
handicap, would it not?” Bridges claimed.108 The tendency for Congress to be alleviated
of its appropriations power would be especially heightened during times of emergency or
war, Bridges noted. When Congress would have to traverse the outcry over a nonspecialized Congress versus a devoted secretary of defense, Congress would ultimately
lose. Despite these concerns, the Senate Committee on Armed Services approved the bill
as amended unanimously and reported it to the Senate on June 4, 1947.109
The final bill, though quite similar to the original, did go through some notable
changes that illustrated the confusion over peace versus war in this period of continuous
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warfare. Foremost, the Senate Committee decided in executive session to retitle the
Secretary of National Defense the Secretary of National Security.110 Security is defined
as being free from danger or threat and is synonymous with peace while defense is
defending from or resisting attack (war). Though not mentioned in the recorded
documents, the subtle language change evidenced the Senate’s attempt to change
Truman’s intentions behind closed doors by moving the target of the National Security
Act away from war preparation to peace maintenance. After the Senate approved this
amended bill, the House investigated it further. In the House Report on the National
Security Act, they integrated the original house bill, HR 2319 and the Senate’s proposed
amended S. 758, coming up with HR 4214. This bill changed the term “security” back to
“defense” and better clarified the military aspect of the bill. “The Term National Military
Establishment is considered a more accurate title than National Security Establishment as
used in S. 758,” the House Report noted.111
Subsequently, the Senate’s proposed Secretary of National Security returned to
being the Secretary of Defense with little explanation other than the necessity of
accuracy, though evidence suggests a greater meaning to the change. In formerly
classified House executive session minutes discussing the role of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) in the National Security Act, Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, director of naval
intelligence, under oath, noted that foreign intelligence alone defined the parameters of
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the CIA, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation retained the domestic front.
Combined with the idea of defense versus security, the CIA’s place in the national
security apparatus illustrated that the Government did not formulate the act and the
national military establishment for national security, but as agencies for war and foreign
intervention.112 A Report on the System Currently Employed in the Collection,
Evaluation, and Dissemination of Intelligence Affecting the War Potential of the United
States stated:
Time of peace is emphasized because it is in time of peace that nations prepare for
war; it is in time of peace that true information concerning the resources, plans,
activities, the political and military movements of potential enemies, is—in these
modern days—most difficult to obtain and to comprehend.113
This report emphasized the utility of a formalized CIA to help prepare for war despite the
supposed period of peace the United States was then experiencing.
In 1949, the national military establishment formally became unified under the
Department of Defense, further cloaking the intentions of the original National Security
Act. A review of congressional committee hearings to amend the National Security Act
in 1949 revealed that the Government downplayed the significance of the name
change.114 Wilfred McNeil, a witness at the hearings and special assistant to the secretary
of defense, asked a clarifying question on the bill at hand. “This [H.R. 5632] applies to
the National Military Establishment and Senate 1843 applies to the Department of
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Defense [?]” asked McNeil. Representative Dewey Short (R-MO), who had proposed the
bill, responded, “Yes, which is a big difference.”115 However, later during the same
House hearings, Short mentioned that the only difference between the House and Senate
bills was the language change from the “National Military Establishment” to the
“Department of Defense.” In the House committee hearings on S. 1843, Johnson
outlined the reason for the change more clearly. By moving the national military
establishment into the realm of an executive department, the secretary of defense would
gain more power over the individual military branches, giving the president ultimate
authority over the secretary at a moment’s notice. Johnson, questioned by the House
Armed Services Committee, argued for organizational and efficiency benefits with the
change.116 Skeptical, Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), responded:
Now, Mr. Secretary, I try to be practical. I know that whether this bill is passed
or not, with the Department Secretaries in full accord with your concept of
unification, and with the President behind you in the event of disagreement, you
are going to run the Department. …the whole subject is now largely academic.117
Vinson essentially admitted that the congressional decisions on the National Security Act
of 1949 were moot—with the support of the president, the executive departments would
do as they pleased. Hogan argued that Truman’s power diminished during the creation of
the national security state because the Army and Navy forced him to beg for their
support, but a Washington Post article from February of 1947 revealed that Truman
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actually used his power as Commander in Chief to command the military to follow suit
when it came to national security.118 The 1949 comment by Vinson during the hearings
on amendments to the National Security Act reaffirmed Truman’s ultimate power
concerning national security and over the military. Though Congress eventually
approved the National Security Act for the president’s signature, the shifting language
and resort to military commands illustrated the fuzzy nature of continuous warfare and
congressional willingness to accede to the president’s interests.
The Benefits of Undeclared War
Once the national security state was entrenched in American government,
Congress had almost totally complied with the president’s ultimate control over all things
related to the preparation and maintenance of war. However, the one constitutional
power that Congress still laid claim to was the traditional right to “declare war.”
Congress had always declared war—traditional extended armed conflict, including World
War II—after a request from the president. Due to the elaborate interplay of politics and
public sentiment, President Roosevelt understood that the United States had to become
involved in World War II, but he also understood that presidential entrance into a war
without properly preparing the country could be a significant public relations problem.
With this in mind, Roosevelt opted to manipulate the public mindset about war through
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his fireside chats while gradually involving the US more and more with the Allied
Forces. The attack at Pearl Harbor then provided a theoretical “back door” to the war,
which Roosevelt opted to take advantage of, and Congress followed suit. Congress voted
almost unanimously, with the exception of pacifist Representative Jeannette Rankin (RMT), to declare war.119 The American people likewise followed Roosevelt into war
bolstered by his educational fireside chats and enraged by the Japanese attack. The
formal US entrance into World War II was the most common American method for
joining a traditional extended armed conflict.
Truman did not choose this traditional method when he decided to engage US
troops in the conflict in Korea, however. Instead, Truman opted for “imperfect” or
undeclared war. In January of 1950, just six months before Truman would send US
troops to Korea, Congress weighed the necessity of defending the Far East from
communist aggression. Although mainland China had become a communist country in
1949, leaving Taiwan or Formosa behind as a republic, members of Congress felt
disinclined to take action in this region of the world. Overall, since 1933 national
defense and foreign policy had shown the largest decline in congressional interest.120
Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) noted, “I believe the Formosan people and the
Chinese can take care of their own affairs without the necessity of our sending armed
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forces there to work out their problems for them.”121 Likewise, Korea was going through
a similar internal struggle against communism, but direct action seemed inappropriate. In
The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950, historian Bruce
Cummings argued that at its heart, the Korean conflict was primarily a civil war, not an
international conflict.122 During an executive session of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, who had just returned from a
trip to the Far East, reinforced Cummings’ analysis. Jessup stated, “On the question of
local Communist strength…In Korea they [the South Koreans], I think, are making good
progress in handling the Communists.”123 Jessup emphasized, “Our military advisory
group thinks that the Korean Army in the South has made excellent progress and is doing
a very good job against the Communists.”124
Nonetheless, slated appropriations for Korea were increased after 1949, rising
from six million dollars in actual aid in 1949 to an estimated 111 million dollars in 1951,
suggesting greater US involvement. Truman noted that the 1949 amount only provided
enough money for relief programs whereas he sought a full recovery program for
Korea.125 What Truman received, however, was an invitation for war when communist
North Korea, with Chinese aid and Soviet equipment, openly attacked South Korea on
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June 25, 1950. In the Washington Star, reporter David Lawrence suggested that the
eruption of war in Korea should have been no surprise to the leaders of the American
government who wrote off the significance of the region. “The whole world acts
surprised—as if the doom of Korea wasn’t foreseen for a long time as a part of the
Washington administration’s policy of concentrating on the cold war in Europe,”
Lawrence remarked.126 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Tom Connally (D-TX), was also quoted in Lawrence’s article. According to Connally,
Korea was simply not an essential area in the US defense strategy.127
The Korean War created a unique situation for both the president and Congress.
The president as Commander in Chief could thoroughly commit US troops to a proxy war
through the new United Nations organization, which circumvented the need for a
congressional declaration of war. Meanwhile, Congress’s war power was quickly
antiquated due to the usefulness of the UN in this area, further reducing congressional
power in favor of the executive. According to the Charter of the United Nations:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces…necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security. …
[This agreement] shall be concluded between the Security Council and
Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be
subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes.128
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As an organization created under the pretense of eliminating war, the UN only required
troop committal from its members in the event of a problem. Despite the Charter’s
deference to individual member nations’ constitutional procedures, the failure to mention
formal warfare couched UN actions in a familiar US constitutional juxtaposition. While
Congress may have controlled the power to declare war, the president controlled the
troops. As a result, under UN sanctioned actions, the president no longer needed any
compliance by Congress. Subsequently, on July 7, 1950, the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution No. 84, which designated all member nation forces in Korea
to fall under a unified command led by the United States. Although fifteen other UN
member nations provided almost 40,000 troops for the Korean War, the United States and
South Korea provided the bulk of fighting forces, nearly 900,000 soldiers. As illustrated
by troop numbers, a Korean civil war and an American war against the communists
united in the Korean conflict.129 No matter the eventuality of the Korean War, Truman
chose to involve the United Nations, giving credence to the young organization, while
also disguising an American war and bypassing congressional involvement.
Although Congress initially believed it held the right to declare war in Korea,
legislators hesitated due to questions over the necessity of US involvement in Korea and
due to a lack of presidential directive. Shortly after the North Korean invasion of South
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Korea, Senator George Malone (R-NV) commented, “I certainly object to backing up the
United Nations without determining whether or not our ultimate safety is involved since
only about half the area of the world is interested in keeping the peace.”130 Malone also
noted that it was Congress’s responsibility to declare war, but that the president was
making inroads on that task. Malone remarked:
Congress cannot determine policy, Congress can only debate the foreign policy
determined by the executive department. …the Congress can declare war or can
refuse to declare war. Of course it may be, as was true in the last two wars, that
very little will be left to be done toward declaring war by the Congress when the
matter is finally submitted to Congress. The Executive may have moved so far
ahead that the question of actually declaring war becomes academic because we
would actually be in war when the issue reaches the Senate floor.131
Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) agreed with Malone and noted that Truman “has brought
about a de facto war with the Government of northern Korea.”132 In addition, Taft
wanted the Senate to debate the United Nations action in Korea and the parameters of US
troop involvement too, so as not to completely disregard congressional power. “If the
incident is permitted to go by without protest, at least from this body,” Taft argued, “we
would have finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to declare war.”133
Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) argued that Taft and many other senators, as well as
newspapers, had derided Truman for acting illegally: “To condemn the President’s
actions is to play into the hands of the enemy and to lend credence to the enemies’ false
charges.”134 Likewise, Senator Paul Douglas (D) of Illinois thought the speed of the
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Korean attack necessitated a quick presidential response to circumvent the potentially
slow congressional process and noted several times in the past when presidential
directives controlled armed forces. In this first war since the use of atomic bombs, there
was also a fear of nuclear annihilation that depended upon quick executive action for
deterrence.135
The process of committing US troops under the UN Charter caused much
confusion over the right to declare war in Congress and the press. An article in the
Christian Science Monitor illustrated the issue. “If the President’s action was not a
declaration of war—something only Congress can make—it was not illegal under the
Constitution,” the article noted.136 However, the real concern was why Truman would
openly go against protocol and how the Congress would react toward the war in Korea.
The Chicago Daily Tribune suggested that Truman had ulterior political motives for
taking action in Korea in the way he did. According to the Tribune:
Mr. Truman’s political fortunes are in a bad way. He can use a war, just as his
predecessor needed one in the midst of the Roosevelt depression of the late ‘30s.
Mr. Roosevelt…finally had to squeeze the Japanese into their attack on Pearl
Harbor. Mr. Truman’s problem is simpler. He can expect American airmen to be
lost over Korea and he can count upon American indignation to do the rest.137
Truman’s job approval rating had been steadily plummeting since 1949, but the war in
Korea would do nothing to help Truman’s political fortunes. Instead, Truman’s approval
plunged even lower throughout the Korean War until it bottomed out in February 1952 at
just twenty-two percent, still the lowest ever recorded of any American president. The
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president takes a risk whenever he asks Congress for approval of something. While
congressional approval could mean the backing of the whole country increasing the
president’s political power, congressional disapproval suggested a weak president.138
With already low approval ratings, Truman may have circumvented Congress
strategically to avoid further loss of power. In his memoirs while discussing the Korean
War, Truman noted, “[t]he official position of the United States…is defined by decisions
and declarations of the President. There can be only one voice in stating the position of
this country in the field of foreign relations.”139 Members of Congress had given up
interest in foreign policy due to the rapid and global nature of modern war and easy
delegation of power to the executive during WWII. By acting alone on Korea, Truman
reiterated the position of a singular power, the president, in foreign relations. By quickly
giving up the declaration fight and opting to focus on other benefits, Congress reinforced
the president’s power for the rest of the twentieth century and the foreseeable future.
Votes and Appropriations for the Korean War
It was evident from the reaction to the undeclared war in Korea that Truman did
not seek to gain political glory, but instead solidify the United Nations and expand the
power of the American presidency through a blatant disregard for the congressional war
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power. A later discussion over appropriations for the Department of Defense reaffirmed
the fact that Korea or the Far East in general was not a major concern for the United
States militarily. In remarks later confirmed by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson,
Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL) noted, “We were not committed to a policy of
meeting aggression by force in the Far East and were not prepared to do so. As a matter
of fact, the administration policy was directly the opposite.”140 Republicans in Congress,
bolstered by McCarthyism, complained that the Truman administration was weak on
communism and that the Far East should have been a major area of concern, prior to the
outbreak of hostilities in Korea. As early as June 26, 1950, Representative Arthur Miller
(R-NE) claimed, “As we look over events of what has happened in Korea, we can only
come to one conclusion. It has been the policy of the State Department through Mssrs.
Acheson, Hiss, Latimer, Jessup, Service, and others, that has caused the softness toward
communism in the Far East.”141 When the Truman administration took action in Korea, it
both confirmed these earlier Republican complaints but also left Republicans with no
room to criticize the executive as Truman was now doing exactly what they had wanted.
However, Congress, even without its war powers, still had a valuable check on the
executive’s actions, the power to control appropriations. Since the congressional reaction
to the Korean War was initially negative, it made sense that Congress would rein in the
president through stunted or nonexistent appropriations toward the war, but the
circumstances of the Korean War put the Republican party, especially, in an odd position.
Republicans could no longer complain about the administration’s lack of action in the Far
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East and instead had to support the war.142 Although Republicans would eventually see a
political benefit to backing the war effort, it appeared that Congress fully acquiesced to
the president’s requests, further decimating any congressional power over foreign affairs.
Beginning on July 25, 1950, the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense
Appropriations began hearings on additional funding primarily for the execution of the
Korean War. The Department of Defense initially sought approximately ten and a half
billion dollars in supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1951.143 According to
Johnson, in his statement to the subcommittee, “I want to emphasize that this is not a call
for full mobilization. It is a call to increase our strength in being, in order to enable us to
support the United Nations’ action in Korea and to build up our strength elsewhere to
meet the threat to world peace.”144 Despite Johnson’s downplay of the significance of the
level of action in Korea, Representative George Mahon (D-TX) initially illustrated some
concern over both the funding and significance of the Korean War. Mahon questioned
Johnson, “[I]s this enough money to meet the emergency which faces our Nation; and,
second, is this the beginning of world war III?”145 Johnson’s response regarding the
amount of funding reiterated the fiscal responsibility of the Department of Defense and
that the request came directly from President Truman under advice from the Joint Chiefs
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of Staff. The subcommittee discussed, off the record, the possibility of the Korean War
becoming a part of a Third World War.146
Truman himself contended that the US was not at war. In a June 29, 1950 press
conference, Truman, prompted by a reporter to respond to the question of “are we or are
we not at war?” responded, “We are not at war.” Truman later described the
circumstances in Korea as a “police action” under the UN.147 Nationalist Republicans
like Taft initially blamed Truman for “inviting” the communist attack in Korea due the
lax US Far East policy, but because of the purposely ambiguous nature of the Korean
conflict at its outbreak, most did not want to openly go against the president with no clear
idea of what might develop in Korea.148 The Congressional Record showed a continuing
concern over US participation in the Korean War. On July 27, 1950, Representative
Robert Rich (R-PA) asked, “Why sacrifice American men to save the world—and do it
alone? Why should we let the President or the State Department commit us to sacrifices
unlimited[?]”149 In Rich’s comments, he blamed Truman for getting the US involved in a
war without the say of their representatives. Again, negativity toward the US action in
Korea and hostility over the usurpation of congressional war power suggested a need for
an empowered Congress to utilize its appropriations powers against Truman’s
prerogatives, but the fuzzy nature of the Korean War halted any action by Congress in
this regard.
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Congress did not opt to restrict the president though they had the ability to do so;
instead they acquiesced to his funding requests, further supporting a strong presidency
and weakening legislature. Congress passed the first supplemental appropriations bill in
September of 1950, allocating some 11.7 billion dollars toward the Department of
Defense and a specific four billion dollars toward military assistance in Korea. By the
end of fiscal year 1951, Congress appropriated 32.8 billion dollars in supplemental
appropriations to the Department of Defense concerning the Korean War. In 1952 and
1953, Congress combined appropriations for the Korean War into regular Department of
Defense appropriations allocations. In 1952, the Department of Defense received 56.2
billion dollars in congressional appropriations, followed by 43.3 billion dollars in 1953.
Cummings contended that the Truman administration purposely participated in the
Korean War in order to increase military spending to the levels called for in the National
Security Council’s (NSC) memorandum 68. NSC 68 put forward a plan for a protracted
Cold War of gradual coercion that pitted slave (communist) against free (democrat) and
requested a severe increase in peacetime defense spending. Cummings’ analysis is
unlikely, however, when one considers the ordinarily fiscally responsible Truman.
Instead, Truman sought to oversee a limited war under the parameters of the UN,
solidifying its international reputation while subsequently gaining executive benefits at
home. The steadily increasing military appropriation bills also included ongoing support
by the Republican members of Congress.150 For an unpopular war that had little
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congressional or public support, the congressional appropriations toward it suggested
some other benefit for legislators to financially supporting the war as well.
Wartime Industry and Congressional Districts
The benefits legislators received in return for their acquiescence regarding the
Korean War most likely dealt with manipulation and deal making in an effort to reach
their personal and policy goals outside the then defunct congressional debate surrounding
foreign affairs. Political theorists such as David Mayhew have argued that legislators
have a single significant goal, reelection. 151 Mayhew claimed, “[reelection] has to be the
proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and over if other ends
are to be entertained.”152 Due to the inherently changing nature of the US legislature,
legislators must be focused on this reelection goal constantly and devote resources to
advertising, credit claiming, and position taking, which would best ensure reelection.
Political scientist Richard Fenno added to Mayhew’s theory by elaborating on the goaldirected theory of Congress. Fenno noted that legislators have multiple goals, including
reelection, but also power and the creation of good public policy.153 Multiple goals often
conflict in the real life application of legislative action, so legislators manipulate their
positions and goals to achieve the best possible outcome individually.
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Legislators achieve their desired ends most notably through distributive policy.
Distributive policy or politics allowed benefits for specific populations such as
congressional districts or states while spreading the cost of such benefits across the
general population through taxation. These benefits could be bargained for by individual
legislators, and their addition to or removal from a particular bill in no way impacted the
overall effect of the bill or the outcome for other individuals. The popular media referred
to the manipulation of these benefits as “pork barrel politics.” By filtering various
projects to their home districts and states, legislators often ensured their reelection while
gaining some leeway to do as they wished on more salient issues within Congress, which
might help them achieve other goals, such as power.154 The doling out and distribution of
“pork” likewise allowed other legislators to achieve their potential “good policy” goals
by creating coalitions within Congress. According to political scientist Diana Evans in
Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in
Congress, “large national policy edifices are constructed, in part, with bricks of pork.”155
Although the relationship between Congress and the president often obscured
congressional policies, especially concerning foreign policy, the distribution of these
benefits explained the willingness of Congress to do away with certain ingrained
congressional obligations, such as declaring war. Regarding these benefits, Schneider
contended:
Contextually rich and intensive analyses of particular events, including case
studies of battles over particular policies, leadership fights, and analyses of
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changes in congressional structures and processes, often reveal far more about
operative intentions and behavior of Members.156
However, finding actual “pork” or distributive benefits during the 1930s-1950s is nearly
impossible due to the vagaries of appropriations distribution during this period.157
Despite this roadblock, through careful analysis of events, there are still some suggestions
of congressional benefits available in the historical record.
An undeclared war, such as the Korean War, gave a unique bargaining position to
members of Congress. Whereas traditional declarations of war yielded support to the
president fully, often generating criticism of those legislators who spoke out against the
government’s actions later, undeclared war gave legislators more flexibility and provided
a fuzzy area in which they could maneuver politically. Political scientist Ronald J. Caridi
emphasized a clear shift in support from the Republican side of Congress around August
of 1950. Caridi claimed, “The [Republican] [P]arty’s Senate representation did not praise
Truman nearly as often as it had in the first days of the war, and more importantly, some
members began to express doubts about the meaning of intervention for America.”158
Caridi argued in The Korean War and American Politics that, prior to the Korean War,
two factions polarized the Republican party in Congress and the party leadership sought
to use the frustrations during the war to bolster Republican politics.159 However, Caridi
focused on the obvious verbal shift from support to nonsupport of the war instead of
concentrating on the underlying benefits these legislators received. Caridi’s analysis
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illustrated that by only lending de facto support to the Korean War through
appropriations, legislators could gain benefits for their states and districts while still
maintaining an anti-war stance if politically popular at election time.
The Korean War immediately created defects in the traditional system of wartime
mobilization because it altered the standards for peacetime while not fully mobilizing the
country as would a traditional war. The Korean War, though it included traditional
fighting, was another example of the politically malleable liminal zone between
traditional peace and traditional war. The House Subcommittee on Military Public
Works illuminated this paradox in 1952 in what it referenced as the “peculiar needs of the
Korean crisis.” The subcommittee concluded that military construction had run into
economic problems because these construction projects had initially sought to maintain
the permanent peacetime needs of the military establishment and prepare for the
temporary needs of full military mobilization for war.160 “The requirements of the
Korean crisis fit neither slot. This emergency was not followed by a total mobilization
but did demand a great and immediate increase in standing forces,” noted the
subcommittee.161 Furthermore, under the limitless parameters of the communist threat,
there was no limited timeframe for which to plan. As a result, the Air Force scrapped
projects like new fuel storage tanks at the Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma after halffinishing them. The military awarded contracts for construction of warehouses and
storage buildings at the Benicia Arsenal in California to negotiated bid contractors
instead of competitive bidders, restricting the contractors involved and hobbling the
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necessary time needed to figure proper proposals. Congressmen such as Leroy Johnson
(R-CA), a member of the House Armed Services Committee from the district housing the
Benicia Arsenal, benefited from this haphazard building by being able to emphasize the
employment of some 6,700 civilian workers during the Korean War, more than at any
previous time at the arsenal.162 Johnson also drew attention to the Democrats in regard to
war-related problems. The overall mobilization issue was one target of Johnson’s claims.
“I do think that the ineptness in our statesmanship and diplomacy should be called to the
attention of the American voters at the appropriate time, when I hope they will take steps
to make a change,” Johnson argued in 1951.163 Just as Johnson both took advantage of
the war situation and criticized it, most Republicans saw Truman’s ambiguous limited
war as a political advantage, spinning events for their own use. Historian Steven Casey
argued, “the president’s decision to adopt a low-key public posture had created problems.
As well as encouraging journalists to speculate, it had given Republicans the opportunity
to put their own spin on why America was suddenly at war.”164
In accordance with the war contracts in Johnson’s district, the government
allocated the majority of defense contracts to large companies, which could directly
influence congressional elections and employ large numbers of people within individual
legislative districts and states. According to Marquis Childs of the Washington Post,
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legislators took full advantage of the upswing in government funding toward defense.
“[S]eldom has there been such jostling, such pulling and hauling, among the big boys
seeking privileged access to the billions of dollars being spent by Government,” Childs
wrote.165
Overall, defense contracts meant more jobs and profits, both positive political
elements for elected legislators. During the first year of the Korean War, the top fifty
defense contract companies included General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company,
and Chrysler Corporation, of Michigan. Henry Ford II, president of Ford Motor
Company, remarked on one individual Ford contract to manufacture jet engines, “When
full production is reached approximately 5,000 workers will be needed to manufacture
parts and assemble the J-40.”166 Though Michigan unemployment was high at the start of
the Korean War, as domestic post-war manufacturing slowed, wartime manufacturing
should have created a boom in Michigan’s economy as more workers moved to the state
and as more people became employed by wartime plants, such as Ford’s J-40 production
facilities.167 However, the partial mobilization inherent in the Korean crisis and
continuous warfare overall, served only to bog down domestic manufacturing while not
allowing wartime manufacturing to flourish either. “Michigan is one of the few
states…whose unemployment is severe at this time due to conversion to partial defense,”
noted Max M. Horton, assistant executive director, Michigan Employment Security
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Commission.168 Likewise, Detroit Mayor Albert E. Cobo warned Truman that
unemployment would continue to worsen without more civilian production. However,
Michigan manufacturers received around five billion dollars in defense contracts, the
result of lobbying by Michigan agencies.169 At the same time, Representative Thomas J.
Lane (D) of Massachusetts lambasted the Defense Department for giving contracts to
foreign companies. According to the Washington Post Lane claimed, “[T]he Defense
Department is planning to give war contracts to foreign countries while some American
workers are unemployed.”170

While it appeared that defense contracts meant continued

unemployment in Michigan while offering potential employment opportunities in other
places, like Massachusetts, what the conflict illustrated was the ability of legislators to
benefit multifold from the war in Korea without endorsing the war itself. Overall,
defense contracts meant jobs for people and profits for companies, both themes that
legislators could spin positively while seeking reelection.
In Ohio’s 1950 Senate race, the outspoken Robert Taft (R) campaigned for
reelection against Joseph T. Ferguson (D), illustrating how either side could spin
economic benefits and the war in Korea to their advantage. Taft’s campaign focused
heavily on anti-communist propaganda and pegged Democrats as soft on communism,
manipulating the Korean crisis to appear as an affirmation of Republican ideology.
According to the New York Times, Taft charged, “confusion in the Truman
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administration, to the very extent that Russia was virtually invited into Korea, brought on
needless hostilities in which American lives are being sacrificed.”171 Taft paired his
rhetoric with a flyer, “The Veteran and the Welfare State,” that emphasized the
diplomatic blunders of the Democrats and illustrated lingering questions regarding the
Cold War and the possibility of World War III (see fig. 3.4). In an effort to combat
Taft’s arguments, Ferguson turned to more hard and fast economic issues. In one
cartoon, the Ferguson campaign illustrated the backwardness of Republican support for a
Democrat-initiated war, exposing the underlying benefits for senators like Taft (see fig.
3.5). The cartoon clearly showed a businessman making hefty profits off the production
of war materials with Taft clinging to the profits. Aptly captioned, “Doughboys!” the
cartoon pegged war profiteering to military supply companies in an attempt to expose
Republican manipulation of the fuzziness surrounding Korea.172 Although Taft retained
his Senate seat in 1950, the campaign against Ferguson illustrated the malleability of the
Korean crisis.
Michigan’s senatorial race in 1954 between incumbent Homer Ferguson (R) and
Patrick V. McNamara (D) revealed similar examples of how benefits might work.
Ferguson claimed in the Holland, Michigan Evening Sentinel that the Republicans in
Congress “gave our people peace, prosperity without war, and great hope for the
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future.”173 Ferguson’s campaign focused on support from the large industrial companies
such as Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, that had received government contracts
during the Korean War, while McNamara’s campaign relied simply upon the sway of the
liberal-labor coalition in Michigan. Ferguson gained the backing of the Michigan
Federation of Teamsters with the help of Jimmy Hoffa, but Walter Reuther, president of
the United Automobile Workers (UAW), referred to Ferguson as an “extremely
reactionary spokesman for big business and the auto industry.”174 The UAW placed their
loyalty with McNamara, though with a decided lack of enthusiasm. The fluctuations in
Michigan’s economy during the Korean War crisis between war contracts and civil goods
employment ultimately resulted in a Democratic-run state government and a McNamara
win on its coattails with a voter difference of less than 40,000.

Although Ferguson’s

campaign was unsuccessful, he pushed the Republican noninvolvement in the Korean
War while gaining war contracts for Michigan and campaign contributions from the
companies like the Big Three automotive giants. President Dwight D. Eisenhower
benefited from Ferguson’s motives most as he won the state of Michigan in 1952.175
Overall, Republican legislators profited the most from the lack of a formal
declaration of war. Whereas they could still gain benefits for their districts and states
through appropriations and defense contracts, they also avoided responsibility for any
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war-related problems. Unlike World War II, where the two parties both agreed to support
the war, and were therefore both responsible at some level for the problems associated
with the war, the Korean War eliminated this responsibility, especially for the
Republicans. Democrats, though they could claim nonsupport for the war as well, were
inherently connected through their party affiliation. As a result, Republicans could play
up war-related problems while reaping the economic and financial rewards. Truman
himself complained that the Republicans were just “seeking headlines.” By midSeptember 1950, Republicans were still willing to support important bills regarding the
war inside the walls of Congress.176 However, the Korean War quickly became the topic
of debate in the 1950 midterm elections. Casey noted that after July 1950, when Truman
shifted away from his more frugal economic policies to increased defense spending,
Republicans saw an opportunity to spin the Korean War to their advantage, despite their
inherent support of the action overall. Republicans took the stance that Truman’s efforts
in Korea were a direct reversal of American foreign policy, putting Democrats on the
defensive, and that Democrats were finally ending their appeasement of communism.177
Republican National Committee Chairman Guy Gabrielson noted just before the election,
“The people appear determined to register their protest against the politics of
appeasement toward Communists in Asia and the domestic program leading toward
socialism.”178 According to historian Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Republicans wanted to “have
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their cake and eat it too” by opposing price controls and tax increases while approving
defense expenditures that often benefited their home territory.179
Furthermore, members of Congress exhibited caution when dealing with foreign
policy or military business for several reasons, which allowed them to avoid
responsibility. Foremost among these reasons was the special role of the president as the
sole leader of foreign relations, which relegated Congress to take a passive role in foreign
policy in general. Politicians in Congress simply did not possess enough military
intelligence to analyze what was happening in Korea. Republicans specifically avoided
sitting on key congressional committees because by their absence they could feign lack of
consultation and maintain their criticism of the administration policies in general.
Additionally, the necessary secrecy and complicated technology involved in warfare,
such as the atomic bomb, made foreign policy difficult for Congressmen to comprehend
fully. Finally, the national appeal of foreign policy issues went beyond the mainly local
or partisan interests of legislators.180
Conclusion
By the 1950s, Congress barely held on to the power to declare war. As the US
government would note in its brief for the Youngstown steel seizure case (that illustrated
the Supreme Court’s equal unwillingness to go against the commander in chief in 1952),
there was an historical precedent for presidential control of war. Presidents going back as
far as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson had ordered the military into combat without
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congressional approval, but Truman was the first to involve the American military in a
full-scale war without a formal declaration of war from Congress.181 Though Congress
had constitutional grounds upon which to abbreviate Truman’s war in Korea, including
the power of the purse or through impeachment proceedings, the legislators acquiesced to
the president. In the beginning phase of continuous warfare, this submission set a
dangerous precedent and served to weaken permanently the congressional right to declare
war while simultaneously increasing executive power. Due to congressional insecurity
with new methods of war, such as the secretive and complex atomic bomb with its
potential for rapid annihilation, and the overall change in the nature of warfare from the
cautious isolationism of the First World War to the global post-WWII era, members of
Congress were willing to give up this somewhat antiquated and formal right to declare
war in favor of more political maneuverability. Likewise, future presidents were
unwilling to ask for congressional permission. The benefits that Congress received from
undeclared war in the form of war contracts, campaign contributions, votes, and plausible
deniability, served to seal this precedent and permanently removed a politically charged
topic from future congressional discussion. In an era in which warfare became
permanent, embedded into the national security structure, and run by the president, the
congressional right to declare war and subsequently restrict warfare served as the only
reasonable check on executive power, outside of legal action. Truman’s lack of a clear
definition regarding the actions in Korea, another lesson in the ambiguous nature of
continuous warfare, compelled Republicans to manipulate the circumstances for their
own benefit, either directly through economic benefits to their home regions, or indirectly
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through political grandstanding, giving political credence to the fuzzy nature of
continuous warfare from the perspective of legislators. Pierpaoli argued, “[The United
States] blurred the distinction between war and peace and oftentimes used war,
sometimes hot and sometimes cold, as a way to preserve peace.”182 When Congress
dissolved their right to declare war by acquiescing to the president, they stabilized the
structure of the imperial presidency and served as the floor on which Truman built the
walls of his house of peace.
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CHAPTER IV

FRAMING THE WALLS: WAR AND JUSTICE ON THE SUPREME COURT

With congressional power against the executive vacillating during continuous
warfare, only the third branch remained able to restrict wartime usurpation of power by
the president. The Framers intended the Supreme Court to serve as an independent and
non-partisan check on both executive authority and the constitutionality of statutory law.
According to constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar, “Laws would first be enacted by
the legislature and then implemented by the executive. Only at that point might the
judiciary appear.”1 Alexander Hamilton noted that the judiciary was the weakest branch
of federal government, with no real authority to back up its decisions.2 However, as the
president and Congress began to battle for power during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the court gleaned more power and respect as a final arbiter. The addition of
discretionary jurisdiction for the court in the early twentieth century likewise yielded
more power to the court as it hand-selected its cases and molded its own agenda.3 As a
result, the court gradually came to depend upon its own institutional legitimacy for its
power and gained immense respect from the public over time.
Despite the court’s designated role as a purely legal institution devoid of politics,
political scientists have revealed a more complex socio-political nature to the modern
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court. Though grounding its decisions in law, usually, the court sometimes based its
judgments upon outside political connections or interests, internal collegiality, and
societal positions. Beginning with C. Herman Pritchett in The Roosevelt Court in 1948,
political scientists noted that the law was not the sole basis for the Supreme Court’s
behavior. This observation fell in line with the objectives of the early twentieth century
legal realism movement. Pritchett was the first to notice a fissure among the Roosevelt
Court, named so due to its largely Roosevelt-appointed bench, which suggested a more
nuanced gradation of ideological standpoints, later touted by Glendon Schubert and
attitudinalists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth.4 From here, political scientists theorized
that a number of characteristics such as collegiality, strategy, or outside elements also
affected Supreme Court decision-making. Overall, political scientists revealed a more
complicated court and the necessity to analyze opinions for more complex answers to
legal questions, yet their methods and models often did not go far enough when analyzing
specific cases and the circumstances surrounding them. Only a combination of both
political and historical analysis could remedy this gap in understanding, yielding a
complete picture of how the court operates as a socio-political entity.
Additionally, the other governmental branches’ near inability to check the court
resulted in increased judicial branch power as the court took on a larger role in American
government. Although the Constitution allowed for the impeachment and removal of
justices from the high court, Congress only attempted this procedure once in 1805 with

4

For more on this discussion see C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial
Politics and Values, 1937-1947 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1948); Glendon A. Schubert, The Judicial
Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1965; Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

241
the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase. Congress acquitted Chase and he continued
to serve on the bench until his death. The legislature could also attempt a “soft-check” on
judicial decisions by passing a constitutional amendment abrogating a court decision,
though this has occurred only a few times in the nation’s past. In response, the court
sometimes retreated from controversial questions of law, but this was generally
temporary and did not apply to constitutional questions, revealing the court’s role as a
political adversary to Congress and not a willing follower.5 Roosevelt’s own perceived
failed attempt at controlling the court during his Court-Packing Plan illustrated the near
impenetrable position of the court by the twentieth century.
With almost full discretionary jurisdiction, the modern court held the final check
on both legislative and executive power. Historically, the court’s justices have fallen
under the purview of biographers, and the history of the court as an institution has fallen
into various intellectual movements like the law and economics movement, the critical
legal studies movement, and various offshoots thereof such as critical race theory. While
each of these analyses has offered a deeper and more complex look at the law through
various perspectives, they lacked a close look at justices’ actions as individuals, leading
to a skewed picture of the court. The problem with these legal theories, much like
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political science models, was that while useful for analyses, they downplayed each
actor’s individual role in lieu of a larger structure or outcome. 6
As a result, this study pairs detailed historical analyses of people, events, and
cases alongside these theories and models. Since the court has traditionally been the least
public institution and most mysterious in its operation beyond the courtroom itself, an
interdisciplinary approach will allow for a more detailed analysis of how the court
functioned in specific cases, under certain circumstances. Political models and legal
theories provide a structure for interpreting how the court functions and makes decisions.
Historical context expands on this framework to create a solid picture of what happened
within limited and specific circumstances. While this specificity might not provide an
easily repeated model or overarching theory for other court analyses, it does explain the
historical placement of the court in regard to executive power during continuous warfare.
On the topic of warfare, the court has sided with the executive repeatedly, giving
up its decision-making power, much like Congress, to the president. Law professor Mark
E. Brandon contended that the most common attitude of the court on this issue of how
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warfare and constitutionalism could fit together was to invoke the historic “Inter arma
silent leges (in time of war the laws are silent).” Brandon asserted that historically, the
court understood that the government might unofficially suspend written law during
times of war, such as in the example of the Civil War Prize Cases, but this argument
seemed simplistic for a country frequently at war.7 Instead, Brandon claimed that the
court weighed the importance of the war among the other branches of government when
judging whether the government could infringe upon citizens’ rights. However, Brandon
did not take into account the specific behavior of members of the court concerning its
own prerogatives, instead acknowledging its position as the weakest branch, which the
other branches easily manipulated. Political scientist Amanda DiPaolo agreed with
Brandon’s analysis that the court tended to defer to other leadership when the president
and Congress agreed upon an action during wartime, though she noted that the court did
not defer to the other branches when they were in disagreement.8 While both Brandon
and DiPaolo offered important analyses of court actions, they discounted the significant
difference between traditional armed conflict and modern continuous warfare in their
analyses. This significant gap in scholarship illustrated the deceptive capability of
continuous warfare and presidential power under its purview.
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During the beginning phases of continuous warfare, the court’s decisions in the
Japanese internment cases, specifically Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States (1944),
and the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et. al. v. Charles Sawyer
(1952), recognized the shift from the traditional powers of the Commander in Chief to the
expanded powers of the executive. Political and legal analysis of these two cases from an
historical perspective, both dealing with executive power issues, revealed the court’s own
traditional deference to the president while also showing confusion over new methods of
warfare as well. Utilization of the concepts behind political models helps to give deeper
insights into how and why the court may have acted while lending a richer analysis to the
court’s decisions beyond just the written record. Likewise, historical analysis
contextualizes the significance behind these actions and how the court’s choices
correlated to the more predominant twilight phase during the late forties and 1950s. With
this in mind, analysis will show that the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases dealing with
issues of executive power, such as Korematsu and Youngstown, throughout the forties
and early fifties served to extend executive power under the parameters of warfare,
lending strength to the imperial presidency.
The Judicial-Executive Relationship
Historical Precedent and the Two Presidencies
In order to understand fully how these interdisciplinary ideas come together in the
liminal zone between traditional peace and traditional war one must first examine
relevant political models as they apply to judicial behavior leading up to continuous
warfare. Foremost, the president’s powers as Commander in Chief only fully come to
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fruition during a period of war, though they exist at all times. This dynamic created a
dualistic presidency that varied in power according to peace or war. Political scientist
Aaron Wildavsky posed this theory of “two presidencies” in 1966, when he claimed there
was “a powerful foreign and military affairs leader who receives extensive deference
from other politicians, and a less potent domestic leader who must persuade others to
support his policy preferences.”9 The first part of Wildavsky’s theory clearly placed the
president in his role as Commander in Chief with expanded powers due to war. Showing
itself as a political institution not simply there to uphold the law, the Supreme Court then
deferred in its decisions toward the executive during warfare, as would any other
politician.
One of the most salient historical illustrations of the court’s wartime deference to
the president, lending weight to Wildavsky’s theory, was the Civil War era Prize Cases.
The Civil War offered its own unique complexities to the question of the meaning of
warfare. President Abraham Lincoln sought to deny the Confederate States of America
the benefits of consideration as a belligerent nation under the traditional terms of war;
therefore, Lincoln denied recognition of the Confederacy and never sought a formal
declaration of war from Congress, instead proclaiming the “war” a “domestic
insurrection” instead.10
Lincoln’s method of handling the American Civil War became a problem in early
1861, however, when he proclaimed a naval blockade of southern ports. On April 19,
9
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1861, Lincoln proclaimed a blockade against all ports from South Carolina to Texas.
Lincoln extended his blockade less than two weeks later to include ports from Virginia to
North Carolina as well. The Union blocked ships carrying contraband goods such as
arms and ammunition from coming into port, while the Union also blocked ships seeking
to export confederate cotton, the main economic sustenance of the confederacy, from
leaving as well. Union warships immediately seized vessels under this pretext, as a prize
of war, and sent the ships through federal district courts setup as prize courts. The legal
confusion came with these court proceedings, where seized parties argued that the
blockade, as an act of war between two nations, was illegal as no declaration of war
existed. However, the blockade served to notify foreign nations that war was, indeed, in
progress.11 Lincoln’s war powers as Commander in Chief came under question in a set of
these seizure cases that came before the Supreme Court in 1863, known collectively as
the Prize Cases.
The Prize Cases illustrated both the political nature of the court and its tendency
to side with the executive during a state of war. Union ships seized four vessels, the Amy
Warwick, the Hiawatha, the Crenshaw, and the Brilliante, as part of Lincoln’s blockade
in 1861. Lower courts upheld all seizures, and the prize courts maintained that a “legal
war” existed despite the lack of declaration. Congress strengthened the validity of the
blockade in August 1861, when they passed the first Confiscation Act, retroactively
endorsing all of Lincoln’s acts, proclamations, and orders after March 4, 1861, including
the blockade. However, the owners of the seized property argued that a war did not exist
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in March 1861 and that the blockade was an unconstitutional act of the president. The
owners then appealed their cases to the Supreme Court of the United States.12
The political nature of the court immediately came into play for the Lincoln
Administration. Attorney General Edward Bates wanted the court to move quickly on
these cases as many similar cases waited for decisions at lower court levels and relied
upon the high court’s opinion. However, Bates also knew that the court’s stance was
politically risky in 1861, and sought to delay the proceedings until Lincoln had a chance
to appoint more like-minded, politically reliable justices. By 1863, Lincoln had replaced
three of the court’s justices and the Prize Cases came up for hearing.13 One of the
attorneys arguing for the government, Richard Dana Jr., persuasively claimed war was “a
state of things, and not an act of legislative will.”14 Dana’s argument set in place the
concept of war without declaration and solidified the executive power to control this
“state of war” without congressional consent.
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The court handed down a five to four decision in favor of the Union government
and with this decision, solidified Lincoln’s control. Associate Justice Robert Grier
opined in the majority opinion of the court:
The right of prize and capture has its origin in the "jus belli," [law of war] and is
governed and adjudged under the law of nations. To legitimate the capture of a
neutral vessel or property on the high seas, a war must exist de facto…As a civil
war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine, against insurgents, its actual
existence is a fact in our domestic history which the Court is bound to notice and
to know.15
Grier and those joining in his opinion rearticulated Dana’s argument that war could exist
without a formal declaration based on the actions surrounding the situation. On the
powers of the president as Commander in Chief, Grier noted:
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is
bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority. …Whether the President, in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-chief
in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance and a
civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must
be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted.16
The court had effectively proclaimed that the president himself was the one to decide
when a war was a “war” and what actions to take as a result. Grier claimed, "He [the
president] must determine what degree of force the crisis demands."17 The Prize Cases
decision did not, however, remove congressional war powers. Grier and the majority
fully believed and stated in their opinion that Congress held the only constitutional power
to go to war, but a civil war created a unique circumstance.
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The dissenting minority likewise focused their reasoning against the validity of
the seizure on the lack of war due to the constitutional necessity of a declaration before
an act of war, such as a blockade, could commence. According to minority author Justice
Samuel Nelson:
[B]efore this insurrection against the established Government can be dealt with on
the footing of a civil war, within the meaning of the law of nations and the
Constitution of the United States, and which will draw after it belligerent rights, it
must be recognized or declared by the war-making power of the Government. No
power short of this can change the legal status of the Government or the relations
of its citizens from that of peace to a state of war.18
Nelson argued that while the Civil War was a public or material war, it was not a legal
war with all the elements governed by the law of nations. The Prize Cases resulted in
more power going to the executive during a state of war, whether legally the altercation
was a formally declared war or not. This precept would come into play again in the steel
seizure crisis during the Korean War of the early 1950s. The Grier opinion stated that,
“The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that
a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure under
the circumstances peculiar to the case.”19 The court left the conflict between the
president and Congress’ war powers as a political question outside their jurisdiction.20
This legal conclusion implied that a state of war was not reliant upon an actual threat or
formal declaration but at the sole prerogative of the president as Commander in Chief.
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Whether Congress declared war or not, war could exist and the only person authorized to
make decisions regarding actions during war was the president.
The Prize Cases suggested a difference in presidential power during warfare akin
to the two presidencies theory, which the Roosevelt administration thoroughly utilized
during World War II in successfully arguing such issues as Japanese internment in front
of the modern court. The Truman administration would likewise fall back on this
historical precedent when it took up its right to seize the steel mills in the 1952
Youngstown case. While the Roosevelt administration clearly enjoyed the same latitude
of action as Lincoln, tied to traditional armed conflict directly involving the United
States, Truman’s steel seizure fit into the fuzzy abyss of continuous warfare centered on
the administration’s ill-defined conflict in Korea fought by UN forces. Unlike Grier’s
unblemished Civil War Era concept of war, the Vinson Court in 1952 was confused over
the meaning of war and yielded several equally disjointed opinions on Truman’s actions
within modern war.
Presidential Appointment and the Attitudinal Model
Beyond the Prize Cases decision, the circumstances surrounding the ruling also
suggested an important element in how the court decided a case—not solely based on
law, but on personal and political ideological attitudes of the justices as well. In looking
at court ideology alone, some political science scholars have argued that the best measure
of determining where a justice stood on the political spectrum was a combination of
presidential appointments and justice “ideal points” or the preferred policy positions of
the justices. Attitudinalists like Jefferey Segal and Harold Spaeth claimed that the
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Supreme Court justices relied on attitudes, or personal preferences, alone when
determining their votes. According to Segal and Spaeth:
Although the justices conventionally claim for public consumption that they do
not make public policy, that they merely interpret the law, the truth conforms to
Chief Justice (then Governor) Charles Evans Hughes’s declaration, ‘We are under
a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.’21
Foundationally, jurists’ attitudes reflected their political ideology. Critical legal theorists
agreed with attitudinal theory that law was political.22 Subsequently, presidents were
most likely to appoint justices who they believed shared their own ideological beliefs,
just as Lincoln hoped to sway the court in his favor before the Prize Cases decision.23 A
personal letter between Justice Louis Brandeis and his son-in-law Jack Gilbert in 1939
supported this concept on the modern court as well. Brandeis wrote, “Justice [Pierce]
Butler’s death will present a difficult problem for the president. A westerner, who is a
Catholic and a New Dealer will natural[ly] be his desire. Do you know any such?”24
Brandeis understood the political significance of the president’s appointment power,
something that Roosevelt had used and sought to expand during his court-packing
scheme in 1937. Just as Brandeis predicted, in 1939 Roosevelt appointed the devout
Catholic from Michigan, Frank Murphy, to the bench. Previously serving as Governor
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General then High Commissioner of the Philippines under Roosevelt and also Attorney
General, Murphy was a dedicated New Dealer as well.25
The significance of presidential appointment would certainly come into play
during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. After Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
failed, he finally managed to appoint several justices to the court. With the court
weighted in Roosevelt’s favor, eventually comprised of all Roosevelt appointees,
Roosevelt passed controversial wartime policies with little dispute from the court. While
the Roosevelt Court may have disagreed on other issues, Roosevelt’s main concern was
the economy, which included both his New Deal and US involvement in WWII, to which
his court appointees lent their support.26 Sharing much of Roosevelt’s political ideology,
Truman should have had similar success with the Vinson Court, led by Chief Justice Fred
M. Vinson, in the early 1950s, still heavily occupied with Roosevelt appointees along
with Truman’s appointments. However, what Truman experienced diverged from
attitudinal theory in that these theoretically like-minded justices did not always align with
Truman’s policy prerogatives, again illustrating the need to include an historical
examination of events in addition to political models. Partially due to the repercussions
of the post-Roosevelt fissure of the Roosevelt Court emphasized by political scientist C.
Herman Pritchett, and partially due to the concern over the fuzzy meaning of war that
played a predominant part in the Youngstown case, Truman did not win over the entire
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court. Historians, legal scholars, and political scientists often view Youngstown as
quashing executive power because the wholly Roosevelt/Truman-appointed court did not
side with the president, as attitudinal models would predict. However, the fluid definition
of warfare in general tore the court apart fundamentally, leading to a disjointed decision.
When viewed within the parameters of continuous warfare, the Youngstown decision not
only makes sense but also shows a more nuanced court supportive of wartime executive
power.
Packing the Court and Presidential Prestige
Presidential prestige was another variable that played into the success of the
president before the court.27 Political scholarship suggested that public approval, or
prestige, “reflects the country’s broader opinions on politics, policy, and good
governance.”28 As a result, political actors depended on public approval to maintain their
legitimacy (and in some cases, their position). According to political scientist Richard
Neustadt, there were both direct and indirect forms of public support. The president and
Congress largely depended upon the direct form of support, voting. However, the
Supreme Court depended on a more indirect method, maintaining public confidence and
authority—legitimacy. The court needed this legitimacy so that the other branches of
government enforced its decisions.29
In addition, some scholars have argued that maintenance of this legitimacy caused
the modern court to act strategically. Political scientists William Mishler and Reginald
27
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Sheehan claimed, “the legitimacy of the Court and its moral force may be jeopardized by
a pattern of decisions that contradict deeply held and abiding public beliefs or
concerns.”30 In the case of the Supreme Court, while the court did give the impression of
a majoritarian institution, there also appeared to be a slight lag between public beliefs and
the actions of the court due to gradual changes in the attitudes of the justices. Mischler
and Sheehan placed this lag at around five years.31 Historically, this theory was
important because it allowed the court to operate on a separate timeline from other
political players, which might affect scholars’ overall understanding of court actions as
strategy or ideologically based.
In one well-known example, when Roosevelt came into office in 1933 and began
his Hundred Days of New Deal legislation, he expected the court to follow suit because
of his popularity and because of the public opinion in favor of relief and reform
programs. Roosevelt did not take into account a possible lag between public beliefs and
the stance of the court, however, and sought instead to force a change in the court’s
opinions. Roosevelt cloaked his political objectives in rhetoric that preached workload
efficiency in the courts, hoping to gain support for his ill-fated scheme to shift the
ideological majority of the court. However, by 1937, the court may have already been
moving toward greater support of New Deal initiatives in line with public sentiment
stretching back to 1933. Though the result appeared to be the court’s strategic shift in
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line with self-preservation, it may have been a more gradual ideological change
correlating to earlier public sentiments.32
Within Roosevelt’s administration, most stood behind the president’s New Deal
objectives and considered the court a roadblock to those goals. In a 1936 document titled
“Before the Court Bill (From Beginning of October 1935 Term to Introduction of Court
Bill)” from Roosevelt’s files, the author noted:
The President has attained the most difficulty [sic] of his objectives, i.e., the
liberalization of the interpretation of the Constitution. …He has yet to obtain: (a)
insurance of the continuity of that liberalism and (b) a more perfect judicial
mechanism for giving a maximum of justice in a minimum of time.33
This document suggested that Roosevelt’s administration considered the court both slow
to hear cases and make decisions, and a perpetrator of outcomes not beneficial to
Roosevelt’s larger liberal plan for the United States. A memorandum that came into
Roosevelt’s hands through his wife Eleanor likewise alluded to the controversial support
available for a plan to alter the Supreme Court. The memo, originally between an
anonymous writer and Sidney Hillman, a labor leader, was noted to be “strictly
confidential” by Eleanor Roosevelt. The author, most likely George Spiro, was a founder
of the Leninist League, a notorious communist group.34 Spiro remarked, “Whether we
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take up legislation on labor, commerce or other social and economic subjects, the hostile
attitude of the Court remains to be met.”35
Spiro’s letter further suggested to Roosevelt that he might manipulate the court’s
jurisdiction to his favor through the Democrat-controlled Congress without having to
pack the court. Spiro contended:
The Constitution makes the Congress supreme, and not the Court, as to what
appellate jurisdiction the Court may have to try and decide cases. Congress may
give or it may take away jurisdiction to pass upon an Act of Congress, or to try
any other kind of case on appeal.36
Following Spiro’s suggestion, Roosevelt inquired to Attorney General Homer Cummings
in January of 1936 for an explanation of the McCardle case of 1869. In Ex Parte
McCardle, Congress effectively withdrew a proposed amendment to the Judicial Act of
1789 that allowed the Supreme Court to serve as an appellate court in cases of habeas
corpus (unlawful imprisonment), such as that of William McCardle, who authorities
arrested in Mississippi for violating the Reconstruction Acts. McCardle argued that the
acts were unconstitutional and sought a writ of habeas corpus. By withdrawing the
Judicial Act amendment after arguments in the McCardle case but before the court could
issue an opinion, Congress managed to alter the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
order to uphold the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts. The court dismissed the
case for want of jurisdiction.37 The timing of this memorandum suggested that Roosevelt
planned some form of control over the court already by early 1936, but knew that open
manipulation of the institution itself was a political risk. The response from the Justice
35
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Department hinted that this plan might be too detrimental to the court’s overall role,
noting that Congress might take away the “power to review certain classes of cases”
only. However, Cummings’ response to Roosevelt illustrated his willingness to help the
president do something to better control the court.38 “This whole matter has been the
subject of considerable study in the [Justice] Department, and, in view of recent
developments, is apt to be increasingly important,” Cummings wrote.39 By December
1936, Cummings wrote to Roosevelt, “Dear Mr. President: I am ‘bursting’ with ideas
about our constitutional problems; and have a plan…I would like to talk over with you
when you have the time.”40 This correspondence illustrated Roosevelt’s willingness to
openly manipulate the court as he did other parts of the government as well.
Although Roosevelt and Cummings were already plotting what would become the
Judicial Reform Bill of 1937 or Court-Packing Plan, Roosevelt continued to maintain an
outward appearance of trying to help the court. In a post-court-packing personal letter to
Judge J. Warren Davis of the Third Circuit, Roosevelt contended that the objective of his
Judicial Reform Bill was “restoring the courts and the Bar to a closer and more friendly

38

FDR to Homer Cummings, January 14, 1936; box 165, file 7; President’s Secretary’s Files;
Papers as President, RP, FDRL; Alexander Holtzoff to Homer Cummings, January 16, 1936; box 165, file
7; President’s Secretary’s Files; Papers as President, RP, FDRL; Homer Cummings to FDR, January 16,
1936; RP, FDRL. See also: James MacGregor Burns, “FDR’s Boldest Gamble,” Experience 20, no. 1
(Winter 2010): 8-19.
39

Homer Cummings to FDR, January 16, 1936; box 165, file 7; President’s Secretary’s Files;
Papers as President, RP, FDRL.
40

Homer Cummings to FDR, December 22, 1936; box 165, file 7; President’s Secretary’s Files;
Papers as President, RP, FDRL.

258
relationship with the people as a whole.”41 Roosevelt added that he firmly believed in an
“independent judiciary.”42
What the court-packing debacle illustrated was, while the court’s members did not
always march in step with public opinion, the justices understood that their own power
relied upon the court’s legitimacy as an institution, which only public support could
promulgate. Roosevelt’s court plan split his party’s strongest supporters and had public
opinion turned against him. Faced with a close split in Congress over the Reform Bill,
the court appeared to act strategically, defending itself by shifting its decisions in favor
of New Deal legislation and retaining public support for itself.43 In a letter from then
Harvard Law professor and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice
Harlan Stone in March 1937, Frankfurter commented on the court’s switch:
Finally, there is [Justice Owen] Roberts’ somersault incapable of being attributed
to a single factor relevant to the professed judicial process. …What kind of
respect for the institution can be aroused in informed and able young minds when
they come to consider in detail…the intellectual process which underlies this
minimum wage litigation?44
Stone responded to Frankfurter, noting:
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I think the Minimum Wage cases are a sad chapter in our judicial history. I might
have written a few words which would have thrown more light on the subject, but
all in all it seemed wise to let it lie in such obscurity as results from explanations
which do not explain.45
Although Frankfurter and Stone’s correspondence suggested a less than legal reason for
the court’s sudden change in ideology, the details of the switch remained obscure. Legal
historian Barry Cushman contended the shift was much more gradual, beginning as early
as 1934, when the court broke down the distinction between public and private enterprise
in Nebbia v. New York. What was clear was that the Court-Packing Plan reinforced
political theories on strategy and presidential prestige, adding a potential layer of
complexity to any historic decisions and giving the justices agency to maneuver as
political actors without legal restrictions. Whether the court had finally caught up with
public opinion by 1937 or whether the court made a strategic decision to retain its
legitimacy by supporting a popular president’s prerogatives that were equally popular
with the public remained largely undocumented.46 During continuous warfare, Truman
would test the court’s power in the politically malleable zone between traditional peace
and traditional war, yielding unique legal decisions that strategically sought to both
expand and restrict executive power based on a changing concept of war.
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Curtiss-Wright and Cue Theory
In addition to outside forces like presidential prestige and public opinion swaying
the justices, the court, as a political body with its own agency, also gives cues as to where
it might stand on certain issues. In 1963, political scientist Joseph Tanenhaus and his cowriters developed “cue theory,” which stated that such things as conflict in lower courts
and amicus briefs served as cues to the Supreme Court that a case was particularly
significant for policymaking. Along the same lines, some political scientists argued that
the Supreme Court also offered its own cues to lower courts and attorneys on what types
of cases they were willing to hear and what type of decisions they would make.47
According to political scientist Vanessa Baird, “A justice might indicate a preference or
priority change with a majority opinion, or even perhaps a concurring or dissenting
opinion.”48 As a result, the justices’ opinions and dissents gave a suggestion as to where
the court’s policy preferences laid, though certiorari votes were the primary concern of
cue theory in general. Yates extended this concept to the executive, adding that the
president gives cues to the other members of the government regarding his true policy
preferences through his State of the Union addresses. Following these ideas, the
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Supreme Court might cloak its true policy preferences or acceptability in more
overarching opinions that might require deeper textual analysis to understand fully.49
The 1936 case of the United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. set up a major
cue to all subsequent cases regarding executive power in foreign affairs. Curtiss-Wright
centered around a congressional joint resolution of May 28, 1934 that banned weapons
sales to countries involved in armed conflict in the Chaco region of South America and
the subsequent presidential proclamations that put this resolution into operation and then
revoked it. The Justice Department indicted the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation in
January 1936 on charges that it conspired to sell machine guns to Bolivia, one of the
countries involved in the war in the Chaco, in violation of the Joint Resolution. The
corporation appealed to the Supreme Court arguing, amongst other things, that the Joint
Resolution unfairly delegated power to the executive.50
In Justice George Sutherland’s majority opinion, there were a number of cues that
suggested that justices might distinguish between domestic and foreign affairs when it
came to presidential power. The nature of the Curtiss-Wright case also suggested that the
president’s powers in foreign affairs did not apply only during a war in which the United
States was directly involved. Sutherland noted, “the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
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categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs.”51 Sutherland went on to
contend:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates.52
What Sutherland’s opinion suggested was that the president had unequivocal power in
regard to foreign affairs, a power that superseded Congress’s. Sutherland’s almost
blatant opinion denoted that the president was the only one who could really know the
conditions in other countries, especially during war.
Sutherland’s cues put in place an unwritten constitutional allowance for the
president to be the final arbiter in all situations regarding foreign affairs, and served as an
undergirding factor in decisions in both Korematsu and Youngstown during a preeminent
shift in the nature of war. In Curtiss-Wright Sutherland proclaimed:
[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations—a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress but which, of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.53
The concept of the president as the sole organ in foreign affairs served to give the modern
presidency increased leniency in this realm, especially during wartime.
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The creation of the “sole organ doctrine” stood out as a cue from the court due to
their misinterpretation of the original source of the concept, John Marshall’s
congressional speech from 1800. While political science suggested these cues exist, only
an historical understanding of events reveals their importance. Marshall had originally
contended that the president was the sole organ in implementing a treaty, not in foreign
policy overall. Statements from Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in The Federalist
Papers supported this more specific concept of presidential power in foreign affairs as
well.54 Therefore, the sole organ cue from the Hughes Court in 1936 served as an
important suggestion to Roosevelt and to Congress that the court would do little to deter
presidential activities in foreign affairs. Writing to Roosevelt about the Curtiss-Wright
decision, Attorney General Stanley Reed noted, “Mr. Justice Sutherland recognizes that
even though not expressly conferred by the Constitution, there nevertheless exists in the
Executive a power to make international agreements which do not constitute treaties in
the constitutional sense.”55 Reed’s comments showed that the Executive Department
took the cue from the court.
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interests of his people.” Federalist No. 75 and 26.
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In the cases of Korematsu and Youngstown, both dealing with a domestic situation
during a time of war, Japanese-American internment on the West Coast during WWII and
government seizure of American steel mills during the Korean War respectively, the
court turned back to this sole organ designation. What the court sought to determine was
if the situation was truly a part of war and therefore foreign affairs, or a domestic squall.
Both situations occurred on the home front, but under the purview of an US-involved war
abroad, and both held ties (imprisonment of a potential enemy and a continuance of war
goods production) to the larger armed conflict at hand. Cues offered in the Korematsu
and Youngstown opinions illustrated the modern complexity of continuous warfare versus
traditional armed conflict when it came to presidential power.
The WWII Rally Effect
The liminal zone between traditional peace and traditional war following World
War II further emphasized a shift in how the court rallied around the president during
traditional war. Political scientists have hypothesized that there was a “rally effect” when
an international situation occurred, giving the president greater support.56 This support
appeared not only through a boost in presidential approval ratings from the public, but
also in the interaction between the branches of federal government, including the
president and the Supreme Court.
The court recognized the ultimate extension of the president’s Commander in
Chief powers in the 1942 case Ex Parte Quirin. In this case, eight German soldiersaboteurs landed on American shores near Long Island, New York and Ponte Vedra
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Beach, Florida, in order to commit acts of sabotage against the United States as part of
Operation Pastorius during World War II. Federal authorities quickly captured the
Germans, two of whom were naturalized citizens of the United States. President
Roosevelt ordered a military commission to try the Germans, who had arrived via
submarine, wearing German military uniforms, and carrying explosives. Roosevelt’s
actions denied the Germans a regular jury trial, and under the military commission, the
military officers found the Germans guilty and sentenced them to death.57
After the Germans exhausted their lower court appeals based on a writ of habeas
corpus, the court rallied around the president for the Quirin case, calling a special session
to make a decision on the case and ultimately side with Roosevelt. In order to show its
support for Roosevelt and by connection the war effort, the court called a special summer
session on July 29, 1942. This corresponded with Roosevelt’s presidential approval
rating, which fluctuated from an impressive eighty-four to seventy-nine percent from
January through July of 1942, denoting strong public support. Additionally, following
the Quirin hearing, the court as a whole issued its ruling (per curium) as opposed to a
traditional single-authored opinion, to dispose of the case. The court concluded that
because the Germans had arrived as spies and removed their uniforms to commit
sabotage, they had violated the law of war and should be categorized as unlawful enemy
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combatants. Since Congress had authorized trial by military commission for unlawful
enemy combatants, the president was not beyond his power in ordering the same for the
saboteurs. In the end, six of the Germans were executed, while the other two served
prison sentences. As illustrated, the court thoroughly rallied around Roosevelt during this
wartime case.58
Justice Felix Frankfurter’s words posed evidence of this rally effect most
succinctly. Frankfurter expressed his opinion over the full decision the court would
release that autumn in a memorandum sent to the rest of the justices. Faced with
arguments over language in the opinion, Frankfurter proclaimed, “’Just relax and don’t be
too engrossed in your own interest in verbalistic conflicts because the inroads on energy
and national unity that such conflict inevitably produce, is a pastime we had better
postpone until peacetime.’”59 Frankfurter’s argument thoroughly supported the rally
effect of the court over the Quirin case.
During the Korematsu and Youngstown cases, the resulting individual rally effect
and subsequent lack thereof illustrated the court’s changing concept of war. Just as in
Quirin, the WWII-era court rallied around Roosevelt’s Japanese internment policy,
despite reservations, in the case of Korematsu because of the traditional nature of the war.
In Youngstown, the decided lack of traditional war and court confusion over the yet
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undefined state of continuous warfare led to an absence of the rally effect. However, the
court’s complicated decision in Youngstown still reinforced wartime executive power.
Personal Relationships and the Problem of Judicial Papers
On top of political and strategic interests, the court, as a collegial body, exhibited
a strong influence over politics through personal relationships both inside and beyond the
court. An examination of the papers of the jurists yields the best look at personal
political connections. However, the use of judicial papers also includes several unique
problems. According to political scientist S. Sidney Ulmer, “Political scientists and
others have frequently suggested that the great basis of Supreme Court power is the
judicial myth of legal certainty, the impartial and nondiscretionary application of correct
legal maxims.”60 Ulmer believed that in order to maintain this myth, many justices
altered their personal court papers to convolute the inner-workings of the court or their
personal reputations. Ulmer noted that justices might purposely tilt their papers with an
“eye to history,” destroy or edit papers to project a certain image, or require stringent
permissions to access papers, so as to restrict usage by researchers.61 “If the Court is to
be successful as a political actor, it must have public acceptance. Thus…the Court
should certainly not disavow publicly the myth upon which its power rests,” argued
Ulmer.62 By editing or destroying papers that allude to some extra-legal discussion
within the court, the myth of constitutionality and legal precedence remain.
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A closer look at justices’ papers revealed an awareness of exactly what Ulmer
preached. In one 1937 letter from Frankfurter to Stone, Frankfurter wrote, “I wonder
how long such confidence—and upon it the future of the institution [the court] ultimately
rests—can survive observation of the doings and contrivings [sic], particularly of the
Chief, during the last few years.”63 Here, Frankfurter was referencing the court’s switch
after Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan. Referring to the court as “spiritual vestal virgins
of our political scheme,” Frankfurter believed the court should remain an independent
legal institution only.64 Though some political scientists believe the personal papers of
the justices are too problematic to use, historians cannot ignore these documents, and
when used carefully in conjunction with public sentiments, political and legal theory,
these papers can reveal valuable insights into personal political relationships, often
ignored or taken too skeptically by political models.
The most significant of personal political relationships was the relationship
between the president and the individual members of the court, which held both political
salience and the possibility for undue influence over court decisions. “On close
examination, the whole notion of a judiciary totally secluded from politics appears to be
more myth than history,” noted political scientist Bruce Allen Murphy.65 Legal realism
has focused on the intertwined nature of the law and politics since the early twentieth
century, yet the Supreme Court has continually sought to maintain a certain public aura
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of impenetrability from politics.66 During the early Roosevelt administration, Justice
Hugo Black considered this judicial-political relationship when he needed to call on
Roosevelt personally. Black, concerned that his future opinion might appear to reflect
Roosevelt’s influence, sought a back channel of communication with the president.
Clifton Durr, Black’s brother-in-law, passed along a message from Black to Thomas G.
Corcoran of the Reconstruction Finance Committee, who would pass it on to Roosevelt.
According to Durr, Black “has been hesitating about doing so [meeting with Roosevelt]
because of publicity but thinks the storm has quieted sufficiently for it to be o.k.”67
Additionally, Black “wants the President to know, however, that he is now writing an
opinion which the press may charge was influenced by the President if he calls before the
opinion is delivered,” noted Durr.68 In this situation, Black was cognizant that his
personal relationship with Roosevelt might alter the appearance of a truly independent
judiciary and sought methods to avoid this problem. Likewise, Benjamin Cardozo wrote
to Roosevelt in January 1938 and noted, “During the ‘amenities’ of 1937, I thought
perhaps that it was best not to ask you to come and have tea or dinner with me—because,
as you know, the White House is a glass house—and the American press is not accurate
on all occasions!”69 Cardozo’s letter illustrated the significance of these personal
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relationships because he discussed wanting to see Roosevelt even during the raging battle
over the Court-Packing Plan. What was apparent in both of these instances, however,
was the awareness of appearance and the maintenance of the idea of an independent
judiciary.
Not all justices maintained close relationships through distance, however.
Correspondence between Justice William O. Douglas and Roosevelt during 1940
concerned planning a salmon fishing derby, which would include the justices on the court
and the men in Roosevelt’s Cabinet. Roosevelt countered Douglas’ fishing plans with a
proposal for a “poker derby” instead. The convivial Roosevelt even exchanged
sentiments on the “ball game” that was the Court-Packing Plan with Douglas in 1939,
utilizing several baseball analogies. The same closeness was also apparent during the
Truman Administration. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson received several books as
Christmas gifts from Truman, such as Mr. President. In an exchange in 1950, Vinson
even referred to Truman’s daughter Margaret as his “’foster’ daughter,” illustrating the
close bond between the two. When writing to the president, Justice Harold Burton began
with “Dear Harry” as opposed to the more usual “Mr. President.”70 While not the only
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factor in decision-making, these justices’ personal relationships with the president may
have caused them to side more easily in favor of executive power during cases such as
Youngstown, where the overall opinion of the court was fissured.
Beyond the president, the court also cultivated relationships with legislators that
may have helped to sway or define their opinions on cases. In a letter to his daughter
Susan in November 1934, Justice Louis Brandeis noted that he dined and “talked
campaign” with Senator Burton Wheeler and his wife and Senator Edward Costigan.
This letter illustrated the political mindedness of the justices and helped to modify the
traditional historical concept of an independent judiciary further emphasizing a modern
political court with political objectives. In a letter to his son-in-law Jack Gilbert in 1939,
Brandeis also noted that he read the Congressional Record from time to time. However,
Brandeis denied having read it recently or with the amount of frequency that an
“admirer” purported to his son-in-law.71 Brandeis’ qualification of his act suggested that
while there was a stigma about judicial knowledge of or involvement in politics, judges
often partook in an active search for political information and activities.
Just as Justice Clark was long-time friends with President Truman, he was also an
associate of Representative Sam Rayburn, another acquaintance of Truman’s. In a letter
written by Rayburn to Clark, he referred to Clark as an “old friend” throughout the
persuasiveness of friendship. Just a few weeks after the Supreme Court agreed to take up Cheney’s appeal
in a case involving his handling of the George W. Bush Administration’s energy task force, Scalia and
Cheney hunted together, causing media speculation over Scalia’s impartiality on the case. Dan Collins,
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correspondence, suggesting a long relationship. A letter to Truman after the end of his
presidency in 1953 by Vinson, mentioned that Vinson, his wife, and Rayburn had all
gone together to see Truman off on the train, signifying they were all friends. 72 This
interconnectedness between the individual justices, the president, and legislators
illustrated the complex nature of judicial politics and legal opinions. While the
persuasive nature of these relationships on the justices’ opinions was not clear, it was
evident that political relationships outside of the court might have come into the jurists’
thought process, lending credibility to the concept of the court as a political body and a
part of traditional politicking.
Finally, friendly relationships between the justices on the court suggested that the
court was a collegial body instead of nine independent justices. The justices’ ability to
work together suggested that their opinions were malleable and not solely based in law or
societal structures, just as critical legal studies theorists asserted. In the case of the
Vinson Court, which would oversee the decision in Youngstown in 1952, the jurists were
extremely friendly with one another. Associate Justice Harold K. Burton loved to travel
and frequently sent Chief Justice Vinson postcards from his trips that noted he should
pass along his greetings to the rest of the brethren on the court. Likewise, Justice Black
held a “steak party” at his home and invited the entire court and their spouses. Justice
Clark frequently sent gifts to other members of the court as well, such as sherry for
Black, Kentucky bourbon for Stanley Reed, and honey for John M. Harlan. When Harlan
was in the hospital, Clark thought to send him a book, Vigilante Justice, as a gift too.
Vinson’s grandchildren, who frequently received letters from members of the court, knew
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Clark as “Uncle Justice.”73 Concerning court duty, Vinson sent a memo to all the justices
noting that certain cases would also be included in the conference discussion simply
because some justices wanted to discuss them.74 No discussion would be necessary if the
justices decided cases independently on facts of law. The collegiality of the court and the
speculative personal relationships justices held with other politicians may have further
complicated later decisions such as those held in Korematsu and Youngstown, illustrating
the court’s own agency and showing that judicial decisions were composed of complex
legal, political, and historical circumstances that go beyond traditional studies of the
Supreme Court. While difficult to prove, friendship may hold some significance in how
an individual decides a case; therefore, historians must not completely disqualify this
element.75
These political science concepts are important because they add another layer
toward understanding the Supreme Court as a complex institution. While originally
formulated in order to figure out how the court, largely a mystery, worked and better
understand future decisions and jurists’ choices, these ideas are equally as important
when looking at historical circumstances surrounding the court. While historical
investigation allows one to analyze the individual justices and legal scrutiny the
individual case outcomes and future implications of decisions, political science allows a
73
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more complete picture of the court as an institution consisting of individuals making
important decisions. Together, history, law, and theories based on these political models
reveal a complexity to the court and its past decisions that individual research methods do
not allow on their own. In the case of Youngstown, historical examination of these
hypotheses shows that the case was not a blow to executive power, as widely believed,
but a reaffirmation of the inherent powers of the president as Commander in Chief during
times of war.
Executive Power Case Studies
Korematsu v. United States
It was in the landmark decision in Korematsu v. United States that the highest
court in the land, guardians of the United States Constitution, fell prey to the actions of an
irresponsible federal government, and Orientalism-tainted public opinion including
World War II era anti-Japanese sentiments. Though unfortunate, Korematsu provided a
typical reaction by the court to presidential power during traditional wartime on issues
framed as foreign affairs. The context of the case was the internment of Japanese and
Japanese Americans on the United States West Coast during the period from 1942
through 1945, at which time the government evacuated nearly 110,000 persons of
Japanese ancestry from their homes and detained them in rudimentary prison camps.76
President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 authorized this evacuation. In E.O.
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9066, FDR stated, “I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military
Commanders whom he may from time to time designate . . . to prescribe military areas in
such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may
determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded.”77 One of the Japanese
American citizens affected by this order was Fred Korematsu of Almeida County,
California.
A second generation Japanese American or Nisei, Korematsu saw himself as more
American than Japanese, but military officials found generational differences
insignificant and targeted Korematsu for his Japanese heritage instead. On March 2,
1942, the military took control of Almeida County, where the Korematsus lived. Military
commanders then told all persons of Japanese ancestry to evacuate immediately and
relocate to government-run camps. Korematsu opted not to leave with his family, instead
staying behind and changing his name and facial features in an attempt to trick
authorities. The ploy did not work; Korematsu was “discovered” on the streets of San
Leandro, California, possibly by a local pharmacist who recognized him and knew his
real heritage. On May 30, 1942, police arrested Korematsu and the local media depicted
him as a “Jap Spy.” Shortly thereafter, American Civil Liberties Union director Ernest
Besig approached Korematsu, wanting to use his situation as a test case for the legality of
the evacuation and relocation orders. While Korematsu was being relocated to
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California’s Tanforan Assembly Center and later, the Topaz Camp in Utah where the rest
of his family was located, his case made its way to the United States Supreme Court.78
In late 1944, the Supreme Court granted certiorari; they would hear the case. On
December 18, 1944, the court issued its opinion on the constitutionality of Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34, which worked to exclude West Coast military areas of all
persons of Japanese ancestry, including Fred Korematsu.79 According to Justice Hugo
Black, who delivered the opinion, the Supreme Court held that while “it should be noted .
. . that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect . . . pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of
such restrictions.” 80 Black also noted that these racial restrictions were subject to “rigid
scrutiny.”81 Despite the questionable constitutionality of racial exclusion, the court
upheld the exclusion order and Korematsu’s violation of it under the pretense of wartime
security and the court’s inability to restrict military actions in defense of the country. The
court contended that it simply could not reject the findings of military authorities that
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internment of all Japanese and Japanese-Americans on the West Coast was necessary for
the safety of the country. The court backed the decision with the idea that there was not
enough time, according to military authorities, to determine which Japanese-Americans
were loyal or not.82 While the internment camps shut down shortly after the Korematsu
decision, their place as an unfortunate part of American history remained secure.
However, a more careful analysis of the Korematsu decision and the justices behind it,
utilizing political science concepts, reveals the complex interplay of judicial politics that
supported Roosevelt’s power as Commander in Chief during World War II.
In the case of Japanese internment, Roosevelt framed a domestic issue with
wartime necessity. In a 1998 article, political scientists Aaron Wildavsky posed, “From
1938, when conservatives regrouped their forces, to the time of his death, Franklin
Roosevelt did not get a single piece of significant domestic legislation passed.”83
However, Roosevelt was extremely successful in wartime legislation, including early
attempts such as the cash and carry policy. As a result, it made sense that Roosevelt
would want internment examined as a wartime measure. The court could have viewed
Korematsu as a logical extension of the president’s power via Curtiss-Wright. The
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) 1982 Report
indicated that internment was simply the final stage in a long struggle against the
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Japanese people on the West Coast. CWRIC noted, “Resentment of effective economic
competition also inflamed public feeling and, combined with differences of language and
culture, left the small minority of Japanese-Americans on the West Coast comparatively
isolated—a ready target at a time of fear and anxiety.”84 Those who found the Japanese
culture strange and West Coast farmers who rallied against Japanese land ownership
rights in fear of economic competition sought passage of laws such as the Alien Land
Law of 1913 to limit Japanese rights, long before World War II.85 The controversial
nature of the Korematsu case and the subsequent endorsement by the court indicated that
Wildavsky’s two presidencies theory held strong during a period of traditional armed
conflict. The success of Roosevelt’s internment policy at the court indicated the strong
influence of a wartime president, not the weakness of a domestic presidential concern.
In the early years of American involvement in World War II, the public sought
removal of those of Japanese ancestry due to largely racialized questions of loyalty or
economic interests. According to one article from the Christian Science Monitor, public
opinion polls in California indicated, “traditional American tolerance and rights of
citizenship should not stand in the way of the most complete possible assurance against
‘fifth column’ attacks in an emergency.”86 Representative Homer D. Angell of Oregon
(R) agreed. Angell claimed, “It is a well-known fact that many of the Japanese, even
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though born in America, believe in dual citizenship and owe allegiance and loyalty to the
Emperor of Japan.”87 Another article in the New York Times cited San Francisco Board
of Supervisors President Dan Gallagher, who claimed, “’the Mayor ought to put an
embargo on truck garden produce brought in here by the Japanese. Everything can be
taken care of here by our own truck gardeners.’”88 Likewise, the Los Angeles Times
urged internment of all Japanese and Japanese-Americans while subsequently
emphasizing the economic significance of the Japanese and Japanese-American
population in Los Angeles County. The Los Angeles Times noted that the Japanese
owned and operated more than 25,000 out of 40,000 acres of vegetable acreage in county.
These examples indicated that while there was a perceived threat due to the large West
Coast population of Japanese and Japanese-Americans, this threat was more economic
than military. The Japanese population along the West Coast posed a domestic problem
for California legislators, but by framing the issue with the war, Roosevelt’s subsequent
policies gained success on a national level. Despite conflicting reports by General
DeWitt, government intelligence ultimately indicated a lack of any fifth column activity
by the Japanese population in the United States, but as a wartime presidential policy,
internment remained positive in the eyes of the public, Congress, and the court.89
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Despite Roosevelt’s elevated power as Commander in Chief, by 1944 he also had
the benefit of having appointed every member then sitting on the court except Owen
Roberts. The Roosevelt Court was much more likely to side with Rooseveltian policies
according to the attitudinal model of judicial behavior. This was especially true under the
pretense of what Roosevelt viewed as important policy, the economic aspects of the New
Deal and wartime policies that were often economic in nature as well. The only true
conservative on the court in 1944 who took part in the Korematsu decision was Justice
Roberts (see table 4.1).90 Confirming this analysis, Roberts voted against Roosevelt and
the government in the case of Korematsu, writing his own dissent. However, Justices
Frank Murphy and Robert Jackson also dissented and wrote separate opinions.91
While dissenting opinions generated by Roosevelt appointees, including Murphy
who fell into the clear Roosevelt-favoring majority of the court, indicated a fault with the
attitudinal model in the Korematsu case, a closer examination of these opinions indicated
a more nuanced discrepancy. Justice Roberts noted:
I dissent, because I think the indisputable facts exhibit a clear violation of
Constitutional rights…it is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not
submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and
solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty
and good disposition towards the United States. …Constitutional rights have been
violated.92
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Roberts indicated his clear disdain for the actions of the Roosevelt administration in his
dissent, adding, “an Assembly Center was a euphemism for a prison.”93 However, while
Murphy and Jackson disagreed with the majority opinion due to the racial motivations
evident behind internment, they did not go against the right of the president as
Commander in Chief to do such a thing if truly necessary. Critical race theory suggested
a larger anti-Japanese mindset was at play in the decision and reflected in the dissents, yet
the larger issue of wartime executive power remained the focus.94 Murphy claimed, “In
dealing with matters relating to the prosecution and progress of a war, we must accord
great respect and consideration.”95 Murphy also added that military authorities must have
wide discretion, but he noted that a judicial test of whether or not the Government could
plead military necessity failed in the case of Korematsu. In Murphy’s opinion, an
individual’s constitutional rights could be deprived if the public danger was “’immediate,
imminent, and impending,’” which would then supersede the regular constitutional
process.96 In the case of Fred Korematsu, however, Murphy noted that Japanese
internment did not correspond directly with a realistic threat along the coast in 1942, and
must therefore be racially motivated.97
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Justice Jackson was the only justice thoroughly concerned with racial motivations
behind Japanese internment and the court’s decision. Justice Jackson contended:
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency. …But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to
show that it conforms to the Constitution…the Court for all time has validated the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
American citizens.98
In a temporary situation, Jackson agreed with Murphy, rights might be abridged, such as
in the earlier case of Hirabayashi v. United States in which the court upheld curfew
restrictions that were part of the Japanese relocation program. Jackson saw Korematsu as
a dangerous precedent, however, a “loaded weapon” that could allow any authority to
disregard the Constitution under the pretense of urgent need.99 In the subsequent case of
Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo the court held that loyal citizens of the United States, no matter
what ethnicity, could not be held without cause, further defining the dissent in
Korematsu. According to Jackson’s notes from the justices conference, Black voted to
affirm the Korematsu decision because “If we hold Endo to be freed [it] would go [a]
long way to hold this [the Korematsu decision] furnished the same.”100 Jackson’s notes
indicated that it was significant that these two opinions came out together. The court
handed down the unanimous Endo decision the same day as Korematsu.101 Despite the
apparent fissure of the court in the case of Korematsu, the attitudinal model, with the
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expectation that all justices would favor Roosevelt, proved true under closer examination
of the justices’ dissents, showing that political models may give valuable insight into how
the court functions during times of traditional warfare, deferring to the executive.
In conjunction with the ideological standing of the court, Roosevelt remained
highly popular throughout the years of Japanese internment, further pressuring the court
to comply. Internment lasted between February 19, 1942 and January 2, 1945, during
which time Roosevelt’s approval rating ranged between seventy-nine and sixty-six
percent. In December of 1944, just before the court handed down the Korematsu
decision, Roosevelt’s approval rating was a strong seventy-two percent. 102 A published
protest letter to Roosevelt, signed by several California residents in 1943, claimed similar
feelings. “[W]e feel that this Japanese question should be given a great deal more serious
thought before the Japanese are freed from internment, allowed back into civilian life
where we know they will make civil existence and efficiency more difficult,” noted the
signees.103 With internment nearing an end, the court still supported the president’s
policy. Public approval, indicated through the Gallup polls on presidential approval
during this time, likewise suggested to the court that they not stray too far from
Roosevelt’s policies, including internment.
Similarly, members of the press indicated their support of internment as well,
signaling the court to follow suit.104 In one 1943 Los Angeles Times article, the author
102
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noted, “As a race, the Japanese have made for themselves a record for conscienceless
treachery unsurpassed in history. Whatever small theoretical advantages there might be
in releasing those under restraint in this country would be enormously outweighed by the
risks involved.”105 Even after internment was to end, the Washington Post reported in
December of 1944, “There will be some noisy protests against their [the Japanese] return,
even though they are to be carefully ‘screened’ for any disloyal tendencies.”106 By
upholding internment, but recognizing the racial discrimination of it, the court’s decision
retained support from the press who also favored Roosevelt’s policies.
The Korematsu decision itself relied upon earlier case cues in regard to executive
power, but dissenting opinions also warned against applying the decision to future
instances of racial discrimination. Likewise, the majority opinion held some reluctance
to uphold the war power of the president due to its association with internment. Though
Korematsu did not directly cite the Curtiss-Wright decision, the majority opinion, by
upholding Roosevelt’s executive order, firmly held that the president as Commander in
Chief and his military delegates had ultimate authority over foreign policy. The court did
not, however, deny that Congress had the war power as well, retaining a traditional
outlook on war. Black alleged in the majority opinion:
The 1942 Act was attacked in the Hirabayashi case as an unconstitutional
delegation of power; it was contended that the curfew order and other orders on
which it rested were beyond the war powers of Congress, the military authorities,
and of the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army… In the light of the
principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that
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it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.107
Additionally, a draft concurring opinion written by Justice Wiley Rutledge, who
eventually joined the majority, did note the applicability of Curtiss-Wright. The
Korematsu majority opinion relied heavily upon earlier cases involving Japanese
internment, including Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States on curfew violation, and Ex
Parte Misuye Endo dealing with illegal imprisonment of an American citizen. The Endo
opinion, delivered by Justice William O. Douglas, noted, “Broad powers frequently
granted to the President or other executive officers by Congress so that they may deal
with the exigencies of war time problems have been sustained” and cited CurtissWright.108 Endo, delivered the same day as Korematsu, served as a death knell to
internment, yet it reaffirmed the sole organ doctrine present explicitly or implicitly
through cues in the wording of the majority opinions. 109
Though each of these internment cases supported executive power over foreign
policy, they were also careful to acknowledge the traditional war-making role of
Congress and warn against open racial discrimination. The court’s fissure of opinions
over Korematsu in combination with the Endo decision cued the government that while
the court supported broad executive power during war, it would be hard-pressed to
support open racial discrimination in future cases. The precedent was set for expansion
of presidential power during wartime and foreign affairs, however.
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In the end, Korematsu served as a typical case of the court’s wartime subservience
to the executive. Though faced with the irredeemable policy of racial discrimination, the
court rallied around Roosevelt because it was a time of war. In the intensified wartime
atmosphere of the country, the court upheld Korematsu on the premise (no matter how
unfounded) of national safety and security, despite the justices’ obvious disdain for the
racial policies implicitly endorsed by their decision. By bowing to the executive in this
instance, the court demonstrated just how willingly it would bend to the Commander in
Chief’s desires.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer
Unlike Korematsu, with its deceptive undertones of racism, which might have
offered a challenge to the court’s willingness to defer to the executive under the precept
of strict scrutiny, Youngstown fell into a previously established presidential seizure of
power that could have been an easy decision for the court based on the historical
precedent of Roosevelt’s seizure of coal and other industries during World War II.
However, the period of continuous warfare that the court operated in during the 1950s
was drastically different from the traditional war in 1943. In Youngstown the fuzzy state
of continuous warfare served to confuse the court, leading to a disjointed opinion
concerning executive power. Though legal scholars have often pointed to Youngstown as
a case quashing presidential power, closer analysis reveals the court’s more nuanced
position that reinforced traditional subservience to the Commander in Chief during
war.110
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Due to the conflict in Korea, Truman decided to test his capabilities as the
Commander in Chief. In the spring of 1952, the United States steel industry was at a
bargaining standstill, trapped between labor’s desire for higher wages and management’s
outrage over government price caps on their product. The Korean situation caused Cold
War tensions to escalate rapidly, Truman knew that a strike in the steel industry would
devastate American armament for the war and send shockwaves through the domestic
economy. According to Truman’s memoirs, “Under our system the responsibility rests
on one man—the President.”111 Truman felt that it was his duty, as president, to protect
the nation and, as Commander in Chief, to protect the nation’s war making ability and
potential for success. Under these auspices Truman decided to issue Executive Order
10340 on April 8, 1952, which allowed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize
most of the nation’s steel mills and put them under government control, eliminating any
potential for a labor strike (due to a halt in negotiations between workers and
management) and allowing the production of steel to continue.112
Truman firmly believed that government seizure of an industry was within his
powers. “Our government is fixed on the basis that the President is the only person in the
executive branch who has the final authority. Everyone else in the executive branch is an
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agent of the President,” Truman noted in his memoirs.113 In a situation that seemed to
suggest there were no other alternatives, Truman used his “final authority” to direct
Sawyer, as an agent of the president, to seize the mills. Concurrently, the Executive
Order claimed that the president’s action was necessary to avoid a national catastrophe,
since a work stoppage would immediately imperil the national defense at a time when
American armed forces were fighting in Korea.114 It was evident that Truman saw Korea
as a conflict akin to war and expected the benefits of increased executive power as a
result.
However, Truman’s own maneuvering within the liminal zone of continuous
warfare created further confusion over the definition of the Korean conflict that would
later hinder legal efforts to claim all the full rights of presidential war power. At the
beginning of June 1950, Truman publically claimed the United States was closer to peace
than any time since WWII, while less than a month later the fighting erupted in Korea.
Truman blurred the line between peace and war by referring to Korea as a “police action”
and telling the press the US was “not at war.”115 To just what effect Truman saw the
steel situation as an actual threat to the nation was undocumented as he refused to discuss
Korea in black and white terms, but the perception of threat would serve as an important
part of his legal defense.
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Immediately after Truman issued E.O. 10340, Sawyer notified the steel mills. In
a telegram sent from Sawyer to the steel mills coming under government control, he
appointed the current presidents “operating managers” of their respective companies for
the United States. In the initial stages of the seizure, the companies remained in
operation as they previously had been except for the flying of the American flag and the
keeping of a separate set of books for the period of seizure. The Associated Press
reported that the Truman administration still wanted unions and industry to agree to new
terms, but the talk of strike lingered. As the seizure operation continued, Sawyer warned
the steel industry that he would begin considering what action to take regarding “terms
and conditions of employment.” At this point, the owners in the steel industry came to
see government seizure as a ruthless plan to force labor’s wage demands on management,
despite the harm it would cause the industry.116
The public reacted negatively to Truman’s seizure, failing to see the emergency
on which he based his actions. In a political cartoon from 1952, the press adversely
depicted Truman as a king, draped in traditional finery, ruling over the steel industry (see
fig. 4.1). This cartoon showed the public’s reaction to Truman’s steel seizure as
tyrannical rather than an accepted wartime power. Though historians often portray
Truman as a weak president, this cartoon stylized Truman as an all-powerful despot.
Another equally dramatic depiction showed presidential seizure as a hand breaking
through the Constitution to snatch up “private property” (see fig. 4.2). In this situation,
the private property illustrated appeared as a factory almost overshadowed by the giant
gloved hand of the president. Again, the implication that Truman’s seizure was
116
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unconstitutional stood out plainly. The press subsequently reported that Sawyer was
planning a wage increase near management’s previous best offer, and that the
government was planning to accept the highest offer tendered, a considerable twelve and
a half cents more per hour plus five cents more in fringe benefits. Industry panicked, and
a later memo on the behalf of respondents filed with the steel companies writ of certiorari
to the U.S. Supreme Court, cited a firm belief that Sawyer would have granted the union
whatever wages and concessions it wanted if the government was in control.117
However, Truman continued to press his message of urgency and national defense
as a viable reason for government seizure of the steel industry. In a December 1951
letter, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization Charles E. Wilson wrote to
Truman, “If threatened stoppage in the steel industry should take place, it would have an
immediate and very serious impact on our entire defense production program as well as
on our total civilian economy.”118 Truman responded, “I think we are about to get on top
of the steel strike and I am sure your report will fill the bill,” assuring Wilson that the two
of them were on the same page regarding the significance of the steel strike.119
Utilizing the fuzzy language of the previous seven years of continuous warfare,
Truman contended that the nation was in an emergency situation and that peace and war
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were no longer differing concepts but patently synonymous in the atomic age. In a radio
and television address, Truman reiterated steel’s importance for both defense and peace.
“Steel is our key industry. It is vital to the defense effort. It is vital to peace,” Truman
stated.120 The president’s portrayal of the Korean War as a national emergency at home,
while downplaying the situation abroad as a police action, continued to blur the meaning
of modern warfare.121
While the Korean conflict was at the forefront of Truman’s address, the atomic
energy program, the economy, the Chinese communists, the Iron Curtain, and prevention
of another world war also became part of the discussion of the necessity for government
seizure of the steel mills, depicting the plasticity of continuous warfare.122 Truman
claimed, “With American troops facing the enemy on the field of battle, I would not be
living up to my oath of office if I failed to do whatever is required to provide them with
the weapons and ammunitions they need for their survival.”123 He continued, “These are
not normal times. These are times of crisis. . . The situation can change over night
[sic].”124 A memorandum from the Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA) to White
House staffer Harold Enarson on the role of government in dealing with labor disputes,
likewise reiterated the confusing period of continuous warfare. “Our present situation of
120
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partial mobilization is one of indefinite and probably rather long duration. Conceivably,
it may phase into a total war,” the ESA claimed.125 Whether Truman understood the
situation to be a true emergency, he certainly wanted the American public, press, and
steel industry to perceive it as an emergency.
Unfortunately for Truman, leaders within the steel industry were growing more
suspicious of the government’s motives, and Congress, still manipulating the Korean
situation for their own political use, seemed unwilling to support the president’s actions
at home. According to Truman’s memoirs, he had sent a message to Congress the day
after he seized the steel mills. “I asked Congress to provide specific legislation for terms
and conditions for the government operation of the mills,” Truman noted.126 Truman also
claimed that he would have been happy to follow any policy Congress wanted, even if it
canceled the seizure. However, some confusion arose regarding the guidelines for
dealing with labor disputes set forth in the Taft-Hartley Act, which Truman seemingly
disregarded.127 On television, Truman had cited the Taft-Hartley procedures as too slow
and incapable of preventing a shutdown. Seeing it as being well within his powers,
Truman seized the mills and waited for Congress to make the next move. Truman
ultimately claimed that he did not want to seize the steel mills, but it was the best
alternative until congressional action and would still provide ample opportunity for
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bargaining between labor and management. Twelve days after the seizure took place,
however, Truman sent another message to Congress, which refused to act.128
At this point, it became apparent that there was some disconnect between
Truman’s actions and his powers as president, thus creating a constitutional crisis. It was
Congress’s job to take private property for public use, but they seemed to do nothing in
the case of steel seizure, so Truman took it upon himself. The power to do so stemmed,
not from statutory law, such as the Selective Service Act of 1948 or the Defense
Production Act of 1950, both of which might have allowed the president to take property
under certain conditions, but from Truman’s assumption of inherent powers in the
Constitution.129 It was this aspect of assumed power that Congress staunchly
disapproved of, especially when there were already mechanisms in place to deal with the
situation. As a result, the Senate attempted to place an amendment on an appropriations
bill, which would effectively cancel the seizure by wrangling in the money needed to run
the mills.130 The amendment seemed unlikely to pass both houses and Truman would
have vetoed it after passage anyway. In the absence of congressional action, Truman
utilized the powers he believed he had as Commander in Chief to protect the nation
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during a time of crisis, giving the Supreme Court reason enough to explore the
parameters of executive power further.131
The owners of the steel companies did not see the crisis that Truman proposed.
Instead, they saw their profits regulated by the government in an underhanded attempt to
convince the nation that the country was in peril and that management was being unfair
in the bargaining process that kept the mills running. Labor unions were unwilling to
sacrifice for the defense effort once the situation in Korea seemed to stabilize, and faced
with shutdown or government operation, workers may have preferred the benefits under
the latter when it came to the steel crisis.132 Newspaper articles focused on issues like
U.S. economic stability and how the mobilization process cloaked this larger problem. In
one article from the Chicago Daily Tribune, the author noted, “Mr. Truman’s seizure, or
attempted seizure, of the steel mills, changes the crisis in that industry from an economic
one to a political one.”133 The Korean War became a problem as the government placed
price controls on industry and post-World War II inflation kicked in, causing laborers to
demand higher wages. The steel industry knew that higher wages would mean lower
profits, despite higher sales because of the war. This became even more apparent as the
government seizure led labor unions to believe their bargaining rights were no longer
with steel management but with the government.
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It was for these economic reasons that the steel companies took their cause to
court. In the affidavit of Walter E. Watson, vice president of Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company and president of Youngstown Metal Products Company, he stated that the
seizure was a coercive effort to get the steel companies to accept the recommendations of
the Wage Stabilization Board, the government body in charge of handling labor disputes.
It was the economic ramifications of seizure that gave the Supreme Court a measure for
damages necessary for it to hear the steel seizure case when the time came.134
As the United States flag rose above steel mills across the country, industry
leaders were already waging their own war, a legal war, against the president’s actions.
The case came to the courts as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Charles Sawyer
and questioned the legal authority of the president to seize the nation’s steel mills.
Although there were other issues at hand in the case, including financial damage to the
steel industry and unfair bargaining practices, one of the most crucial issues centered
around whether the seizure order was within the constitutional powers of the
presidency.135 It was from this standpoint that the court illustrated the ambiguous nature
of continuous warfare and its legal impact on executive power issues.
Youngstown served as a remarkable case study regarding executive power because
it took place during the initial period of continuous warfare when the definition of war
blurred, it offered a look at constitutional principles, and the Supreme Court’s many
opinions in the case offered an opportunity for plentiful analysis. Legal scholars have
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sometimes speculated as to the consequences of Youngstown since the outcome seemed
to paradoxically endorse and quash executive power.136 A careful analysis of the
complexities of judicial behavior and historical circumstances revealed that it merely
quashed part of Truman’s executive authority, instead setting the guidelines for future
expansion under the vague terms of war in lieu of statutory law.
The Youngstown case ultimately questioned the role of the executive and how one
man could have such a different opinion of his powers than those around him in the other
branches of government. As a result, the Truman administration painted its side of the
Youngstown case as one of inherent powers via the Commander in Chief clause, aiming
for the boost in power that Wildavsky predicted under his two presidencies theory. Due
to the Korean War and overall Cold War tensions, the Justice Department believed it had
a clear-cut case in favor of the president’s actions. Consequently, U.S. attorneys asserted
that the president had “inherent power” supported by the “Constitution, by historical
precedent, and by court decisions.”137 The government’s attorneys readily admitted that
the language of the Constitution was vague, but that because the president had assumed
these inherent powers repeatedly throughout history, they were clearly evident in Article
II.
The government’s argument ran into a problem, however, when the case came up
against Judge David A. Pine in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
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President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Pine, a former U.S. Attorney, to the court in
1940. Although it seemed reasonable to assume that Pine would decide in favor of the
president, since Truman had been Roosevelt’s vice president and shared many of the
same initial policy beliefs as FDR, the government miscalculated. Pine wrote a scathing
fifteen-page opinion citing former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard
Taft’s 1916 book Our Chief Magistrate and his Powers. In this work, Taft stated that
there were no inherent powers in the Constitution. Taking on the government’s argument
for prior acts that supported this reading of Article II, Pine declared that several wrongs
did not make something right and that these prior acts had been illegal as well. The court
found the government’s actions to be illegal. Though Pine’s ruling might have seemed
out of character from a traditional attitudinal perspective, as a Roosevelt appointee who
should have favored Roosevelt’s—and by default Truman’s—policies, historical analysis
of newspaper articles from the day of the decision reported that there was applause on
Capitol Hill regarding Pine’s decision. This reaction from Congress suggested that
external pressures, such as the public confusion over the state of war and therefore the
necessity of seizure, might have swayed Pine in a different direction.138
After Pine’s severe blow to the government’s case and subsequent denial of a
stay, the steel seizure case made its way to the Court of Appeals and finally the United
States Supreme Court, all in less than five weeks. Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman
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presented the government’s case, and in the government’s brief to the court, he
maintained that the Constitution was a living document and very much open to
interpretation.139 In the brief, Perlman claimed, “We submit that, contrary to the view of
the district judge, past practice and usage constitute strong constitutional precedent.”140
However, he also contended that, whereas Judge Pine had believed the government
sought unlimited executive power, the government was actually seeking recognition of a
limited executive power as stated in the Constitution. This limited power had to be
sufficient to permit emergency action. Perlman also emphasized the damage caused for
future necessary uses of executive power if Pine’s ruling stood. “[U]npredictable
emergencies” that remained unforeseen might require a necessary volume of executive
power, according to Perlman’s argument.141
However, the steel companies’ attorneys sought to uphold the district court’s
opinion and both legally and publicly push the president’s seemingly blatant disregard for
the law and assumption of power as reasons for the seizure being illegal. In the
petitioner’s brief, they pressed the idea of unlimited executive power and a president only
accountable to the country as the government’s underlying motive. At the same time, the
steel companies found an ally in Congress and began asserting the availability of
congressional law already on the books, such as the Taft-Hartley Act, to deal with labor
issues. In Congress, many debated the president’s actions. Some legislators believed
seizure to be a reasonable action if the president had gone to Congress and asked them to
139
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amend the Taft-Hartley Act.142 Others thought that there was no excuse for seizure.
Senator John Bricker (R-OH), citing a Washington Post article regarding FDR’s seizure
of Montgomery Ward, noted that Roosevelt’s seizure “was done under the pressure of
wartime emotions.”143 Bricker saw none of the same factors in 1952, complicating the
meaning of war further. Representative Abraham Multer (D-NY) told the House that
whatever was happening in Korea could become a full-fledged war and that steel was a
basic requirement.144 Unlike Korematsu where the government successfully framed a
domestic issue as a wartime problem, giving Roosevelt more leeway as a wartime
president, the public and courts framed Youngstown primarily as a domestic labor issue,
yielding less power to Truman under the two presidencies theory.145 The companies
utilized this confusion over the war issue and historical precedent to contend that the
president blatantly disregarded statutory law in a grab for power.
However, the Truman administration continued to structure its actions and
arguments around the concept of war in conjunction with the court’s previous general
deference to presidential war power. “In view of the Supreme Court’s generous
construction of presidential power during wartime, Truman and the White House staff
were confident that the courts would uphold the seizure,” claimed legal historian Maeva
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Marcus.146 Truman hoped that the court would rally around the president during a time
of war, as they had for Roosevelt. However, historian Steven Casey claimed that because
the Truman administration publicly viewed Korea as a short-term emergency, and did not
create a wartime public information agency, it likewise dispelled the “rally round the flag
effect” that normally would accompany strong actions.147 As a result, Truman’s
popularity remained low and neither the court nor public came to his aid.
From the beginning of the government’s seizure of the steel industry, the Truman
administration had adhered to the idea that it was a necessary action due to the Korean
War. Truman himself did not have a hard time maintaining this belief over the several
months of the steel crisis. In general, Truman believed, “As Commander in Chief…any
stoppages in any of the basic industries [were] direct threats to the war effort and the
national security.”148 During the end phases of World War II, Truman had issued
executive orders to seize Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and Gulf Oil Corporation
under this same theory.149 In connection to this understanding, Sawyer’s “Order No. 1”
issued to seized steel companies on April 8, 1952, stated that government took possession
“in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the
existing national emergency proclaimed on December 16, 1950.”150 Sawyer was
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referring to the Korean War and the general fight against communist aggression as the
“existing national emergency” despite Korea’s confusing status as a police action or
undeclared war. The proclamation of an official national emergency was Truman’s
attempt at taking a stronger stand on the Korean situation without completely abolishing
his political mobility by citing war or peace.151 Sawyer also stated in Order No. 1 that he
could terminate the seizure at any time when “such possession and operation are no
longer required in the interests of national defense.”152 While the national emergency
may have given Truman some leeway to act, his denial of a traditional state of war
publically disabled the administration’s legal argument before the court.
For the Truman Administration, national defense stood as a viable excuse for
seizure by the Commander in Chief from the very beginning. As the case reached the
Supreme Court, numerous deponents on the side of the government further reiterated this
claim. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett claimed in his affidavit, “communist
aggression is forcing the free world to fight a limited war on the battlefield and an
unlimited war of preparation and production.”153 Lovett continued, “The cessation of
production of steel for any prolonged period of time would be catastrophic,” due to the
fact that the steel industry provided a staple for “weapons, arms, munitions, and
equipment.”154 Furthermore, Lovett noted that “atomic energy, petroleum, power, and
transportation programs,” which were used to increase war potential, would be under
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severe stress if the steel industry shut down.155 This claim was made in affidavits by
Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Gordon Dean, Administrator of the
Defense Production Administration Manly Fleishmann, Secretary of the Interior Oscar
Chapman, and many more government experts. All of these deponents claimed, in one
manner or another, that the continuance of steel production was absolutely necessary
because of the current war (Korea) and the impending domino effect that a stoppage of
steel production would have on other defense industries.156
Unfortunately, the Truman administration had a hard time proving not that steel
was necessary for fighting a war, but that there even was a war to be worried about
fighting. The “strategic importance” of Korea, a peninsula that few Americans knew
existed until the U.S. became involved there, proved elusive to the American public. In
addition, because the Korean War was an undeclared war, circumstances forced the
Truman administration to fight without acknowledging the war’s total dimensions. As a
result, Congress refused to act as if Korea were a “real war.”157 Though legislators were
initially cautious to react to the Korean situation, they quickly manipulated the fuzzy
nature of this non-war for their own use, with Republicans reframing the issues around
foreign affairs and Truman’s leniency toward communism.158 Newspaper editorials also
stressed confusion over the state of conflict, claiming “that Truman had overstepped his
constitutional powers, since the United States was not at war.”159 This nondescript
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character of the Korean “war” inevitably caused problems for the government’s case in
Youngstown. According to Marcus, “The seizure episode is more profitably viewed,
therefore, as an illustration of the problems faced by an administration in prosecuting a
limited war, especially one which has not been declared by Congress.”160
Focusing on the confusion over the status of the Korean War, the steel companies
took up the claim that there was no actual national emergency and seizure was an unjust
use of executive power. In the brief for the respondent companies, they stated, “it
[seizure] is action taken for the purpose of settling a labor dispute by executive fiat.”161
First, the steel companies claimed that the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
which the government cited as also allowing a method for seizure, did not allow such a
thing. The companies then noted that the president had not been following the law, but
was trying to settle a labor dispute. Finally, the companies noted that the president could
only use the Commander in Chief powers when the public was in immediate danger and
normal government procedure was too slow.162 The respondent’s argument then stated,
“[We] should be unwilling to place such a law on the books until we actually face such
an emergency, and Congress applies the remedy for the particular emergency only.”163
The respondents looked at the action as a domestic issue, not part of a larger national
emergency or war.
The court ultimately issued a divided six-to-three decision holding the seizure was
an unconstitutional use of executive power, but the various opinions offered as part of the
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decision reflected a far more complicated view. Overall, the court did not authorize the
president’s action in the case of Youngstown as an extension of the Commander in Chief
powers because “the steel mills were not part of a theater of war.”164 According to the
majority opinion:
It is clear that, if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be
found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express
constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that
presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the
Constitution. …
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's
military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government
attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need
not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we
cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of
private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is
a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.165
However, the majority opinion seemingly disregarded several significant aspects of the
1950s. Foremost, the advent of the nuclear age, historically, demanded a more rapid
response in government action. The “here today, gone tomorrow” attitude of the era
following the use of the American atomic bomb was only amplified by the Soviet
Union’s first test of the bomb in 1949. The court appeared to disregard this feeling,
instead citing the availability of slow legislative procedures as another option. According
to journalist Roland Sawyer, “The court divided on the question of whether or not the
crisis between the free nations of the world and the Soviet Union was sufficient to
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override the checks and balances the Constitution bestows upon the President, Congress,
and the courts.”166
This decision reflected popular confusion over the Cold War as a “war,” and the
Korean War as a part of that nontraditional war and as an undeclared war. “[A]bsent the
existence of a genuine emergency, the court was unwilling to cloak an exercise of
inherent power with the authority of law. The justices, reflecting the public consensus,
believed the time had come to reassert the ordinary limits on presidential power,” noted
Marcus.167 The majority opinion proclaimed, “The Founders of this Nation entrusted the
lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”168 There was no
true public consensus over the seizure situation or executive power, but Judge Pine’s
earlier decision had been popular and because Congress had some laws in place that
might have effectively dealt with the situation, the court could not allow recognition of
inherent powers in this case.169
The inclusion of several concurring opinions exemplified the graduated nature of
the majority decision, showing that the justices were not taking a firm stance against
executive power as the majority opinion alone might suggest. Justice Frankfurter’s
concise concurrence blatantly stated this point. Frankfurter noted:
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Although the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the principle of
separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may appear
from what MR. JUSTICE BLACK has written, I join his opinion because I
thoroughly agree with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this
case.170
While he agreed with the result, Frankfurter also added, “The issue before us can be met,
and therefore should be, without attempting to define the President's powers
comprehensively. I shall not attempt to delineate what belongs to him by virtue of his
office beyond the power even of Congress to contract.”171 This statement showed a
greater reluctance to delve into the limits of presidential power, hinting toward caution on
the court’s part.
Justice William O’ Douglas also articulated a call for caution in his concurrence
and suggested that the current emergency was too dubious to make a final judgment on
executive power. Douglas argued:
If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the President, we would be
expanding Article II of the Constitution and rewriting it to suit the political
conveniences of the present emergency. …Article II, Section 2, makes the Chief
Executive the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. But our history and
tradition rebel at the thought that the grant of military power carries with it
authority over civilian affairs.172
Though Douglas referred to the present emergency, the Korean War, he also noted his
reluctance in expand the powers of the Commander in Chief to “civilian affairs.” This
proclamation meant that Douglas was unable to see the steel seizure in the light of
foreign affairs and saw seizure only as a domestic issue. However, Douglas’ concurrence
did not recommend the president to have no expanded power in wartime or in a true
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emergency, but seemed to submit that it was not currently one of those times. Justice
Burton agreed about the nature of the current situation, adding in his own concurrence:
The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or
threatened attack. We do not face the issue of what might be the President's
constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations. Nor is it claimed that
the current seizure is in the nature of a military command addressed by the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently
threatened with, total war.173
The court fragmented generally along the question of, not just wartime authority, but the
current circumstances and just what facts constituted a real “war.”
Justice Jackson’s concurrence most clearly laid out the bounds of executive
authority. According to Jackson:
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress. …
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum. …
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. …
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case
only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.174
What Jackson contended in his concurrence was that presidential power existed and was
quite expansive, but could only be exercised openly in an absence of congressional
authority or when Congress’ power was uncertain. The “zone of twilight” that Jackson
referenced articulated the court’s own shifting orientation concerning executive authority.
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Burton again supported Jackson’s ideas in his own concurrence, arguing, “The
Constitution has delegated to Congress power to authorize action to meet a national
emergency of the kind we face. Aware of this responsibility, Congress has responded to
it. It has provided at least two procedures for the use of the President.”175 Jackson’s
twilight suggested a fuzzy area that was politically malleable, but because of Taft-Hartley
and other statutory limits as suggested by Burton, the Youngstown case itself could not
serve as an example of that twilight. However, this cue from the court told the president
to exercise his power carefully, outside of congressional limits.
Subsequently, the court’s dissents advocated the existence of a real emergency
and the need for a strong executive with the ability to take control in these modern times.
Marcus claimed the “dissenters’ interpretation would have been proper if there had been
a declaration of war.”176 According to the dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice
Vinson and joined by Justices Reed and Minton:
Those who suggest that this is a case involving extraordinary powers should be
mindful that these are extraordinary times. A world not yet recovered from the
devastation of World War II has been forced to face the threat of another and
more terrifying global conflict.177
The dissenters thoroughly acknowledged the unique circumstances of the time regarding
warfare, yet left it no better defined. Curry’s initial hypothesis that there was a “rally
effect” in the court when the nation was at war proved untrue in his final analysis,
showing that armed conflict was unfortunate for the president when he (or his actions)
came up before the Supreme Court. A distinct difference in cases involving foreign or
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military powers versus those dealing with domestic power issues—the president faring
well in the former, but not in the latter—compounded this analysis. However, most
political scientists ignore any differentiation between traditional war as “armed conflict”
and the shifting language of war to mean other things during the 1950s, i.e. Cold War,
continuous war, or national emergency, missing the larger historical shift that took place
during the Truman administration and was evidently under consideration in such cases as
Youngstown. Due to this gap in political science research, the historical context of
continuous warfare exposed the necessity of a reexamination of judicial behavior models.
Subsequently, these new perceptions of warfare also altered the theater of war,
making it much less defined overall (such as the domestic fight against communism
during the Cold War). According to Justice Robert Jackson’s conference notes from the
Youngstown case, the concept of warfare divided the court. Jackson noted that
Frankfurter believed there was no war without Congress’ formal declaration, while
Vinson argued that congressional appropriations for the war meant that the United States
had a duty to see it carried out properly. Congressional malleability in the liminal zone
between traditional peace and traditional war further confused the court, whose members
saw Congress as compliant with the war whether it was formally in existence or not.
Black contended that war or not, the United States was not in “great danger” and that
over the past two years the court had made greater invasions of liberty under this
excuse.178 The Youngstown case appeared to fit neatly into political science models,
during armed conflict and dealing with a domestic power issue, when an imperial
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president might fare poorly. However, the concept of war in the 1950s was fluid, altering
this analysis, and potentially blurring the lines between foreign and domestic issues as
well; therefore, a more interdisciplinary approach looking at both history, political
science, and the law provides the best analysis of Youngstown.
When examining the effect of presidential prestige on the Supreme Court in the
case of Youngstown, it became apparent that, while there was no lag, public opinion
affected the court’s decision. As the case entered the Supreme Court in 1952, President
Truman appeared to believe that the government had a strong argument. Working from
the precept that there was a five-year lag between public opinion and its reflection on the
court, Truman also had a strong position. In 1947 Truman had reasonably high approval
ratings, though down from his 1945 high of 87 percent, which public opinion polls
reflected as well.179 In the opinion of Youngstown, Justice Jackson noted, “By [the
President’s] prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion he exerts a
leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his power which often
cancels their effectiveness.”180 However, Truman misjudged his prestige and his power
over the court in 1952.
In the year of the Youngstown decision, Truman had the lowest approval rating of
any American president. This low public approval equated to a significant drop in
Truman’s prestige as well. The media exaggerated Truman’s problems by adopting a
largely anti-government stance that eventually swayed public opinion against Truman. In
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addition, the popularity of Judge Pine’s decision at the District Court level also led to a
decreased support for steel seizure. In 1952 Truman’s approval ratings had plummeted
because of the unpopular Korean War, government economic controls, and the
continuing presence (or perception) of communism and corruption in the federal
government. According to Gallup polls from the period, Truman’s average approval
rating for his second term in office (1949-1953) was around 36.5 percent, but in the
spring of 1952 public approval reached its lowest point at 22 percent (see fig. 4.3).181
Just prior to the Youngstown case, the press was ridiculing Truman for his recent
dismissal of the very popular General Douglas MacArthur. Some articles went as far as
advocating presidential impeachment, and Republican Governor Thomas E. Dewey
(Truman’s previous foe in the 1948 election) called the Truman administration a
“disastrous failure of leadership in Washington.”182 The strong trend of public opinion
against Truman and dipping presidential approval ratings during this period surrounding
and directly before the court heard Youngstown might have affected how the justices
voted. As further evidence of this, William Rehnquist, future Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and court judicial clerk during Youngstown, blamed “public mood” and
Truman’s low approval rating for the government’s loss in the case.183
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Youngstown was a split decision by the Supreme Court, though not along the
more typical ideological divisions per the attitudinal model, suggesting more intricacies
to the result. In a court composed of supposedly similarly ideologically-minded justices,
the difference should have been much smaller. The dramatic fissure in Youngstown
showed that other factors beyond ideology also played into the decisions of the justices.
While some political scientists have based the ideological stance of the justices primarily
on economic and civil liberties issues as expressed in pre-confirmation editorials (SegalCover Scores), this approach yielded disappointing results for the Roosevelt and Truman
Courts. These courts struggled under the unique circumstances of depression, war, and
continuous warfare. Though ideological correlation within the Roosevelt and Truman
Courts was not without importance, it could not be the sole reason behind decisions such
as Youngstown, again suggesting the need for a more nuanced interpretation of the
decision and the court’s behavior within the fuzzy parameters of continuous warfare. 184
In examining the court sitting for Youngstown, Sherman Minton, Harold Burton,
Tom Clark, and Fred Vinson were all Truman appointees. While appointment alone did
not give Truman a majority number of allies on the court, Franklin Roosevelt appointed
the remaining justices. Since Truman formerly served as vice president under Roosevelt,
and His Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson,” Indiana Law Review 29, no
3 (1996): 535-592.
184

Oyez Project, “Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,” Supreme Court Media, accessed
January 25, 2010, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1951/1951_744; Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein,
Charles M. Cameron and Harold J. Spaeth, “Ideological Values and the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices Revisited,” Journal of Politics 57, no. 3 (August 1995): 816-817, 821-822; Lawrence Baum,
“Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme Court Justices from Different Periods,” Western Political
Quarterly 42, no. 4 (December 1989): 514; Dawn E. Johnsen, “Should Ideology Matter in Selecting
Federal Judges: Grounds Rules for the Debate,” Cardozo Law Review 26, no. 2 (January 2005): 463-478.
See also: Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York: Vintage Books, 1941);
Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
Jackson and McCloskey both make reference to the exceptional times of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s,
when determining court decision-making actions.

313
succeeding him as president after his death, Roosevelt and Truman shared similar
political ideologies. Truman’s own pledge to follow Roosevelt’s policies after April
1945 further solidified this argument.185 As a result, the entire court should have been
sympathetic to President Truman’s position in the case of Youngstown. Historically,
however, the fuzzy nature of continuous warfare made this predicted attitudinal outcome
unreliable, as the court fissured over the meaning of war and definition of the Korean
conflict. Additionally, whereas Roosevelt focused on political appointments that
reflected his policy prerogatives, Truman often thought collegially and put his friends
into positions on the court based on the concept of loyalty. This difference in
appointment strategy along with the still ambiguous nature of modern warfare, sometimes
led to divergent opinions concerning executive power in foreign affairs.186 Just as
Truman and Congress were unable to fully grasp a modern definition of war and were
therefore forced to operate within the twilight zone, so too was the court.
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Another factor that may have altered the justices’ votes was their personal
executive experience. Justices are more likely to support presidential power issues if they
formerly served in an executive position at the state or federal level. Being more familiar
with the challenges of an executive office, these justices should be sympathetic to the
president when he comes before the court. However, the only justice on the court for
Youngstown with arguable executive experience was Harold Burton, who had formerly
served as the mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, before Truman appointed him to the court in
1945.187 Despite Burton’s liberal stance, executive experience, and appointment by
Truman, he voted against Truman in 1952.
Finally, an examination of the background of the justices illuminated their
positions in Youngstown. By examining the majority justices, research revealed hints to
the justices’ stances against excessive executive power. For example, despite being a
former Democratic US Senator and Roosevelt’s first appointment to the court in 1937,
Hugo Black had also been a labor lawyer in favor of worker rights. In the steel seizure
case, Black focused on the actual impact that seizure had on the laborers and union
bargaining prerogatives, finding that seizure was not a correct procedure and that there
were already labor arbitration laws in place for the president to follow. Jackson’s
conference notes confirmed that Black was unconvinced by anything the other justices
had to say. In another instance, Roosevelt had almost chosen William O. Douglas,
known for his distinct distrust of government power, as his running mate in 1944.188 In
his place, Roosevelt chose Harry Truman. In today’s court, “appointment to the Court is
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the culmination of [the justices’] employment and life goals,” but Douglas was just one
instance of an earlier generation of jurists who believed the highest goal was the
presidency.189 In a 1951 letter from Truman to Douglas where Truman lambasted
Douglas for publically supporting communist China, Truman reminded Douglas of his
political failures. Only a year before Truman seized the steel mills, he noted:
I am being very frank with you Bill because fundamentally I am very fond of you
but you have missed the boat on three different occasions if you really wanted to
get into politics. Since you are on the highest Court in the land it seems to me
that the best thing you can possibly do would be to give your best effort to that
Court and let the President of the United States run the political end of foreign
and domestic affairs.190
Douglas could have felt animosity toward Truman in particular, which elevated his
distrust of excessive power. Jackson’s notes confirmed this and showed that Douglas
thought the power to seize should be in the legislature.191
Furthermore, those justices who sided with the minority also had backgrounds
likely to affect their positions in Youngstown. Foremost, Chief Justice Vinson had
formerly served as the head of the Office of War Mobilization in 1945 and suggested that
the government seize the coal industry when they threatened to strike. The government
had, in fact, seized coal mines in May 1945 (under Truman) when a strike threatened the
domestic consumption and use of coal as a war material. Vinson also backed Truman’s
recommendations to seize Goodyear and Gulf Oil in 1945. Additionally, the press
considered Vinson to be Truman’s personal choice for vice president, then president in
1952. Despite Vinson’s public disinclination toward the presidency, this choice
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illustrated the close connection he and Truman shared. Additionally, Justice Minton also
had close personal ties to Truman as a good friend, and he consistently upheld issues of
national security over everything else. In a personal letter to Vinson, Minton commented
on politics, Vinson’s family, and their dissent in the steel case, illustrating his interest in
siding together on the case.192 As a result, Supreme Court justices used more
considerations in their decisions than just ideology, making personal connections,
background, and historical circumstances relevant.
A closer look at the language in the Youngstown opinions allowed for valuable
analysis of the actual language, which showed that court members were not steadfastly
against executive power. The sheer number of concurring opinions in the case of
Youngstown suggested that court members had much to say.

For instance, Justice

Clark’s concurring opinion noted, “the Constitution does grant to the President extensive
authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency.”193 Jackson’s notes
indicated that Clark did not want to wipe out executive power entirely, but limit his
opinion “to this case.”194 Clark, like many of the justices in the majority, thought that
executive power was not as clear-cut as the majority opinion claimed. In a note to
Frankfurter from March of 1952, Clark wrote, “I could join with you [on Youngstown]
had you not concurred in the opinion of the court which I construe to limit presidential
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power to Congressional grant.”195 Burton further illustrated that idea with his statement
about the danger level of the US situation in Korea, suggesting it was not as threatening
as the government argued.196 Continuous warfare was unique during the Korean War
because it did not have the usual elements of a traditional war, yet it was not a period of
peace on the home front either. Again, members of the majority made it clear that they
were not leveling an all-encompassing blow to executive power but only in this very
particular situation. These concurring opinions also suggested that inherent powers did,
in fact, exist but a true emergency signified by an attack or threat thereof must precede or
accompany them.
Another issue at hand that the court sent cues about was executive power in the
face of statutory law. Clark again revealed his thoughts on this topic:
I conclude that, where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with
the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in
meeting the crisis; but that in the absence of such action by Congress, the
President’s independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation
confronting the nation.197
What Clark really said was that the president had freedom to do as he wanted during an
“emergency” assuming that there are no previous laws in place to deal with the issue at
hand. In the rapidly changing Cold War environment, it seemed reasonable that
Congress would have had a hard time keeping up with executive actions. Jackson added
to Clark’s opinion with his own, noting that presidential power was restricted in the case
of Youngstown only because Congress had already set statutory law to deal with labor
disputes. Jackson also proclaimed that Supreme Court decisions could not keep power in
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Congress’ hands if they did not take initiative.198 Only Congress can “prevent power
from slipping through its fingers,” Jackson proselytized, sending a strong cue to Congress
that the court would not be responsible for maintaining the balance of power.199
Finally, the majority also took up the fuzzy concept of “war” during the period,
specifically in relation to the Korean War. Jackson’s concurring opinion stated that only
Congress had the ability to declare war but that a “state of war” might exist without a
formal declaration. Though he felt it inappropriate to deal with the status of the Korean
crisis, Jackson set a clear distinction between war de jure and war de facto.200
Frankfurter added, “No remotely comparable practice can be vouched for executive
seizure of property at a time when this country was not at war in the only constitutional
way in which it can be at war.”201 These concurrences suggested that the government’s
argument might have been stronger if Korea had been a properly declared war instead of
a police action. While this might suggest that the Constitution very specifically laid out
the war powers between Congress and the executive, the court also showed a shift in their
own concept of war. Black noted in the majority opinion in Youngstown that the concept
of the “theater of war” was expanding.202 This final statement cued society that, while
Presidential seizure was not currently acceptable during imperfect war, it very well could
be in the future.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decisions in cases dealing with executive power throughout
the forties and fifties served to extend executive power under the expanding parameters
of warfare. When comparing the 1952 case of Youngstown to Korematsu, a traditional
wartime case, it was evident that the concept of war shifted from one case to the other.
Youngstown v. Sawyer appeared to be a solid blow to executive power with the Supreme
Court holding that Truman did not have the constitutional authority to seize the nation’s
steel mills. However, upon closer examination it became evident that the Youngstown
case was a complex example of judicial behavior at its finest. Foremost, historical
examination of these hypotheses showed that Youngstown was not a blow to executive
power but a reaffirmation of the expansion of inherent powers of the president as
Commander in Chief during times of war. The fissured opinions in Youngstown likewise
illustrated the confusing nature of continuous warfare and the necessity for a more
inclusive historical and political analysis of court actions. Subsequently, the court served
to set out vague guidelines for future use of executive power, which would allow it to
flourish in the Cold War Era amidst the inconsistent understanding of “war” and rapidly
changing global dynamics. By setting imprecise terms, the court fostered the growth of
executive power and encouraged expansion of the meaning of war, which yielded more
room for an imperial presidency to grow.

CHAPTER V
MOVING IN: EISENHOWER’S HOUSE OF PEACE

Following the inauspicious Youngstown decision, the questionable position of
American forces in Korea, and continuing threat of communism at home and abroad,
Truman opted out of a second run for the presidency in 1952. The country was yearning
for a leader who could guide them through the Cold War and back toward peace, but
under the system Truman had set up this seemed a difficult role to fill. By the 1950s, the
world had fundamentally changed. Under the threat of nuclear war, the global
community, and the United States especially, was no longer able to go back to the
isolationist principles of the interwar period. However, Americans still sought a return to
the peacefulness associated with a lack of war, which characterized that era. With
nuclear war a very real possibility, the 1950s made the idea of war a constant and more
permanent part of American life. Without a full return to peace after WWII and the
advent of the Korean War soon thereafter, Americans began to accept this lack of
traditional peace and often-subtle though ever-present state of continuous warfare. When
the voters returned to the polls in 1952, they sought a candidate who could best fit within
these modern circumstances and lead the country despite all these uncertainties. This
man would have to serve in a position torn by peace and war—a continuous wartime
president.
For this purpose, the Democratic party chose the eloquent yet unexciting Adlai
Stevenson, then governor of Illinois. In Stevenson’s acceptance speech at the Democratic
National Convention, he sought to quell Americans’ fears about the continuation of one
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party in power for more than two decades. In a moralistic speech peppered with
Christian references, Stevenson articulated, “You will hear many sincere and thoughtful
people express concern about the continuation of one Party in power for twenty years. I
don't belittle this attitude. But change for the sake of change has no absolute merit in
itself.”1 Uninspiring, Stevenson’s motives for winning the election crystallized around
upholding the power of the Democratic party and little else, ultimately causing voters to
question if he could serve in the complicated modernity of continuous warfare. Taking a
more critical stance on the Republican party and their nominee, former general Dwight
D. Eisenhower, Stevenson continued. “[I]s it the part of wisdom to change for the sake
of change to a Party with a split personality, to a leader, whom we all respect, but who
has been called upon to minister to a hopeless case of political schizophrenia?” Stevenson
pondered.2 The accusation against the GOP referenced differences between the two main
emerging wings of the Republican party that came into play during their own nomination
process: the liberal Republicans who favored Eisenhower and interventionism, and the
conservatives who favored Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, a staunch non-interventionist
who called for a complete repeal of New Deal programs. Though Stevenson would
continue to emphasize Republican disunity, this strategy ultimately failed when faced
with Eisenhower, who fit better as a popular candidate than partisan contender, appealing
to Americans’ needs.
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The same disunity message resurfaced, repeatedly, in Stevenson television
campaign commercials during 1952. In one commercial, known as “Platform DoubleTalk,” a two-headed GOP nominee on display at a “Republican side show” spouted
paradoxical stances on issues in response to questions from the audience. Concerning the
Korean War, for example, “Mac GOP” commented, “We don’t belong in Korea. Let the
Commies have it.” While his other side noted, “We should expand the war, open a second
front in China.” The commercial ended with a narrator telling the viewers, “Don’t you be
confused, vote for Stevenson for president.”3 Unfortunately for the Democrats, they
experienced their own, more obvious “political schizophrenia” during the following
months before the election as Stevenson attempted to both support Truman’s
administration as well as separate himself from the controversy embroiling in it.4 In the
absence of Democratic conformity, Eisenhower was able to gain advantage and tout his
unique qualifications for the office that did not revolve around party platforms but cast
him as the right candidate for the time.
Bipartisanship would come to be an important part of the 1952 campaign, and
although the statement would prove futile for Stevenson, he referenced the illusory
construction of a bipartisan “house” of government in his acceptance speech. Stevenson
asked, “Do you doubt the power of any political leader, if he has the will too [sic] do so,
to set his own house in order without his neighbors having to burn it down?”5 Though
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Stevenson aimed to downplay partisanship and emphasize his separateness from the
Truman administration, he instead foreshadowed Eisenhower’s almost covert extension
of the continuous warfare that Truman had begun and his construction of a house of
peace to conceal this militaristic enterprise. This imbroglio and the impending electoral
success of Eisenhower would serve to illustrate the permanence of continuous warfare
beyond party affiliation and underscore the significance of Eisenhower’s almost nonpartisan role.
In the shadow of the Korean War, still lingering during 1952, Stevenson’s
campaign was ultimately unable to fit into the political climate launched by Truman. In a
letter to Clark Clifford at the start of the Korean War, Truman wrote, “I think every effort
should be made to avoid the appearance that this is a contest between two nations but it
should be made to appear what it is, i.e., a contest between one aggressor nation and the
rest of the peace-loving world.”6 What Truman’s letter to Clifford indicated was the
president’s manipulation of the public perception of war. By maintaining the somewhat
fuzzy status of the Korean conflict throughout 1950-1952, Truman extended his political
maneuverability within his final year in office, yet this lack of clarity also hindered
Stevenson’s campaign, as he was unable to embrace the usefulness of the ambiguity
provided by continuous warfare.
With the media turning against the situation in Korea by 1952, Truman had little
choice but to continue to operate within the gray parameters he had set up for the
nondescript conflict, which meant dragging Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson along
as well. Stevenson was forced to try to maneuver within the ambiguousness of Korea or
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take the political risk of separating himself from Truman and Democratic policy
altogether. According to one article from the Los Angeles Times, “There is a tone of
unadorned pessimism in the current reports…The fact that after two years of war the
Korean struggle is still inconclusive…is already handicapping our position in other
countries.”7 Additionally, the press began to report that some of the facts coming out of
Korea, such as statistics on American aviation effectiveness, were artificially inflated or
false altogether. “There is a deliberate effort to hide casualties and conceal losses,”
reported the Chicago Daily Tribune in May 1952.8 Republicans encouraged this shift in
the media by referring to the conflict as a “useless war” and claiming that no Democratic
administration had had peacetime prosperity since the Civil War, which implied an
ulterior economic motive to the continued fighting in Korea.9 Likewise, Republicans
rendered the Democrats as a party of hawks, warmongering instead of focusing on
peaceful prerogatives.
Stevenson, torn by an obvious public cry for change and his support of the policy
of the Truman administration, surrendered to the fuzziness of Korea in an effort to defend
himself against the Republicans. Using the excuse that it would give the communists
“vital information,” Stevenson refused to reveal his plan for ending the war in Korea,
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though he claimed a plan existed.10 This attempt to throw his critics off-balance failed,
however, when Republican vice presidential contender Richard Nixon made a mockery
of Stevenson’s secret plan. Nixon argued, “Mr. Stevenson is putting out bait for votes
and working a cruel hoax on the men fighting and dying in Korea and their families and
loved ones at home.”11 Nixon’s statement brilliantly drew attention to the hard truth
about Korea, whatever its technical status—that American boys were dying there in a
useless war proffered by the Democrats.
Coinciding with Nixon’s tactics, Eisenhower took a completely different approach
from the Democrats and exposed Korea for what it was, a war. In a speech delivered in
Detroit on October 21, 1952, Eisenhower noted:
In this anxious autumn for America, one fact looms above all others in our
people’s mind. One tragedy challenges all men dedicated to the work of peace.
One word shouts denial to those who foolishly pretend that ours is not a nation at
war.
This fact, this tragedy, this word is: Korea.12
Eisenhower then went on to proclaim that he had enlisted in the greatest cause of his life,
“the cause of peace.”13 By clarifying Korea as a war, Eisenhower and the Republicans
gained an even greater advantage in the 1952 election. Working from his stature as a
general and war hero, Eisenhower made his campaign about doing what he knew,
winning a war. By pledging to end the unpopular Korean War, Eisenhower was able to
highlight his military knowledge, yet play up a desire for peace shared by the country.
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Both of these attributes subsequently played well in the media and amongst the electorate
who desired a candidate who could straddle both war and peace.14
As president, Eisenhower would finalize the house of peace utilizing his military
background and leadership skills to make continuous warfare a permanent feature of
post-war American life. In order to do this, Eisenhower cloaked, first his campaign and
later, his presidential rhetoric in an outward message of peace. Defining himself as a
soldier of peace, Eisenhower operated within a uniquely dualistic role that allowed him to
maintain a public affiliation with peace through a superficially downsized military, while
using budgetary maneuvering to support overall US military growth and covert
operations abroad. Paired with a genial, at times almost non-partisan, relationship with
Congress and the American people, Eisenhower’s peace plans, including the Atoms for
Peace Program, embedded continuous warfare into peace dialogue, melding the two
permanently. Under the Eisenhower administration, traditional peace and traditional war
were officially forsaken for a modern version of permanent continuous warfare.
Eisenhower began this transition during the 1952 campaign by taking his stance
for peace to the extreme. In one instance, Eisenhower refused a White House briefing on
the situation in Korea with Stevenson present in an effort to separate himself publicly
from the Democrats’ foreign policy position. Writing to Eisenhower about the incident,
Truman noted, “What I’ve always had in mind was and is a continuing foreign policy.
You know that is a fact, because you had a part in outlining it.”15 Truman’s letter
referenced Eisenhower’s active participation in Truman administration foreign policy
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prior to 1952, which Eisenhower now appeared to counter. This message to Eisenhower
illustrated the purely political nature of Eisenhower’s refusal to meet at the White House
with the Democrats, not his actual feelings toward Truman policy—policy that
Eisenhower had himself helped to create. Though Truman saw the incident as a personal
snub, Eisenhower’s plans were to maintain and strengthen the foreign policy structures
set up under Truman. Realizing that the American people had grown weary of war, due
to the Korean situation, Eisenhower merely sought to differentiate his campaign and
foster the inherent powers available with continuous warfare under a veil of peace.16
Eisenhower, even during his campaign for the presidency, sought to solidify the
continuous warfare that Truman had created, under an overt message of peace. While
Truman refused to take a stance on the formal designation of Korea as a war or
something else, Eisenhower took the opposite approach. Eisenhower, as a general, could
more easily work within the parameters of traditional war, which the somewhat confusing
situation in Korea easily supplied. As an advisor to Truman during the nuclear build up
from 1948-1950, Eisenhower believed there could never be international control over
nuclear weapons. Likewise, one of Eisenhower’s main disagreements with General
Douglas MacArthur was over his policy that there was “no substitute for victory.”
Instead, Eisenhower understood that nuclear weapons would and did change the face of
warfare, leading toward prevention or containment of armed conflict.17 So while
16
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Eisenhower may have pegged Korea as a traditional war, he fully understood the larger
underlying concept of continuous warfare and its relation to the global nuclear
environment. Just as he sought to “maximize his flexibility” during his career in the
military, he likewise sought to maximize his political flexibility by manipulating the
Korean situation to his advantage in 1952. Eisenhower agreed with Truman’s foreign
and defense policies, supporting the unification of the armed services under the
Department of Defense, universal military training, and preventative warfare through
preparation, but in 1952, Eisenhower was concerned with the decreasing support of the
American people for war. As a result, he sought to design an outwardly dissimilar path
from Truman and the Democrats that shifted the nation’s focus away from war toward
peace.18 With this illusion, Eisenhower was able to solidify the malleable continuous
warfare by permanently ensconcing it in the message of peace that the American people
desired.
Eisenhower was the ultimate candidate in 1952 because, as a military mind, he
understood the synonymy that war and peace held after WWII, as could no other
politician. Despite his campaign and presidency evoking a strange, almost melodramatic,
desire for a more traditional peace, Eisenhower bestrode the line between peace and war.
Harold Stassen, Eisenhower’s later director of the short-lived United States Foreign
Operations Administration, noted that while the Eisenhower campaign staff had decided
that foreign and domestic policy had merged post-WWII, their separate treatment in 1952
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was only a campaign tactic.19 While Eisenhower pledged a return to peace, decreased
military spending and peaceful uses of atomic energy, and upheld a genial relationship
with Congress and the American people, he was covertly solidifying the malleable
continuous warfare, which Truman had first created, for future administrations,.
Eisenhower as President
To General Eisenhower, war and peace went hand in hand with one naturally
associated with the other, but as a potential presidential candidate Eisenhower embraced
the fuzziness within which modern peace or war might occur. Even before Eisenhower’s
run for office, as Columbia University’s president in 1951, he pushed for the Institute of
War and Peace studies. The institute pledged to “investigate the function of war as a
‘method of protecting values considered even more precious than the values which war
places in jeopardy’” and “’attempt to find less costly ways of protecting those things for
which we are willing to fight.’”20 Despite the Eisenhower campaign’s clear stance on
peace in Korea, even Eisenhower’s earlier attempts to foster peace studies at Columbia
resulted in a blurring of the once separate concepts. The Institute of War and Peace
essentially pledged to uphold the fighting of war for peace, a paradoxical notion that fell
in line with Eisenhower’s position as a soldier of peace and belief that without war, peace
could not exist.
As president, Eisenhower ushered in a seemingly placid period in American
history, despite the continuing fight against communism at home and abroad. In many
19
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ways, this tranquility aligned with Eisenhower’s proffered vision for peace he had
emphasized during the campaign. According to Stassen, “Eisenhower should be
recognized as the most brilliant leader for world peace in this century.”21 However,
Eisenhower’s concept of peace was not the traditional, post-war return to solemnity that
future analysts would assume, but rather the fuzzy, suggestive idea that war and peace
were intimately linked. During Eisenhower’s presidency, he permanently fused the
traditional concept of peace to the modern concept of continuous warfare, while
maintaining peace rhetoric that the public accepted. Created out of the confusion of
continuous warfare and fuzzy language of the Truman administration, the house of peace
stabilized under Eisenhower’s heavily publicized peace activities. When scrutinizing
Eisenhower’s words carefully, it became evident that most of his public statements
included mention of continuous warfare.
While Truman’s statements began to blur war and peace unsophisticatedly as they
naturally merged in the post-World War II environment, Eisenhower’s statements
reflected a much more conscious effort to conceal this unity. This suppression is most
evident due to Eisenhower’s simplistic speech-making methods. In fact, Eisenhower
argued with his speechwriters continually about their attempts to make him sound elitist
and overly eloquent, instead preferring his common, Midwestern way of talking.
Eisenhower once told Emmet Hughes, his chief speechwriter, “I’m basically a Kansas
farm boy, and damn it, I’m going to talk that way.”22 Eisenhower’s early speeches reflect
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this demeanor, including his first inaugural address. Using short, sometimes choppy
sentences, Eisenhower proclaimed:
We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the
care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense
and display stamina in purpose. … The peace we seek, then, is nothing less than
the practice and fulfillment of our whole faith among ourselves and in our
dealings with others. This signifies more than the stilling of guns, casing the
sorrow of war. More than escape from death, it is a way of life.23
In this portion of his inaugural address, Eisenhower spoke of peace as a way of life, but
this “peace” also included an able defense, military strength, and an outward effort to
display these characteristics to others. Eisenhower’s concept of peace was more than just
an end to traditional war, “the stilling of guns.” Under Eisenhower, peace became
synonymous with continuous warfare.
While Eisenhower’s rhetorical abilities served his purpose as a peace advocate
and won him accolades from the public who saw him as a plain spoken, straight-talking
individual, those in the press began to see Eisenhower as ill-prepared for the role of
president and a tool of the Republican leadership. Due to Eisenhower’s folksy rhetoric
and nonchalant public demeanor, the press and future historians often painted him as
inept. According to journalists Joseph and Stewart Alsop of the Washington Post, “The
greatest political decisions of the Eisenhower Administration are quite literally being
made behind President Eisenhower’s back.”24 Critics who focused on his frequent
golfing and fishing trips quickly pegged Eisenhower as a “Do Nothing President.”
Conservative Republican Robert W. Welch, Jr., co-founder of the John Birch Society,
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even went so far as to refer to Eisenhower as a “mere stooge” in his 1963 book The
Politician.25 Despite these criticisms, a booming economy and outwardly peaceful
decade pushed Eisenhower’s public approval ratings up into and beyond the sixtieth
percentile for the majority of his time in office.26
Authentically, Eisenhower was an incredibly intelligent and dedicated individual
dating back to his upbringing in rural Kansas. Though the Midwest did not offer many
exciting opportunities for Eisenhower, or his five brothers, his parents consistently taught
him the virtues of self-reliance, integrity, and ambition. Ida, Eisenhower’s mother, taught
all of her sons to do their own laundry and cooking so as not to ever have to rely on
someone else. With six boys in one small house, it was never enough just to complete a
task either; there was constant competition to see who could do something the best.
Likewise, the strict Mennonite religious philosophy of his parents translated into a very
structured home life bookended by prayer in the morning and at night. During the day,
Eisenhower and his brothers had school and chores.27 The comfort that Eisenhower felt
with this regimented daily agenda translated well into his later career in the military and
fostered his organizational practices in the White House. Likewise, Eisenhower’s rise to
the top of the American military and political realm reflected the competitiveness and
self-sufficiency of his childhood.
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Revisionist historians saw the conflict between the portrayal of an apathetic
Eisenhower and the relatively harmonious decade of the 1950s as a sign that there was
more to Eisenhower’s leadership style. Beginning in the late 1970s, scholars reevaluated
Eisenhower through this new perspective. Political scientist Fred I. Greenstein gave a
name to Eisenhower’s leadership style, labeling it as a “hidden-hand” presidency in 1982.
Greenstein purported, “The very practices that led political observers to underestimate
Eisenhower were central to his leadership.”28 These practices included a strategic use of
language, refusal to get involved in public fights, an ardent desire to fulfill his public
duty, and an obsession with organization and structure.29 This analysis was unsurprising
as Eisenhower’s moralistic parents ingrained all of these attributes into their son as a
child in Kansas. However, R. Gordon Hoxie of the Center for the Study of The
Presidency went so far as to tag Eisenhower as the “principal architect of the modern
institutional presidency.”30 Working from newly declassified documents available in the
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Greenstein and others represented Eisenhower as an
incredibly able and intellectual man who dominated the role of president, despite an
outward appearance of simplicity or disinterest.
While Greenstein and his contemporaries convincingly articulated a more
complex Eisenhower than previous scholars had believed, they ignored the historical
situation in the 1950s that gave meaning to Eisenhower’s carefully chosen phrases and
actions. Just as Roosevelt’s megalomania made sense in the dual crises of depression and
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war, and Truman’s collegiality in his contrived post-Roosevelt position, Eisenhower fit in
his period as well. Greenstein argued, “Many of Eisenhower’s presidential utterances
directly play on the public image of the military hero who is a soldier of peace.”31
Greenstein goes on to attribute this quality to Eisenhower’s desire to appeal widely to the
public as a sort of popular head of state. However, Greenstein discounted the paradoxical
notion of a soldier of peace in the first place. In a more traditional period where the end
of armed conflict naturally brought peace, Eisenhower’s strategy would seem out of place
or unnecessary. In the fuzzy era of continuous warfare, where modern peace and modern
war were synonymous, Eisenhower’s strategy of playing the soldier while speaking for
peace made sense. The type of peace that Eisenhower sought to maintain was the relative
calmness found in the liminal zone between traditional peace and war. During
Eisenhower’s administration, this peace was characterized by US economic and military
hegemony that fostered continual, though subtle, global tension through the massive
buildup of the US military and continued use of containment policy. Though articulated
as the Cold War in the 1950s, this tension continued long beyond the American concern
over communism.
At the same time, Eisenhower’s public denigration of involvement in decisionmaking was far from apathetic, instead helping to conceal his role in perpetuating the
buildup of the military-industrial complex. While revisionist historians attributed this to
Eisenhower’s “hidden hand” mentality, in reality, it was part of his personal turned
presidential skillset. Just as Roosevelt and Truman came into the presidency with a
certain set of skills, so too did Eisenhower. For Eisenhower, as a career military man,
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indoctrination into the military organizational structure was standard and something that
suited him well due to his regimented upbringing. What Greenstein refered to as an
obsession with organization was Eisenhower’s personal and military background coming
into play in the White House. Eisenhower willingly delegated authority to subordinates,
who were trusted to make decisions in a typical military fashion. The chain of command,
however, always led back to Eisenhower, though the level of his involvement in certain
decisions and actions fluctuated.32 Though this was vastly different from the decisionmaking control that Roosevelt and Truman utilized, it was more transferrable to future
presidents, helping to maintain a structure of power across administrations, again
solidifying the house of peace.
Ultimately, by delegating many tasks away to his Cabinet members and liaison
officers, Eisenhower was able to maintain separate public and political agendas, which
was crucial to making continuous warfare permanent under the guise of peace. By
speaking of peace and war as separate concepts in his public speeches, Eisenhower
sought to solidify his own public role as a peacemaker. However, Eisenhower’s push for
a reorganized Department of Defense, continued testing of nuclear weapons, and support
for the “Eisenhower Doctrine” that pledged unrequited military aid to countries
threatened by communist aggression, greatly diverged from this public path toward
peace.33 It was the very political maneuverability available through the blurring of the
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two concepts, peace and continuous war, that in reality, allowed Eisenhower to carve out
his niche as a solder of peace in the modern era of continuous warfare.
The Atoms for Peace Program
In office less than a year, Eisenhower began his first major program foray as
president, which emphasized his role in upholding the US house of peace while further
defining his status as a soldier of peace. With a speech before the general assembly of
the United Nations Eisenhower claimed, “Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to
conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of
today's existence.”34 Eisenhower then went on to discuss the current nuclear situation in
the world and again express his interest in peacemaking. As a result, Eisenhower
proposed, “It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be
put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to
the arts of peace.”35 In both statements, Eisenhower paired militaristic language with
peaceful intentions, further illustrating his conflicting nature and attempt to conceal
continuous warfare within the concept of peace.
By the 1950s, the threat of nuclear war had become a more permanent part of the
global mindset amidst growing US-Soviet nuclear capabilities. Just as physicist Leo
Szilard told Lewis Strauss on January 25, 1939, nuclear energy could produce both
clear on its face, the peaceful intentions were obscure. The necessary request for help that accentuated the
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energy and “atomic bombs.” A focus only on peaceful uses of atomic energy could not
remove the ultimately militaristic capabilities of such a tool. According to author
Richard Rhodes, physicist Philip Morrison remembered, “when fission was discovered,
within perhaps a week there was on the blackboard in Robert Oppenheimer’s office [at
Berkeley] a drawing—a very bad, an execrable drawing—of a bomb.”36

As illustrated

by these early nuclear pioneers, the primary use of atomic energy was for weapons of
war. Though Eisenhower sought to remove the concept of war and highlight the concept
of peace in terms of nuclear energy with his UN speech, he essentially rallied for control
of world fissionable material by an Atomic Energy Agency, a part of the UN. Cloaked in
Eisenhower’s language of peace, a redistribution of atomic materials to the UN appeared
as the fastest route toward global utilization of the peaceful components of atomic
energy, such as inexpensive power supplies. However, this redistribution would also
diminish the destructive capabilities of the world’s atomic stockpiles, including that of
the Soviet Union—a boon to US Cold War objectives.
Eisenhower’s initiative, known as “Atoms for Peace,” served as a showcase for
American efforts toward international control of atomic materials in an effort to create
“peaceful” uses of nuclear energy, though it ultimately worked to help conceal US
military enterprises. The most blatant demonstration toward this end was a series of
museum exhibits displayed all around the world, including the Library of Congress.
These exhibits included such articles as model nuclear airplanes and ships, and displays
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showing the futuristic application of atomic energy to agriculture, medicine, and more.37
According to a letter from Acting Director of the Library of Congress Abbott Washburn
to Eisenhower in 1955, “the ‘Atoms for Peace’ exhibits have proved the most effective
means we have for conveying the full meaning of your U.N. message of December 8,
1953.”38 Washburn noted that the Library of Congress exhibit would be traveling to San
Francisco, as well as Central and South America. Similar exhibits were also on display
in India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Helsinki, Yugoslavia, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and
São Paulo, with even more exhibits under construction.39 A National Security Council
memorandum revealed an even greater significance for the Helsinki exhibit, in particular.
According to NSC 5525 from June 30, 1955, “An exhibit on peaceful uses of atomic
energy in Helsinki was arranged to coincide with the Communist-organized World Peace
Congress, announced for May 22–28. Advance publicity for the exhibit can be credited
with contributing to the Communist decision to postpone the opening of the Peace
Congress for one month.”40 This note from the NSC showed further confusion over the
purpose of the entire Atoms for Peace program. In one regard, the US wanted to spread
information about peaceful means of atomic energy, but as the Helsinki circumstances
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demonstrated, the US also was in competition with the Soviet Union for the promotion of
“peace” during the Cold War.
In an even greater effort to display the usefulness of atomic energy beyond the
battlefield, Eisenhower proposed the construction of a nuclear ship in the spring of 1955.
The president slated this “atom-powered merchant ship,” dubbed an “Atom Ship for
Peace” by the media, to travel around the world as a useful display of the non-destructive
power of the atom. Though Eisenhower supposedly intended the ship for use as a trade
vessel, an article in the New York Times connected it to military implications as well.
The article’s author contended:
[V]isiting the ports of the world [the atom ship] will bring both knowledge and
practical demonstration of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in medicine,
agriculture and power production to the underdeveloped and power-starved areas
of the world and help them thereby to plan their own industrial and technical
revolution in the light of the atomic age. …the greatest and freest possible world
trade that we can achieve without damage to our own economy is also an integral
part of our defense against the perils facing us.41
This peculiar and peaceful economic function of the atom ship aimed to take
atomic energy outside the militaristic implications of the Cold War. However, as
historian Melvyn Leffler contended in his Preponderance of Power, the Cold War was
economic in nature, pitting the Soviet Union’s desire for expanded trade networks against
that of the United States. Although Leffler focused only on the Cold War in his work,
and not the underlying ambiguous nature of continuous warfare, his analysis provided a
viable connection between the atom ship’s peaceful economic intentions and the
underlying military needs at which the New York Times hinted.42 Though promoted as a
41
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merchant ship, the atom ship might just have easily served as a warship, again engaging
the notion of military prowess in opposition to peace. Along these lines, when discussing
the atom ship project, Congress mentioned the submarine U.S.S. Nautilus, the first
nuclear-propelled warship, launched in 1954, reiterating the dualistic war/peace function
of atomic vessels. Congress ultimately recommended an approval of appropriations for
the “U.S.S. Atomic Enterprise” peace ship for 33.65 million dollars, but the entire
scenario demonstrated a shift in US perceptions of peace that Eisenhower reinforced as a
soldier of peace.43 With a growing permanence to the Cold War, threat of nuclear war,
and the situation in Korea, Americans gradually saw peace as inclusionary of subtle
though constant threat—a formidable component of continuous warfare.
Despite Eisenhower’s overwhelming message of peace at the UN, before the US
Congress he revealed a more militant motive behind the sharing of atomic energy
information, which reiterated a fundamental change in perceptions of peace. In a
message to Congress on February 17, 1954, Eisenhower requested Congress amend the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Eisenhower stated:
I urge…that authority be provided to exchange with nations participating in
defensive arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is
essential to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for
atomic warfare.44

43

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Authorizing Appropriations for a Nuclear-Propelled
Merchant Ship, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, H. Rep. 1604, 3-4. Though approved under the Eisenhower
administration, the “peace ship,” formally named the NS Savannah and costing 41 million dollars, only
operated from 1965 through 1970 as a merchant ship. To the present, the Savannah has been the only
American merchant ship ever built. John Konrad, “The World’s First Nuclear Merchant Ship—NS
Savannah,” accessed September 27, 2012, gCaptain, http://gcaptain.com/the-worlds-first-nuclearmerchant-ship-ns-savannah/.
44

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, S. 3323 and H.R. 8862, To Amend the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954, 10.

341
Eisenhower went on to request cooperation with friendly nations on the exchange of
“restricted data” on industry uses of atomic energy and fissionable materials required for
these uses. “Such amendments should prescribe that before the conclusion of any
arrangements for the transfer of fissionable material to a foreign nation, assurances must
be provided against its use by the recipient nation for military purposes,” Eisenhower
added.45 However, as part of the congressional discussions over the amendments,
Chairman William S. Cole (Representative, R-NY) determined that “special material,”
mainly nuclear material, would remain the property of the United States “as an exercise
of the powers of the United States to arm itself, and to prepare for its defense.”46 While
there were undoubtedly beneficial peacetime uses of atomic energy, such as nuclear
reactors, the main concern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and their witnesses
focused on retention of ownership of nuclear materials and caution in sharing information
with foreign countries, due to the undeniable threat of nuclear war associated with atomic
energy.
Concerns over the Atoms for Peace program also infiltrated the Eisenhower
administration itself. In a memorandum from Gerard C. Smith, special assistant for
atomic energy matters in the Department of State, to Lewis Strauss, chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, Smith laid out his concerns over recent proposed
amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Specifically, Smith was concerned that
the section dealing with shared information might imply that an international pool of
informed allied countries was purely to serve the United States’ own defense
45
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prerogatives.47 The section of the proposed amendment stated, “the President has
approved and authorized the execution of the proposed agreement for cooperation, and
has made a determination in writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will
promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and
security.”48 While the amendment articulated the promotion of global common defense,
Smith expressed concern that within this common defense was an implied defense of the
United States; therefore, the Soviet Union could view this as “an added instrument of
American world dominance.”49
Furthermore, congressional discussions of the Atoms for Peace program revealed
the militant nature of Eisenhower’s so-called peace objectives. During a discussion of
the Atoms for Peace Program, Representative John Bricker (R-OH) noted that there were
many advantages to basing the program around bilateral agreements instead of entirely
through the UN. Bricker claimed, “we avoid Soviet obstruction by dealing with other
nations individually. Even a veto-proof international atomic energy agency could be tied
up in knots by Soviet propaganda.”50 On the surface, Bricker’s comments appeared to
harbor the same Cold War concern over Soviet meddling that any discussion of national
security revitalized. Bricker was not talking about national security, but a plan for
peaceful uses of atomic energy, which should have harbored no negative repercussions
by the Soviets. In actuality, however, the Atoms for Peace Program could not be, despite
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Eisenhower’s rhetoric, solely based on peaceful motives. The world had fundamentally
changed by the 1950s, and in his role as a soldier of peace, Eisenhower sought to
epitomize this shift. Repeatedly, within the Eisenhower administration and in Congress,
the focus was on atomic energy in the service of warfare and defense, with peaceful use a
mere addendum. Though Eisenhower would make peace the overwhelming objective in
his public sentiments, the underlying purpose was much closer to defense objectives such
as his plan for massive retaliation.
To Eisenhower, peace served as a shield against anti-war and anti-defense
arguments that focused on the possibility of nuclear annihilation in the next large-scale
war. In the global context of the 1950s, these peace proclamations would serve as little
defense in a real life nuclear scenario, however. As a result, the Eisenhower
administration advocated a radical theory of massive retaliation, which preached the
extensive use of nuclear warheads in response to any attack but had the end effect of
maintaining the liminal zone between peace and war.51 This plan was first sanctioned in
National Security Council memorandum 162/2 of October 30, 1953, which claimed that
“In the face of the Soviet threat, the security of the United States requires…A strong
military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage
by offensive striking power[.]”52 Massive retaliation fit within the concept of
51
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“brinkmanship” that promoted bringing two parties to the brink of war, at which time,
under the threat of massive nuclear retaliation, the threat would subside, retaining
peace.53 Although NSC 162/2 expressed concern that the Soviet’s use of “the fear of
atomic warfare and the hope of peace” would divide the free world, this was exactly the
tactic that the Eisenhower administration sought to use against communism.54 The
obscenity of using war to promote peace tainted Eisenhower’s foreign policy objectives
during the 1950s, but prospectively, promoted the extension of continuous warfare and
maintenance of an exterior of peace.55
As further evidence of the hypocritical nature of the Eisenhower administration
with reference to atomic peace plans, Eisenhower continued to test and increase new
forms of nuclear weaponry as part of the US military arsenal. In a statement by Strauss
on March 31, 1954, he noted, “one important result of the hydrogen bomb developments
has been the enhancement of our military capability to the point where we should soon be
more free to increase our emphasis on the peaceful uses of atomic power—at home and
abroad.”56 As Strauss indicated, Eisenhower’s main objective remained military strength,
despite his continuing message of peace. Likewise, Strauss’ comment that the
administration could now increase its emphasis on peaceful uses suggested that peace
was a secondary objective at best. An April 1954 telegram sent from Djakarta to
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Eisenhower further supported this conclusion. The message, sent by the Sentral
Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI), a large Indonesian trade union,
emphasized that the Indonesian people felt threatened by recent US hydrogen bomb
explosions in the Pacific. The telegram emphasized that these tests were not “serving
[the] cause of peace” but instead emphasizing “American war designs” and threatening
the lives of Asiatic peoples.57
The inability of the Eisenhower administration to separate atomic weapons of war
from atomic energy for peace was a lingering issue with the Atoms for Peace program,
but also a meaningful historical detail. Eisenhower was unable to separate these two
issues because, in actuality, they were inseparable in the global atmosphere of the Cold
War. The administration even wanted to claim that weapons testing contributed to
peacetime uses of atomic energy in 1955. Faced with the creation and release of a film
titled, “Atomic Tests in Nevada,” Morse Salisbury, the director of the Division of
Information Services of the US Atomic Energy Commission, wrote to C. Herschel
Schooley, director of the Office of Public Information in the Department of Defense, that
“contributions if any by weapons tests to peacetime development were incidental, and
could not be planned for.”58 Salisbury told Schooley that he should disregard inclusion
of this subject in the movie specifically, yet include a brief narration and Eisenhower’s
UN speech on Atoms for Peace at the end of the movie. Salisbury noted the narration
text, “’The towering cloud of the atomic age is a symbol of strength, of defense, of
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security for freedom-loving people everywhere—people who want peace.’”59 In
Salisbury’s narration, peace and war once again became fuzzy as the mushroom cloud of
atomic war was tied to people desiring peace.
A 1950s pamphlet on the “Pathway to Peace” further muddled the already
ambiguous nature of Eisenhower’s declaration for peace. Though designed for general
distribution amongst the public, specifically at Atoms for Peace exhibits and conferences,
“Pathway to Peace” took a decidedly militaristic spin on supposedly peaceful uses of the
atom. Subtitled, “United States Proposals for the Control and Reduction of Arms,” the
pamphlet declared, “As never before, and especially in the nuclear age, there is no
alternative to peace.”60 Likewise, “if a worthwhile peace is to be gained, it must be not
merely the absence of a condition of war—it must be a positive, safeguarded peace, one
with justice and durability,” noted the introduction.61 Obtaining peace was not an option,
according to the pamphlet, but a necessity. In this regard, the government promoted
peace as a long-term condition and nothing just short of actual war, but a more traditional
notion of peace. However, the path advocated for the creation of such a peace in the
pamphlet was full of implied military necessity as well.
Foremost, “Pathway to Peace” called for a lessened world nuclear threat, a
reduction in non-nuclear armaments, and a counter to the possibility of a surprise attack.
All of these concepts, though touted as a deterrence to war and harbinger of peace, were
further explained in fuzzy detail that illustrated less peaceful prerogatives. As an
59

Salisbury to Schooley, March 10, 1955.

60

Disarmament Staff, “Pathway to Peace: United States Proposals for the Control and Reduction
of Arms,” undated, Box 581, File 1, WHCF: OF, EP, DDEL.
61

Disarmament Staff, “Pathway to Peace.”

347
example, the government explained stockpiles of fissionable materials as a considerable
threat to world peace, yet equally emphasized their usefulness for “peaceful purposes.”
Instead of seeking to eliminate stockpiles, the pamphlet emphasized conversion to
alternative uses. Additionally, the pamphlet prompted an international system of aerial
and ground inspection in order to deter surprise attacks. Eisenhower’s “Open Skies”
program essentially called for a system of spy planes, cloaked under the idea of a
peacetime inspection service.62 “The development of various means of photography now
permits round-the-clock surveillance through all weather, by day or by night, in spite of
camouflage,” noted the Pathway to Peace pamphlet.63 This qualifier went beyond the
more mundane concept of inspection and implied that there were more sinister intentions
under investigation. This confusion played itself out in real life during the 1960 U-2
incident, where Eisenhower embarrassingly explained why the Soviets were able to shoot
down a US spy plane.64 In the epic battle between the US and Soviet Union, peace
prerogatives were always tainted by Cold War objectives, maintaining the underlying
state of continuous warfare.
Finally, national security premises clouded any true notion of peace throughout
Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” and “Pathway to Peace” programs. “The American
people are determined to maintain and if necessary to increase U.S. armed strength for as
long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security,” noted
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Eisenhower at the Geneva Summit in 1955.65 Along with peaceful motivations for
disarmament and inspection, Eisenhower threatened to increase U.S. military strength as
well, all under the concept of peace. The “Pathway to Peace” pamphlet quoted this
Eisenhower speech:
During the early phases of a disarmament program, the United States would
continue to hold such strength, not for aggression, nor for narrow national
purposes, but as a contribution toward world stability in this transitional period.66
Though Eisenhower again appeared to promote peace, the underlying parameters of such
a peace included a more militaristic predisposition. The widely circulated “Pathway to
Peace” pamphlet reflected Eisenhower’s dualistic role as a soldier of peace and the
administration’s continuing deceptive use of peace as a deflector for ulterior motives in
the liminal zone between peace and war.
Congress and the New Look
With major programs and concepts such as Atoms for Peace underway,
Eisenhower quickly came to rely on Congress for funding requests and approval of yearly
budgets, so he created a structured approach to dealing with Congress. While the slim
Republican majority in both houses during the first two years of Eisenhower’s
administration worked in his favor, he also held a unique advantage in dealing with
Congress. Due to Eisenhower’s considerable lack of partisanship and overall moderate
views, he was largely able to woo both parties when necessary; therefore, Eisenhower
avoided the typical party roadblocks to most policy formation.
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Eisenhower also wanted a structured approach to dealing with Congress that
reflected his military organizational nature, which future presidents might easily repeat.
Unlike Roosevelt, who easily manipulated Congress into acquiescence, and Truman, who
focused on personal political relationships to make legislative deals, Eisenhower could do
neither. As a military man, Eisenhower lacked the personal political connections that
Truman held, and Eisenhower’s penchant for order and organization left him unable to
maneuver through the political spectrum of Congress, twisting people to his need like
Roosevelt. Instead, Eisenhower created a congressional liaison office within the White
House, which focused solely on dealing with Congress.67
The congressional liaison office was the first of its kind and remained a
permanent White House fixture into the future, illustrating the transferability of
Eisenhower’s structure. Eisenhower’s liaison officers primarily visited congressional
offices, made phone calls to legislators, lunched with members, and invited senators and
congressmen to various functions with the president. Likewise, liaison officers had easy
access to Eisenhower himself, which proved impressive when dealing with legislators
and their various agendas.68 Speaking about the congressional liaison office in an
interview in 1967, Eisenhower noted, “If you’re going to do anything, you’ve got to
make Congressmen your personal friends; that’s really what I tried to do.”69 Since
Eisenhower was a relatively new Republican, his relationships with party leaders on both
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sides of the aisle were built around his personality and friendship, while his connection
with regular members was left up to the liaison office.70
Though Eisenhower faced two considerable defense-related battles with Congress
during his presidency, over the Bricker Amendment in 1954 and the restructuring of the
Department of Defense in 1958, he enjoyed a relatively harmonious relationship with
Congress overall.71 This was largely due to the actions of the liaison office and
Eisenhower’s considerable use of the veto power.

It was also due to his efforts, though
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wildly popular, rating an average of sixty-five percent approval throughout his
presidency.72 According to a Gallup press release from 1953, pollsters determined that
Eisenhower was the only man in recent history “who could have been elected President
on EITHER ticket.”73 The public did not see Eisenhower as a Republican or a Democrat
and did not blame him for the pitfalls of his party either. A study by political scientist
Harvey Zeidenstein argued, “Eisenhower’s popularity was so personal, so uniquely
divorced from partisan and ideological politics, that Congress considered it irrelevant to
whether they supported his positions.”74 As a result, Eisenhower was able to cement
continuous warfare as a non-partisan issue by working extensively with both parties’
leadership, sometimes clashing with his own party’s conservative prerogatives.
The battle over the Bricker Amendment was just such an instance and stood as
solid evidence of Eisenhower’s party flexibility and willingness to work with any
members of Congress to meet his agenda. A desperate response to the Democratic
policies of Roosevelt and Truman, the Bricker Amendment illustrated a lingering fear of
foreign intervention and presidential power mostly associated with isolationist ideas.
Senator John Bricker (R-OH) proposed this constitutional amendment on January 7, 1953
in order to make all treaties and executive agreements with foreign nations and
international organizations enforceable only with corresponding legislation, as passed by
the US Congress. Conservative Midwestern Republicans such as Taft heavily backed the
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amendment, which would have the effect of greatly reducing the president’s treatymaking and foreign negotiation abilities. Though Republican, Eisenhower found himself
at odds with his own party over the amendment.75
As a military general, Eisenhower understood the immediacy that accompanied
modern, potentially nuclear, warfare and saw the Bricker Amendment as an antiquated
isolationist concept, dangerous to US defense. In a letter to Senator William Knowland
(R-CA) Eisenhower stated:
Adoption of the Bricker Amendment in its present form by the Senate would be
notice to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our country intends to
withdraw from its leadership in world affairs. The inevitable reaction would be of
major proportions. It would impair our hopes and plans for peace and for the
successful achievement of the important international matters now under
discussion. This would involve the diversion of atomic energy from warlike to
peaceful purposes.76
Though alerted that the Eisenhower administration would not support such an
amendment, conservative Republicans still continued to push for its passage. The
amendment ultimately fell short of the two-thirds majority needed by only one vote, but
illustrated one of Eisenhower’s many breaks with his own party and overall political
fluidity.77 The battle over the amendment also showed Eisenhower’s dedication to
executive power in foreign affairs despite his outward public disinterest in governing.
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It was largely due to Eisenhower’s almost nonpartisan political maneuverability
and popularity that he was able to push through budget proposals with little alteration,
concealing evidence of military expansion. Although Eisenhower pledged, in his first
State of the Union, a return to “economic health” that included a balanced budget and
reduced deficit, he also advocated maintaining an “adequate military power” by meeting
the “huge costs of our defense,” which greatly limited his ability to downsize a federal
budget heavily tilted in favor of the military. Under the parameters of peace, Eisenhower
should have been able to reduce all aspects of defense spending and still maintain a
satisfactory national military, but within the framework of continuous warfare, he sought
to manipulate the federal budget around a new type of defense need based on nuclear
weaponry. Eisenhower’s famous “New Look” defense plan emphasized strategic air
power and a nuclear arsenal that promised a greater military impact at a lower cost.78
The Eisenhower administration laid out the New Look plan as early as October 1953,
though it would not entirely go into effect until the 1955 budget.79
The New Look, though premised on the Cold War between the US and the Soviet
Union, created an alarming permanence to continuous warfare that would expand beyond
Eisenhower’s presidency. As defined by NSC 162/2 of October 30, 1953, “it is necessary
that the United States…continue, for as long as necessary, a state of limited defense
mobilization.”80 This position between general peace and general war left Eisenhower
squarely within the fuzzy parameters of continuous warfare. A key factor in
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Eisenhower’s position was his desire to boost the US economy and civilian morale,
which relied upon a budget-friendly alternative to actual armed conflict that still provided
a necessary security front, as seen through the Cold War perspective. According to the
language of NSC 162/2, the type of peace that Eisenhower spoke of publicly was far from
the minds of the National Security Council. Though the details of massive retaliation and
continuous mobilization fell under the NSC’s discussion of “peacetime aims,” these
concepts did not aim to promote peace at home or globally as Eisenhower pledged to do
with his Atoms for Peace program. In further evidence of the ambiguity of the New
Look, peacetime aims focused on a situation just short of general war, whereas the
Eisenhower administration’s “war aims” detailed the complete destruction of the Soviet
regime in the event of an actual armed conflict.81
In an effort to put the New Look plan into function, Eisenhower sought the
approval of Congress and an appropriately downsized federal budget, though like
Truman, Eisenhower would serve these ends mainly by shifting money around instead of
making actual cuts. Defense cuts and stretches such as the placement of money on
atomic weapons and air power programs instead of traditional armaments began as early
as 1951, but left billions of dollars in the military production pipeline well into 1956.
With the military working from these excess funds, Eisenhower era defense cutbacks
were really much less dramatic than they appeared.82 In reality, Eisenhower filtered
many of his defense cuts to another area of the defense budget. As seen through the
funding of the Manhattan Project, the budgetary system throughout the thirties, forties,
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and fifties had a great deficiency in that it was difficult, if not impossible, to trace exactly
how departments spent allocated appropriations. In the estimated budget for 1954,
prepared by Truman, the largest expected increase was for the Department of Defense,
focused mainly on increases in the Air Force budget for a total of 17.5 billion dollars.
This amount was more than 2 billion dollars above the estimate for 1953. Funding for
the Navy likewise increased, though only slightly, and that of the Army decreased
considerably. Truman itemized each of these departments under the Department of
Defense in the 1954 budget. Truman explained the overall increase in budget spending
as part of his administration’s determination to build the armed forces to a “state of
readiness,” despite the ongoing war in Korea.83
The first budget prepared under the Eisenhower administration showed marked
differences from that of the Truman administration, though inherently followed the same
focus on defense spending that Truman had initiated. Most significantly, the proposed
1955 budget conglomerated the military branches together under the Department of
Defense, no longer itemizing the individual cost of each. As a result, the overall budget
showed a significant decrease in defense spending from an estimated 41.5 billion dollars
in 1954 to 37.5 billion dollars in 1955 for “military functions.”84 Eisenhower did not
mention individual costs for the separate branches in his initial budget, though they
would appear in the final version. However, discussions in the House of Representatives
reflected a concern over the reduction in military spending and curiosity about where
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these cuts would happen. Representative Errett Scrivner (R-KS) relayed information
from the Military Subcommittee on Appropriations hearings over the proposed budget.
According to Scrivner, Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL) showed much concern over
the defense cuts. Sikes argued:
I have been disturbed about the real meaning of the ‘new look’ in defense policy.
To me it means a weakening of our overall military strength at a time of
continuing danger from communism. I am quite seriously disturbed about the
proposed manpower reductions, particularly in the Army.85
The subcommittee further discussed that the cuts were made to non-military personnel
and that even with smaller overall numbers, a force armed with atomic weapons would be
considerable nonetheless. According to the Chief of Staff of the US Army General
Matthew Ridgeway, “we could beef up the firepower on a percentage basis of our
divisions 500 percent, or maybe 10,000 percent, by putting a few of these atomic
weapons in the division.”86 In cautious support of what appeared to be blatant military
cuts during the height of the Cold War, Ridgeway noted that the Army had worked to
help prepare the budget based on “economic and strategic decisions which have been
made at a higher level.”87 Ridgeway then articulated this higher level to mean the
Commander in Chief. Scrivner added that the president “has a reputation of being a
pretty good military man” in what appeared to be a bit of committee humor. “I wanted to
be sure we all understood, because it does make a difference,” Scrivner concluded.88 The
subcommittee conversation revealed that while the Army took a budget cut, nuclear
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weaponry was quickly making inroads to cover the manpower losses as a less expensive
alternative. Additionally, since these decisions came from Eisenhower, as a five star
military general, they carried heavier weight amongst the committee, despite some
concerns.
While military funding appeared to be decreasing, funding for atomic weapons
tests and construction was increasing alongside though budgeted separately from,
defense; this allowed Eisenhower to claim defense acts and peace prerogatives while
steadily funding a massive nuclear program. Truman crafted the Atomic Energy
Commission’s budget separately from the defense budget so it would not fall under his
budget ceiling during the 1940s. This policy broadened under Eisenhower’s New Look,
which produced and deployed thousands of nuclear weapons without connecting them to
the military. Those in government circles commonly believed nuclear weapons offered a
“bigger bang for a buck,” though they were far more expensive in reality and carried
much heavier political consequences for their bang.89 As a result, Eisenhower made
military increases under the unconnected budget for the Atomic Energy Commission,
giving the illusion of defense cuts while the government funded a massive nuclear
program. As reflected in the 1955 budget, the AEC’s budget increased by 225 million
dollars over the 1954 budget.90 Eisenhower also transferred funding for research
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programs from the Department of Defense to the National Science Foundation in 1955,
furthering the deception of defense cuts.91
Eisenhower filtered money away from traditional military and defense funds
while still pushing financial resources toward his defense goals. To the public there
appeared to be a dip in defense spending under Eisenhower’s administration, yet there
was actually an increase. Through Eisenhower’s careful construction of the budget and
movement of military expenditures into other budgetary areas, Eisenhower continued the
illusion of peace and security over a massive modern military buildup. This continued
blurring of peacetime and wartime labels would become more difficult after the issuance
of the 1957 report Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (Gaither Report), that
called for a dramatic increase in military spending, expanded civil defense plan,
integrated foreign and defense policies, and warned of a growing missile gap between the
US and USSR. The report was a direct response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the first
artificial satellite in space. There was little mention of peace in the report, but as part of
the panel’s suggestions for an integrated policy, they did recommend that nuclear
weapons be kept in US custody in peacetime, but placed under NATO command in
wartime.92 The difference between peace and war was now negligible and the panel left
the terms undefined. The panel argued, “If not integrated into our foreign policy, any
substantial program to reduce the vulnerability of the United States might be widely
interpreted as signaling a retreat to ‘Fortress America.’”93
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This fortress, backed by extensive nuclear and traditional military weapon
stockpiles by 1957, was essentially the house of peace in its final form. The Gaither
panel’s suggestion that America was a fortress relied upon their knowledge of military
and defense programs already underway or possible under a further increased budget.
Superficially, the Eisenhower administration continued to pledge fiscal responsibility and
peace. After the Gaither Report appeared, however, Eisenhower requested 1.27 billion
dollars in supplemental appropriations for defense to go toward missile construction and
research, and strategic air command.94
Despite Eisenhower’s best effort at keeping defense spending in check, he could
not wholly continue to preach peace and downsize under the heightened threat of Soviet
advancement seen in the Sputnik launch and perceived missile gap inherent in the Cold
War world. In Eisenhower’s message to the Congress on the 1959 budget, he stated,
“Expenditures in 1958 are now estimated to be $38.9 billion compared with the original
1958 estimate of $38 billion. Estimated expenditures for 1959 are $39.8 billion, an
increase of $0.9 billion over the current estimate for 1958, $1.3 billion higher than in
1957, and $4 billion more than in 1956.”95 By 1961, the estimated Department of
Defense budget was near 46 billion dollars.96 Even with Eisenhower’s initially crafty
maneuvering of funding toward defense, he was ultimately unable to avoid a noticeable
increase in defense spending during a time of proclaimed “peace.”
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Keeping the Peace
With defense budgets constantly on the rise amidst the Cold War, Eisenhower
continued to minimize direct use of American forces in favor of actions just short of
actual armed conflict that fell into the realm of continuous warfare. Though Eisenhower
advocated extreme and wide-reaching policies such as massive retaliation and the
Eisenhower Doctrine, in practice his administration took a much more conservative route
that was less likely to create an actual war. This stance allowed Eisenhower to appear
tough on communism, yet still preach peace. According to an assessment of Eisenhower
scholarship by historian Mary S. McAuliffe, “although Eisenhower's commitment to
peace was real, it was limited to the prevention of large-scale nuclear warfare. His
alternatives to war consisted of a broad range of activities, including counterinsurgency
and political warfare.”97 McAuliffe’s analysis only held true under a modern concept of
peace as continuous warfare—where keeping the peace simply meant a confusion of
peace and war for political advantage. In particular, Eisenhower was a firm advocate of
“unconventional warfare” utilizing the Truman-created Central Intelligence Agency’s
foreign information. These lessons in keeping the peace speckled the Eisenhower
presidency, most notably in Iran, Guatemala, Vietnam, and Lebanon.
Eisenhower’s extensive use of the Central Intelligence Agency for the first time in
American history in Iran in 1953 further ingrained the concept of continuous warfare.
The intelligence offered by the CIA afforded Eisenhower the leeway he needed to act
militarily without an obvious and public deployment of troops that would tarnish his role
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as peacekeeper. Though Truman created the CIA under the National Security Act,
Eisenhower was the first to utilize the agency for “peacetime” covert activity. In 1953,
CIA information was used in a US-backed coup d’état to remove Iranian Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadeq.98
Though British interest in Iranian politics had been ongoing for decades, US
interest only developed in 1950 amidst growing unrest and economic recession in Iran.
In close proximity to the Soviet Union, leaders in the US Government saw Iran as a
dangerous situation within the definition of Truman’s containment policy. According to
a secret CIA document from October 1947:
The ruling groups [in Iran] are united in their fear of Soviet ambitions, and with
the decline of British power in the Middle East, they are turning more and more to
the US and the UN for support, a policy which is consistent with the basic antiSoviet, anti-Communist, and pro-US attitude of the majority of the people.
However, the continued failure of the government to rectify critical internal
conditions is seriously jeopardizing Iranian stability.99
As a result, Truman installed a small Point Four aid program, pushed greater US financial
backing of business interests in Iran, and increased the CIA and embassy staff in the
country.100 Despite this considerable increase in US presence, Truman opted to work
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with the Mossadeq government to quell the ongoing controversy (mainly regarding
British oil interests) and keep Iran in the “Western camp.”101
The government’s plan for Iran shifted dramatically after the 1952 election
because military advisors believed Eisenhower would take stronger action than the
Truman administration had. Though Truman had primarily sought to keep Soviet
influence out of Iran and keep the flow of oil from the region open, Eisenhower upgraded
the significance of the situation in Iran in an effort to firmly establish western influence
and prevent a communist takeover. According to a CIA document from November 1952,
“The USSR appears to believe that the Iranian situation is developing favorably to its
objectives. …the USSR has the capability for greatly increasing its overt and covert
interference in Iran at any time, to the detriment of US security interests.”102 As early as
February 1953, top CIA officials decided on a coup to remove Mossadeq from power.
After some snags, the coup was successful as of August 1953, and the US-backed
Fazlollah Zahedi was installed as prime minister.103
Though scholars have sometimes interpreted the 1953 Iranian coup as a battle
over US oil interests or a simple Cold War struggle to prevent the expansion of
communism, the coup had larger implications when viewed through the perspective of
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continuous warfare.104 The Truman administration had the chance to back a British
invasion of Iran, which would have likely resulted in an actual war for western
domination, but Truman chose to avoid US involvement in armed conflict.105
Eisenhower, newly sworn in as president, also chose to avoid a physical confrontation,
instead opting to safeguard US interests through covert activities. Though the situation in
Iran would continue to cause problems for the US until the present day, leaders in the
government did not consider war an option until the early 1990s due to the preoccupation
with the larger problem of the Soviet Union. Though easily pigeonholed into the
containment policy or oil interests, Iran provided a testing ground for large-scale
unconventional warfare that would become a mainstay in the US avoidance of armed
conflict. As a result, US peace plans could continue unabated, while the US subsequently
removed hostile regimes without war.
Likewise, the methods utilized by the CIA in Iran transferred to a similar situation
in Guatemala in 1954. In part, members of the Eisenhower administration worried that
Guatemala would become a base for Soviet expansion in the Western Hemisphere. This
concern was largely due to a land redistribution program initiated by popular Guatemalan
President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1952. Though Arbenz claimed he sought a modern,
economically independent, capitalist state, his land redistribution program focused on
government seizure of uncultivated land for redistribution to individual farmers. The

104

For an “oil interests” perspective, see Burton I. Kaufman, “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel
Case and the Cold War,” The Business History Review 51 (Spring 1977): 41-47; Mary Ann Heiss, “The
United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953-1954,” The International
History Review 16 (August 1994): 511-535; For a Cold War perspective see: Blanche Wiesen Cook, The
Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City, NY: 1981); Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies:
Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY: 1981).
105

Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup,” 275, 266.

364
Guatemalan government then compensated landowners for this taking at three dollars per
acre in guaranteed twenty-five year bonds. While the program equally affected those
with or without wealth across the board, including Arbenz himself, who had 1,700 acres
taken, it also impacted American business interests.106
Although the Eisenhower administration would define the Arbenz government as
an agent of international communism, the feud largely took place over the interests of the
American-owned United Fruit Company. United Fruit was the largest landowner in
Guatemala and had maintained a presence since the late 1800s. However, the company’s
land holdings included roughly eighty-five percent uncultivated land, which the Arbenz
government confiscated. The Eisenhower administration subsequently requested that
Arbenz denounce his communist allies and those in his government who followed
communist teachings, and return the land to United Fruit. According to a sanitized CIA
memorandum from February of 1954, Mrs. Arbenz’s secretary noted that Arbenz “would
not accept assistance from any group which proposed to remove Communists as he
considered them the only honest and devoted civil servants in Guatemala.”107 The CIA
saw this as evidence that Arbenz was firmly within the communist camp.
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Unsurprisingly, Arbenz refused to oust communists from government, so the United
States cut off relations with Guatemala.108
Following the same design as in Iran, the Eisenhower administration began
fomenting a plan to destabilize the Guatemalan government and remove Arbenz from
office, utilizing unconventional warfare. The CIA attempted to turn the Guatemalan
military against Arbenz and on June 18, 1954, sent in a 200-man army trained by the CIA
and led by exiled Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. This small force, combined
with clever CIA radio broadcasts served to convince the Guatemalans that there was a
large military presence and that fighting was widespread. On June 27, Arbenz turned
over control of the government to Armas.109
Once again, the Eisenhower administration saw both business interests and Cold
War anxiety as the justification for the removal of Arbenz, but as in Iran, continuous
warfare allowed the Eisenhower administration to manipulate both motives while still
maintaining its desired political façade. With only circumstantial evidence of communist
influence in Guatemala, Eisenhower and the CIA pushed for removal of a popularly
elected government.110 Though the threat of the spread of communism was a real
component of US foreign policy during the Cold War, the methods behind dealing with
this perceived threat would have overall greater impact than the Cold War itself.
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Avoidance of armed conflict, or even the appearance of involvement, in global conflicts
allowed the US to continue its outward message of peace while the CIA pushed covert
military action in places like Iran and Guatemala. This combination of words and actions
again blurred the definitions of peace and war.
While covert activities were still happening in Guatemala, Eisenhower was
publically attempting to deal with the growing unrest in Indochina. Beginning after
World War II, Vietnam attempted to declare its independence from France under the
communistic leader Ho Chi Minh. The loss of colonial holdings was common to
European imperial powers in the post-WWII era, but the proximity of Vietnam to both
the Soviet Union and China along with Ho’s penchant for communism posed a larger
threat within the parameters of the Cold War. After failed negotiations, relations between
France and Vietnam completely disintegrated by 1946, leading to the First Indochina War
between Ho’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the French. The US pledged
economic aid to the French in the struggle by 1950, but with US involvement in Korea,
Vietnam continued to remain inconsequential to US foreign policy interests.111
Faced with continuing French defeat, Eisenhower sought to involve the US in the
war in Vietnam more greatly, arguing that if one country in this region fell to
communism, those around it would easily fall as well. On April 7, 1954, Eisenhower
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articulated this idea at a press conference when posed with the question of the strategic
importance of Vietnam to the “free world.” Eisenhower explained both the specific
(production and political reasons) and general strategic importance of Vietnam.112
Generally, Eisenhower noted:
[Y]ou have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the
"falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over
the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go
over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would
have the most profound influences.113
The media quickly dubbed the falling domino principle the “domino theory,” which
would continue as the primary policy for US involvement in Vietnam throughout the
fifties, sixties, and seventies.
Although the domino theory itself, under the heightened tension of the Cold War
and larger containment policy, almost guaranteed US involvement in Vietnam,
Eisenhower continued to expound a commitment to peace and retain his role as a soldier
of peace. In the same press conference where he initially defined the domino theory,
Eisenhower added, “the hope is always that it is peaceful conciliation and
accommodation of these problems” when asked about his plans to get the UN involved in
the situation.114 Having won his campaign on the premise of ending the Korean War and
maintaining peace, Eisenhower was leery of openly involving the US in a military action
that could challenge his soldier of peace role. After talking with the president about
united action between the US, England, and France concerning Vietnam, Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles released a statement to the press. On April 10, 1954 Dulles
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claimed, “Our purpose is…to create the unity of free wills needed to assure a peaceful
settlement which will in fact preserve the vital interests of us all.”115 Shortly after this
statement, Dulles attended a meeting in London where it was agreed that the US and
England would take part, along with other nations involved, in a collective defense action
through the UN.116 In a joint statement issued by Dulles and British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden, the two stated, “We recognize that our basic objective at the Geneva
Conference will be to seek the re-establishment of a peace in Indochina.”117 Dulles
helped retain Eisenhower’s exterior of peace through these statements, but as the French
situation in Vietnam grew more desperate, US involvement tipped precariously toward
armed conflict.
While signs of further US concern over the status of Vietnam surfaced during the
latter part of April and May, Eisenhower sought a more subdued route to quelling the
communist threat in Vietnam than US involvement in the war. The first public
suggestion that there was more than a simple dedication to peace underlying the
Eisenhower administration’s plans for Vietnam appeared in a comment by Vice President
Richard Nixon. On April 16, before the press, Nixon made the comment:
If in order to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and particularly in IndoChina, if in order to avoid it we must take the risk by putting American boys in, I
believe that the executive branch of the government has to take the politically
unpopular position of facing up to it and doing it...118
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Nixon’s comment, though quickly explained away by the State Department, and nullified
altogether by Dulles, hinted at a parallel administration discussion of deeper US
involvement.119 Historian Frederick W. Marks III argued that Dulles was the one seeking
to keep Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for sending ground troops to Vietnam in check, despite
Eisenhower’s open proclamations to retain peace.
Although Marks overdramatized Eisenhower’s desire for US involvement in
Vietnam, Eisenhower was a soldier of peace with a realistic willingness to fight in order
to avoid nuclear war and achieve the larger objective of containment. Operation Vulture,
a secret US plan (1954) to rescue French forces at Dien Bien Phu using American
bombers and small tactical nuclear weapons, may have been where Nixon’s statement for
more US involvement originated. This plan would have avoided a traditional armed
conflict through modern tactics and weaponry while subsequently showing US strength
in the Cold War. By avoiding large scale US involvement, Eisenhower could maintain
the reality of continuous warfare while still leaving Americans secure in the house of
peace. Despite the use of reconnaissance flights and a distinct naval presence in the Gulf
of Tonkin during negotiations, Eisenhower never put Operation Vulture into effect.
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Instead, the Geneva Accords of 1954 continued to stave off US involvement in Vietnam
until the 1960s, and Eisenhower maintained his public peace platform.120
Finally, in 1958 Eisenhower had the first real opportunity to diverge from his
public path toward peace and test the Eisenhower Doctrine, in Lebanon. Lebanese
President Camille Chamoun, a Christian who had practiced pro-US foreign policy, sought
to extend his term in office by amending the Lebanese constitution in 1958. Under this
circumstance, Lebanese Muslims who supported Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s demand for Pan-Arab nationalism called for Chamoun’s removal. In May of
1958, amidst violence in Lebanon, the US supplied Chamoun with weapons to put down
anti-government riots. Later, Eisenhower provided troops to Lebanon in support of
Chamoun.121
Faced by a coup d’état in nearby Iraq, Eisenhower decided in mid-July 1958 that
it was time to act in Lebanon. Though concerned about the fall of the region to
communist influences, Eisenhower also knew that propping up an unpopular government
might hurt the integrity of the United States amongst other developing countries. On July
15, 1958, however, Operation Blue Bat filtered 14,000 US Marines into Beirut, Lebanon
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without conflict.122 In a message to Congress, Eisenhower noted his reasons for sending
in American troops:
Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American
people, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I
believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of
Lebanon's grave peril.123
In line with his peacekeeping agenda, Eisenhower also wanted to make clear that US
involvement in Lebanon was, in no way, to be confused with a US entrance into war. In
an official statement, Eisenhower claimed:
In response to this appeal from the government of Lebanon, the United States has
dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American
lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in
defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as
any act of war.124
Despite these venerable reasons, Eisenhower immediately sought the quickest way for the
US to disentangle itself from Lebanon. After Lebanon held elections in September and
the new government led by former general Fuad Chehab safely took power, American
troops returned home, unharmed.125
The rebels had supported the newly elected president of Lebanon, yet the US
sought to recognize this government in an effort to retain stability in the region.
Lebanese President Fuad Chehab accepted the new government of Iraq and stated his
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lack of opposition to Arab nationalism. Despite concerns by the Eisenhower
administration, the US likewise recognized the new government of Iraq. Chehab soon
requested US troops withdraw from Lebanon and they did, quietly. These actions by the
US, though they served their purpose under the Eisenhower Doctrine, set up a strange
relationship between the US and Middle East that would last well into the future. Though
initially concerned about the “independence and integrity of Lebanon,” which meant
communism’s potential influence over the people of the region, Eisenhower’s
administration would lose prestige in the region when faced by opposition from the very
people it sought to help. Supposed US peace efforts in the Middle East would swiftly
disintegrate into actions in favor of US oil interests, and little else, during future
administrations.126
Despite the fact that US troops only occupied Lebanon from July through October
of 1958, the action showed the incredible power of Eisenhower and forecast the future
power for presidents under continuous warfare. As Commander in Chief, the president
wielded American troops as a weapon to support policy prerogatives abroad, no longer
hindered by Congress. Though the Eisenhower Doctrine proved successful in Lebanon,
the situation illustrated the modern version of peace at gunpoint that became standard in
the fuzziness of continuous warfare.
Overall, Iran, Guatemala, Vietnam, and Lebanon provided points that emphasized
Eisenhower’s full embrace of continuous warfare and the structures set up under the
Truman administration, mainly the CIA and congressional deference to the Commander
in Chief, which would continue to perpetuate the fuzzy nature of peace and war. These
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formidable events stood out only slightly amongst a decade of turbulence cloaked in
peace. Eisenhower dealt with political crises in the Suez, Taiwan, Berlin, and Paris,
deftly avoiding conflict in all circumstances.127 Although Eisenhower would leave many
of these critical situations for his successors to deal with, his administration illustrated
that Truman’s house of peace, a permanent, liminal zone between peace and war, was
thoroughly in operation by 1960.
Conclusion: Move in Day
On January 17, 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower bid the nation farewell in a televised
address. “A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms
must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to
risk his own destruction,” Eisenhower stated in a final combination of his public peace
platform and covert military buildup.128 Eisenhower then went on to detail the growth of
the military industrial complex during his presidency and to warn of its immense power.
Eisenhower noted, “The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and
will persist.” Oft noted as the most famous portion of any Eisenhower speech, this
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“warning” yielded future fodder for opponents of military expansion. However, it was
also a warning against the increased executive power apparent in a nation continuously at
“war,” which relied upon a perpetual military buildup under the control of the
Commander in Chief. With virtually all viable checks on the president’s war power
removed, there was great potential to abuse this increased power through thinly veiled
arguments regarding national security, war, or in the interest of peace. While the political
malleability of continuous warfare allowed for greater military control by the
Commander in Chief and instantaneous response in the rapid world of nuclear warfare, it
also opened the door to the imperial presidency.
Though Truman may not have intended his governmental and national security
framework to provide for an imperial presidency, Eisenhower, through his own extensive
use of these structures, saw the potential for abuse amidst the haziness of continuous war.
“We must face the fact that the house of peace must be built on the rock of power,”
Truman had proclaimed early in his presidency, and by 1960, both peace and power were
firmly in place.129 In the end, continuous warfare provided a “twilight period” between
traditional peace and war where the horrors of war subsided but the associated executive
and governmental powers did not, leading toward greater political malleability and
potential for abuse. While the Cold War publicly overshadowed continuous warfare until
the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, this covert war continued until the present
day and underlined all US foreign policy prerogatives.
Truman, Eisenhower, and other presidents concealed this continuous war by
building around it a house of peace. “We [Americans] are a moral people. Peace is our
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goal, with justice and freedom. We cannot, of our own free will, violate the very
principles that we are striving to defend. The whole purpose of what we are doing is to
prevent world war III. Starting a war is no way to make peace,” stated Truman in his last
message to the American people as president.130 Truman’s final message diverged from
his earlier rhetoric that confusingly sought to combine peace and war, but called into
question his definition of each. The outward appearance of peace, promulgated through
Truman’s fuzzy language, Eisenhower’s covert activities, and federal subservience to the
executive throughout the 1940s and 1950s, helped Americans, unknowingly, embrace the
modern idea of warfare. Therefore, while starting a war was not a way to make peace,
continuous warfare’s existence certainly did not preclude “peace.”
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EPILOGUE

THE MODERN HOUSE OF PEACE

September 11, 2001 brought the imperial presidency to the surface of American
politics once again. Faced with a full-blown, global conflict against terrorist enemies
everywhere, President George W. Bush fully utilized his expanded powers as
Commander in Chief, in some instances arguably stepping beyond the limits of the
Constitution.1 In the absence of the Cold War, continuous warfare persisted into the
twenty-first century, bringing with it expanded executive power and the potential of an
imperial president.
Through an interdisciplinary approach to studying executive power, Building a
House of Peace revealed the entirely new concept of continuous warfare, which allows
scholars to examine modern presidential power beyond the parameters of the Cold War
relied upon by previous historians, including the recent presidency of George W. Bush.
The truly interdisciplinary nature of executive power scholarship like this work takes
such studies’ usefulness beyond one particular field. By focusing on Congress and the
Supreme Court and utilizing political science and legal scholarship, Building a House of
Peace demonstrated the necessity of advanced and expanded perspectives offered by a
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combination of the aforementioned fields with history, yielding an entirely new
perspective to presidential studies.
Though no President since Richard Nixon had abused the power of the presidency
at the same imperial level, Bush perhaps came closest when viewed from this new
perspective. On September 20, 2001, in a message to Congress Bush stated, “Tonight we
are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to
anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice
to our enemies, justice will be done.”2 With an undefinable enemy, seemingly found
everywhere, the situation forced Bush to rely upon his own skills as President, the power
granted to the executive through the acquiescence of Congress and the Court, and his
increased powers as Commander in Chief under continuous warfare. In an effort to
maintain the American house of peace, Bush sought revenge against the perpetrators of
the September 11 attacks using the structure set up by Truman more than fifty years
before.
The modern house of peace, the one under Bush’s care from 2001 until 2009, was
creaky, drafty, and in desperate need of renovation, yet continued to stand firm just as
Truman had built it. Bush responded to 9/11 with a call to arms that sent American
soldiers to Afghanistan and eventually Iraq. According to the President, “Our war on
terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” Following this initial
proclamation, the government articulated a new program of foreign policy, the Bush
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Doctrine, which called for preemptive strikes against potential enemies.3 Though
ambitious and controversial, the Bush Doctrine sought to confine conflict abroad and
maintain the house of peace at home. When warfare, congressional apathy, and Court
support coalesce, executive power has the ability to go completely unchecked to the point
of an imperial presidency, even in the current era.
On September 18, 2001, Congress aided Bush with the passage of a joint
resolution authorizing use of military force against terrorists (not a formal declaration of
war) and several terrorism prevention measures. First, in an effort of bipartisanship,
legislators scrambled to pass the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act). This law allowed the government to designate certain groups as
terroristic, use covertly obtained information against terrorists in legal cases, and make
support of terrorist organizations a criminal activity. Likewise, the PATRIOT Act
strengthened US security and American borders while expanding limits on warranted
searches. Though originally controversial, the act passed in October of 2001.4
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Congress initially gave up its power during continuous warfare because of the
changing nature of war and its insecurity regarding new methods of war, but also because
of benefits that occurred by lax use of congressional power. Congress used the
opportunity provided by the War on Terror to pass several security measures that retained
the American illusion of peace and safety, and offered distinct legislative benefits. These
measures included the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTP), which
modified Truman’s original National Security Act by restructuring the intelligence
community. DHS combined more than twenty federal agencies and organizations into
one department that carried a 30 billion dollar budget in its first year of operation. DHS
contracts provided a windfall to businesses nationwide that provided security-related
services and products, pushing legislators to fast track security issues, such as IRTP, for
district and state economic incentives that confirmed their reelection.5
Americans, shocked by September 11, supported Bush and expansive legislative
measures under the idea that this was simply daily life in the modern house of peace.
Though saturated by global conflict, the house of peace stood strong as the government
promised Americans their safety and continued peace at home. A National Terrorist
Advisory System (terror alert level), heightened airport security, and no-fly lists issued by
the government assured Americans of this security. 6

5

Ellison, “US Legislative Initiatives,” 483; “Security Against Homeland Pork,” New York Times,
July 8, 2003. See also: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458,
108th Cong., 2d sess. (December 17, 2004).
6

Department of Homeland Security, “National Terrorism Advisory System,” accessed February 7,
2013, http://www.dhs.gov/national-terrorism-advisory-system.
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The outward appearance of peace, promulgated through covert activities, fuzzy
language, and federal subservience to the executive throughout the forties and fifties had
led Americans to embrace the idea of warfare under an illusion of peace; the government
upheld this house of peace until the present through a manipulation of power provided by
continuous warfare. It was this liminal zone between traditional war and traditional
peace that allowed political actors to employ warfare for their own purposes and granted
extended executive power to the President as a result. This left Americans to believe
peace embodied their nation, even as American military forces participated in acts of war
openly or covertly. As Eisenhower had illustrated in the 1950s, peace and war were
patently synonymous in the era of continuous warfare and traditional concepts of each
were thoroughly shattered by the mid-twentieth century. Using the framework set up by
Truman, solidified by Eisenhower, and implemented by every other President, Bush had
confirmed the structural soundness of the house of peace in the twenty-first century and
demonstrated how it might shelter an imperial presidency even today.
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Figure 2.1. Atomic Energy Political Cartoon, 1946. Source: The Call (New York), March 11, 1946, box 45, file 4, Harold L.
Ickes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

382

Figure 2.2. Mutual Defense Assistance Program General Organization from House report on the M.D.A.A. of 1949. Source:
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Report prepared by John Kee.
81st Cong., 1st sess., 15 August 1949. House report 1265, 33.

383

Figure 3.2. International Relations in War Materials or Processes. Reproduced from Senate Special Committee on the
Investigation of the Munitions Industry, Munitions Industry (Nye Report Part 8), 74th Cong., 2d sess., 1936, S. Rep. 844,
289.
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Figure 3.3. Chart Illustrating the Administration’s Plan for a Merger. Reproduced from Sidney Shalett, “Only Defense Head
Will Be In Cabinet in Army-Navy Plan,”New York Times, January 18, 1947.
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Fig. 3.4. Flyer issued by Robert Taft in 1950. Source: “The Veteran and the Welfare
State,” box 1, file 57, Robert Taft Papers, US-95-05, Archives and Rare Books Library,
The University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
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Fig. 3.5. Pro-Joseph Ferguson cartoon. The caption reads, “Take a good look at this—
and vote for Joe Ferguson on November 7!” Source: “Doughboys,” box 1, file 22,
Robert Taft Papers, US-95-05, Archives and Rare Books Library, The University of
Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.
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Fig. 4.1. Truman and Steel, May 11, 1952, Washington Star. Source: Truman and Steel,
box 4, file 3; Enarson Papers, HSTL.
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Fig 4.2. “Iron-fisted Breach” cartoon, April 23, 1952, Knickerbocker News.
Photographs Division, LOC, accessed November 1, 2012,
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/acd1996002234/PP/.

Source: Prints and

Fig. 4.3. Harry Truman’s job approval ratings trend ~1945-1953. Source: Gallup Inc. “Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup
Historical Statistics and Trends.” Gallup Inc. http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-GallupHistorical-Statistics-Trends.aspx (accessed January 1, 2010).
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Table 3.1. Partisan breakdown of roll call votes on the Neutrality Act of 1939
Party
Republican
Democrat

House
172

Senate
24

243

55

Source: Data from: “House Vote #93 (Nov. 3, 1939),” Govtrack.us, accessed October
24, 2011, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h76_2-93; “Senate Vote #113
(Nov. 3, 1939),” Govtrack.us, accessed October 24, 2011,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s76_2-113.
Table 3.2. Breakdown of partisan gains and losses in Congress, 1942-1945

Year
1942
1944
1945
Total
Overall
Gain or
Loss

Dem.
66
57 (-9)
57 (=)

-9

Senate
Rep.
28
38 (+10)
38 (=)

Other
1
1 (=)
1 (=)

Dem.
267
222 (-45)
243 (+21)

House
Rep.
162
209 (+47)
190 (-19)

Other
6
4 (-2)
2 (-2)

+10

0

-24

+28

-4

Source: Data from: L. David Roper, “Composition of Congress Since 1867,” personal
website, accessed November 2, 2011,
http://arts.bev.net/roperldavid/politics/congress.htm.
Note: Dr. Roper is professor emeritus of physics at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University who writes on scientific connections to politics amongst other topics.
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Table 3.3. Breakdown of Partisan Gains and Losses during Congressional Terms,
1945-1951

Year
1945-1947
1947-1949
1949-1951
Total
Overall
Gain or
Loss

Dem.
57
45 (-12)
54 (+9)

Senate
Rep.
38
51 (+13)
42 (-9)

Other
1
0 (-1)
0 (=)

Dem.
243
188 (-55)
263 (+ 75)

House
Rep.
190
246 (+56)
171 (-75)

Other
2
1 (-1)
1 (=)

-3

+4

-1

+20

-19

-1

Source: Data from L. David Roper, “Composition of Congress Since 1867,” personal
website, accessed November 2, 2011,
http://arts.bev.net/roperldavid/politics/congress.htm.
Table 4.1. 1944 Supreme Court Ideal Points Arranged from Conservative to Liberal
Martin-Quinn Uni-Dimensional Scores for 1944
Supreme Court
Year

Justice

1944 Roberts
1944 Stone
1944 Frankfurter

Ideal Point
2.75
0.5
0.25

1944 Jackson

0.125

1944 Reed

-0.25

1944 Rutledge

-1.4

1944 Murphy

-1.5

1944 Douglas

-2

1944 Black

-2.5

Source: Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. “Patterns of Supreme Court DecisionMaking, 1937-2000.” http://www.csss.washington.edu/Papers/wp26.pdf (accessed March 1,
2012).
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Table 4.2. Michael Bailey’s ideal point scores for the 1952 Supreme Court and
President arranged in order from most liberal to most conservative.
Bailey Scores for 1952 Supreme Court and President
Year
Institution
Name
Ideal Point
1952 Supreme Court
Black
-1.77
1952 President
Truman
-1.68
1952 Supreme Court
Douglas
-1.31
1952 Supreme Court
Frankfurter
-0.86
1952 Supreme Court
Jackson
0.29
1952 Supreme Court
Clark
0.34
1952 Supreme Court
Burton
0.42
1952 Supreme Court
Vinson
0.65
1952 Supreme Court
Minton
0.74
1952 Supreme Court
Reed
0.8

Source: Michael Bailey. “Ideal Point Data from Chapter 2 of Bailey & Maltzman (2009)”
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/baileyma/Data_BookIdealPoints_Oct2009.htm
(accessed January 6, 2010).
Table 4.3. Martin-Quinn ideal point scores for the 1952 Supreme Court arranged in
order from most Liberal to most conservative.
Martin-Quinn Scores for 1952 Supreme Court
Year
Justice
Ideal Point
1952 Douglas
-2.371
1952 Black
-1.237
1952 Frankfurter
0.054
1952 Jackson
0.962
1952 Clark
1.124
1952 Minton
1.199
1952 Burton
1.23
1952 Reed
1.296
1952 Vinson
1.358

Source: Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. “Martin-Quinn Scores.”
http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (accessed January 6, 2010).
Note: The “Ideal Point” column represents Martin and Quinn’s suggested usage of their
posterior mean (post_mn) score.
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